

Guide to Chapter Six of Gareth Evans' *The Varieties of Reference*

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6.0 What Happens in Chapter Six

The main topic of this chapter is Evans' account of demonstrative thought, though he produces an account of here-thoughts along the way. Here is a summary. First Evans gives a theory of egocentric space, the space in which the objects of our perception and action are located. This space includes locations that could be thought about as *here*, *there*, and so forth for many many locations (but our experience of egocentric space is much more rich and fine grained than what can be captured linguistically). The account of egocentric spatial experience is that it is underwritten by a rich set of interconnections between perception and action. To see something as being *to the left* is to be disposed, upon getting information about the object, to act in various ways towards it, such as turning to the left to foveate it. A special location in egocentric space is *here*. Evans gives an account of our "here"-Idea as an Idea of a location whose controlling conception is fed by information links dedicated to providing information about one's surroundings. For example, when I open my eyes and see blackness, this

information is fed into the controlling conception in such a way that I judge *it is dark here*.

When you perceive an object, the ILs with that object not only provide information about it, but they also often allow you to locate that object in egocentric space. You can see, or feel, where it is. But location in egocentric space is not enough for discriminating knowledge. The fundamental ground of difference of material objects is location *in objective space*. If a subject has a cognitive map – a representation of objective space – that can be brought into coordination with egocentric space, then locating an object in egocentric space will also locate it in objective space. And the subject will then have a fundamental Idea of the object. Evans allows that in certain cases, the subject may not be able to place the object at a determinate location in egocentric space, and also might be lost and hence unable to coordinate objective and egocentric space. But so long as the IL allows the subject to discover the object's location, and so long as the subject *has the ability* to coordinate egocentric and objective space, the Idea will be *adequate* (if not fundamental).

Evans then discusses the fact that his view explains why demonstrative thoughts and “here”-thoughts are *immune to error through misidentification*. Many thoughts are such that I can question them in the following way: I go to the parking lot and see a dented car and say “My car has been dented.” But it makes sense for me to ask “Some car is dented, but is it my car that is dented?” because I realize I may have misidentified that car as my car. But demonstratives and “here”-thoughts are immune to this sort of error (provisos are discussed in the chapter): when I open my eyes and see darkness, it would be anomalous to wonder, on the basis of the apparent darkness “*Somewhere* it is dark, but is it *here* that it is dark?”; and if I am

watching a log burn and think “that log is burning”, it would be anomalous to wonder “*Something* is burning, but is it *that log* that is burning?”

The explanation is that “that”-Ideas and “here”-Ideas are functionally tied to information links such that when predicative information comes in through the link it is automatically placed in the CC of that Idea — there is no intermediary identifications. To feel *hotness* just is to feel as though it is hot *here*. It is not to feel that *it is hot somewhere*, in such a way as to require one to marshal resources to infer that that somewhere is *here*.

6.1 Demonstrative identification and perception

This chapter is concerned with the thoughts that underlie the linguistic semantic category of demonstratives.¹ Chapter 9 will apply the lessons of this chapter to demonstratives as a linguistic category. In this preliminary section, Evans explores briefly the connection between demonstrative identification (in thought) and perception, since to a first approximation it seems that in order to understand a sentence using a demonstrative one must be able to perceive the referent. First, Evans points out a couple of ways in which the notion of perception is vague: do we perceive the stars, when the light we see has been traveling for thousands of years; do we perceive objects through information transmission media such as recordings?; do we perceive the entire object when only a part is affecting our senses? Second, Evans points out that we have to be careful not to just assume that any time the word ‘this’

¹ I have published, with Amanda Brovold, an account of demonstrative semantics which differs from Evans' account in key respects. In particular we argue that perception is not the primary notion, though it is a special case of the key notion. This is beyond the scope of this guide, but interested readers should consult Brovold and Grush (2012), especially Section 4.

or 'that' shows up in a sentence that it is functioning as a demonstrative. These are prologues to the material in subsequent sections.

For Evans *demonstrative identification* is a theoretical notion — one of the three kinds of identification of objects (the other two being description and recognition-based) that suffices for satisfying Russell's Principle. A demonstrative identification is a way of knowing which object one is thinking about, and the thought one has when one identifies an object this way Evans calls a *demonstrative thought*. Evans will argue that the semantics of demonstratives as a semantic category of referring expression in natural language (*this, that*, etc.) is to be explained in terms of the sort of thought — a demonstrative thought — that one must have in order to understand a sentence using a demonstrative expression.

Evans begins by pointing out the oft-noted relation between demonstrative identification and perception, and gives Strawson's rough characterization that it involves perceptually picking out or perceptually discriminating an object. Two points about this are first, the characterization is vague in a number of ways, and second that even if it is right, it doesn't explain why it is that this sort of perceptual discrimination makes thought about an object possible. This latter point is to be understood in the light of Chapter 4. If we are to be able to think of objects *demonstratively*, this means that there must be something about this perceptual contact provides (or is a necessary part of the provision of) an Idea of the object — a fundamental Idea — that will allow us to distinguish the object from all other objects.

Two sorts of vagueness that Evans discusses concern i) information links that are long (seeing the stars) or circuitous (seeing a person via their image

on TV); and ii) being in perceptual contact with a part of an object vs the entire object.

The suggestion is going to be that the theoretical considerations concerning what perception must do in order to make thought about an object possible will go some way to helping us clarify the various vagaries. That is, if we have a theoretically motivated account of what a demonstrative Idea is and how it makes thought possible, then we will have insight into the kinds of perceptual contact that are able to underwrite the required Ideas. Roughly, the requirement will be that the perceptual contact has to be such as to allow the thinker to satisfy Russell's Principle. Exploring **what** how this happens is the point of this chapter.

Evans closes by raising a cautionary point about taking 'this' and 'that' in English as indicators of natural semantic kinds. He brings up a case of what he calls (following Quine) deferred ostension: using 'that man' when pointing at a car to refer to the car's owner. In this case the speaker is not in any sort of perceptual contact with the referent. Evans claims that in this case the referent is thought about by description, as something like 'the owner of this car'. In any case, it points to a need for greater theoretical clarity on the relation between perception and thought, and also between demonstratives as a grammatical category and demonstratives as a semantic category (since "that man" said while pointing to a car might be a demonstrative grammatically but not semantically).

6.2 Information-links are not sufficient

*There are five strands to this section. **First**, Evans introduces the technical term information-link (IL), which is a causal channel by which we get information from an object. Perceptual contact typically provides us with an information link to an object. **Second**, there is a remark on the relation between ILs and demonstrative Ideas. In particular, an Idea's having a controlling conception that is fed with information from an IL is part of what makes the Idea a demonstrative Idea. **Third** there are some considerations aimed at showing that ILs are not by themselves sufficient to sustain demonstrative thoughts (though they are necessary). Evans' claim is that they don't guarantee satisfaction of the generality constraint. **Fourth**, Evans discusses what else, besides an IL, is required to sustain such thought. The suggestion is that the Idea that the subject is employing must be an adequate Idea (Chapter 4) of the object. In the case of demonstrative identifications, the Ideas will be fundamental, since they involve locating the object in space. Putting these last two points together, the suggestion is that a demonstrative Idea has two aspects: i) it is fundamental, it characterizes the object in terms of its fundamental ground of difference (spatial location), and ii) it includes an information link to the object. **Fifth** and finally (the last paragraph), Evans claims that cases of identification involving long time-lags and such appear to be sui-generis, and neither purely demonstrative nor purely descriptive.*

First (in the first paragraph) we get a characterization of information-links (ILs). They are causal links between objects and thinkers that provide the thinkers with information about the objects. But they are not *merely* causal links: they require perceptual mechanisms that isolate objects from background noise, and also allow for the tracking of objects over time. Just having sense receptors sensitive to certain kinds of causal impingement is not enough. An IL is a sort of conduit through which information from an object is mainlined into the subject's controlling

conception of that object. This doesn't come up here, but it is important for this chapter: recall that the content of an information state, especially one that derives from perception, need not concern specific objects (Chapter 5). This means that we should conceive of the information that comes in from an IL not as information characterizable as "that object is red", but rather is "redness is instantiated" (or blueness, or heat, or a loud pitch).² This will be expanded upon when we get to Section 6.6.

Second (the paragraph bridging 146-7, and also footnote 8) is a point of major importance. Remember for Evans an Idea is what Evans calls the means I employ to think of some object. What makes an Idea of an object a *demonstrative* Idea (used when I am thinking of an object *demonstratively*, as opposed to by description, for example) is that it is part of a functional characterization of a demonstrative Idea that their controlling conceptions (aka dossiers) are fed by information supplied from an IL. And moreover that any information derived from this link, because it is mainlined into the Idea's dossier, will be treated as immediately germane to thought about *that object*. For example, information coming in through the IL to the effect that *redness is instantiated* is mainlined into the dossier associated with that Idea, and can then support the thought that *that object is red*.

² It will turn out that in some cases ("here"-thoughts and "I"-thoughts) an IL can be quiescent, delivering no information but still being maintained such that if any information arises it will make its way through the conduit.




Figure 1

I've tried to capture the basic relations between ILs, Ideas, and governing conceptions in Figure 1. The IL is a perceptual mechanism that collects information from objects via causal contact. The information is passed along in terms of properties being co-instantiated. One can think of this as employing a variable like x as notation for a dummy 'object' for purposes of binding properties. (Recall Chapter 5's discussion of the content of an information state in terms of unbound variables as in "Red(x) and Ball(x).") The Idea is where the subject's satisfaction of Russell's Principle comes into play. One can think of it as providing substance (so to speak) to the dummy variables used to characterize the information from the ILs. It allows the subject to think "That ball is red." The rest of this section is essentially spelling out Evans' claim that demonstrative thought about an object requires both IL and the Idea. The governing conception is a repository of such contents concerning the object. In pure cases (where the object is not being identified as one for which one already has a file) this will include information derived from the ongoing IL, as well as (to some extent) information about the details of the encounter (where you were when you saw it). This brief sketch will need to be made more complicated when the topic of re-identification of objects comes up.

Third (from the top of p. 147 to the bottom of p. 148) Evans provides an argument to the effect that an information link is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain thought about an object. Evans is making an implicit 3-way distinction in this discussion between proposals for how an IL with x might be involved in a thought about x:

- i) the IL with x is, by itself *sufficient* for thought about x;
- ii) the subject can appeal to the IL as part of a definite description that identifies x; and
- iii) the IL is a necessary part of a demonstrative Idea of x.

Proposal (iii) is unlike (i) in that the demonstrative Idea (the middle box in Figure 1) brings in resources over and above the IL itself (the left box); and it is unlike (ii) in that the Idea is functionally linked to the IL, it does not involve a *description of* the IL. Such a description, which would employ the concept of *information links* or *causal contact*, would lack the 'conceptual simplicity' of a demonstrative Idea.

This brings us to the fourth topic (from the top of p. 149 through the last full paragraph of p. 150), which is the argument against (i). In order to have a thought about an object, one's Idea must allow the subject's thought to satisfy the GC. Evans has argued that there are two ways for this to happen. Either one's Idea of the object is fundamental [δ], or if non-fundamental [a], it is *adequate* if the thinker knows what it would mean for [a = δ] to be true. In short, it is the Idea (the middle box) that provides the wherewithal to satisfy RP and hence have a genuine thought about the object.

For physical objects, the fundamental ground of difference is location (at a time). If the the subject is able to locate the object in space, then it is a

fundamental Idea. (And as we shall see, a job often done by the IL, in addition to providing information about the object, is that it is part of the mechanisms by which the subject is able to locate the object in space, see Section 6.3.)

A second way of satisfying RP would be by description. If the subject has a conception of physical objects supporting certain kinds of causal links, then they could generate a definite description that makes appeal to the IL itself.

But the mere existence of the IL doesn't guarantee either of these. If the subject has no Idea of the object (no middle box), then no thought about it is possible. Even if the subject has the ability to produce such Ideas, if the IL isn't providing to this Idea the capacity to locate the object in space (see 6.3), then demonstrative thought about the object isn't possible. And if the subject doesn't have a conceptual grasp of the information link, then a descriptive thought might not be possible. The point of Evans example of the 'primitive people' who thought that someone was inside the radio is that these people, because information transmission tech wasn't even on their radar, couldn't resort to a description that invoked the IL. So they couldn't think about *the man* whose voice was heard. Of course it is natural to attribute to them beliefs about "that man", as per the discussion in Section 5.3 about people having the goal of referring to the object that is the causal source, etc.

Fifth and finally, Evans comments that certain sorts of case, those involving large time-lags, seem to be neither demonstrative, nor descriptive, but *sui generis*. There is little argument or discussion here, and nothing hangs on this point for later purposes.

6.3 Egocentric spatial thinking: 'here'

Section 6.1 posed the question How does perception make a thought possible? We will now start on answering this. Perception can make a thought possible by allowing the subject to place the perceived object at a location in space at a time. In so doing, perception allows a fundamental identification of the object, and this makes thought about it possible. This section spells out how this happens — how perception allows us to locate the perceived object in space. This section is one of the longest in the book and could easily have been broken into two or more sections. Six topics can be discerned. First, a gloss on what is needed for a fundamental identification of a material object — the ability to make such an identification being crucial for demonstrative identification. This turns out to be its location in objective space. The problem is, we perceive things in egocentric terms, not objective terms. So second, there is a long discussion of egocentric spatial representation. The upshot is that an experiential episode carries egocentric spatial content if that experience is hooked up in the right way with the complex web of perception-action connections that a subject has. Thus, in the normal case, perception of an object makes its location in egocentric space manifest. Third, there is a discussion of our ability to bring egocentric space into coordination with objective space, thus allowing us to locate objects in objective space and hence to have a fundamental identification of them. So an information-link by itself is far from sufficient. First, a lot of machinery is required for an IL to even present its object as being in egocentric space, and more work yet is required to be able to know what it would mean for an egocentrically located object to have an objective spatial location. Fourth, there is a discussion of 'here' aimed at showing that even 'here' thoughts require more than an information link. Fifth, a brief comparison between the information-based identification of places (here, there) and of objects (this, that). And sixth, an argument that demonstrative thoughts about places are Russellian. In order to try to keep things manageable and clear, I will number these six topics in this section as 6.3.1 - 6.3.6, and treat them as distinct subsections.

6.3.1. Introduction (beginning of section to bottom third of p. 152)

The fundamental ground of difference of physical objects is their (objective) spatial location at a time, so in order to have an adequate Idea of an object for use in demonstrative identification, we must either be able to locate the object (or the *place*, if we are attempting a thought about a *place*) in space, or know what would make such an identification of its the object's location with a location in objective space true. Either way, what is crucial is the ability to *represent spatial locations*.

What is required for a fundamental identification is the location in *objective space*. Objective space contrasts with egocentric space in that the latter represents objects' locations relative to oneself. Locations-from-a-point-of-view, or egocentric spatial locations, do not provide fundamental identifications of objects. This is because knowing where something is only in relation to me does not necessarily tell me where the object is located in objective space, and thus does not serve to distinguish it from all other things of its type. Rather, what is needed for an objective location is what Evans calls a 'cognitive map' in which there is no privileged reference point. It is a representation of the spatial relations between the objects in the world as well as the landmarks that establish these objective locations.

Although knowing where something is in egocentric space is not a fundamental identification of an object, it often is the first step towards knowing where it is in objective space, and hence a fundamental identification. If the subject can locate an object in her egocentric space, and if in addition the subject has the capacity to align her egocentric space with

an objective cognitive map, then the subject will have the capacity to locate the object in objective space, and will have an adequate Idea of it. It is to the notion of egocentric space that we turn first, and and to thoughts about spatial locations.

6.3.2. Egocentric Space (bottom third of p. 152 to the top of p. 162)

As a prelude to the discussion of egocentric space, Evans begins with a discussion of *here*. The first point is that here-thoughts differ from normal demonstrative thoughts (about objects) in that we need not be actually receiving information from our current location in order to think of it as here. Evans' example is of someone in a sensory deprivation tank thinking "I wonder what it's like here."

Evans says that this fact — that we need not be receiving information from our location to think about it as 'here' — might suggest to some that "here"-thoughts are not at all like demonstrative thoughts, but are rather descriptive, as 'the location where I am'. Evans argues against this. One reason is that that approach would completely sever the connection between here-thoughts and perception (and action, more about that soon), and Evans does not think that is right. He will argue shortly that information links are still required, even if they are not currently providing information. That is, demonstrative Ideas and "here"-Ideas are both constitutively tied to ILs, but in the case of "here", those ILs can be latent.

A second reason for rejecting the description account of "here"-thoughts is that it would require that *I* has primacy over *here*, and Evans doesn't think that's right either. Evans' point here seems to be that indexicals including 'I', 'here' and 'now' are inter-defined: they form a local holism. One does not

define one or some of them on the basis of the others, but rather the three are given together.³

Evans then points out that 'here' is part of a cluster of related spatial notions, including 'there', 'to the left', etc. The manifold of these constitute egocentric space, or as Evans will later call it, behavioral space. What makes these notions as a group available, and what distinguishes each of them from the others, are interconnections between perception and action. The position is summed up nicely in the first full paragraph on page 154:

Egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the content of our spatial experiences would be formulated, and those in which our immediate behavioural plans would be expressed. This duality is no coincidence: an egocentric space can exist only for an animal in which a complex network of connections exists between perceptual input and behavioural output. (p. 154)

The first part of the argument for this hinges on drawing a distinction between i) being selectively sensitive to something at a location, and ii)

³ Evans' remarks on the brain in a vat example could be made more strongly. Imagine someone in the situation described in *The Matrix*, who, while still in the virtual reality program, is appraised of her situation. She might come to believe (truly) that what she had been identifying as her brain is not the thing sustaining her thoughts. It is just one more illusory construct of the Matrix. She might be able to speculate that there is such a brain, somewhere (though it is not anywhere in the universe as she knows it) — something that sustains her thoughts. But it would be an assumption that the thing really sustaining her thoughts is a *brain*. Perhaps in reality thoughts are sustained by something very unlike brains. But the point is that any thought about a location she might think of the form "the location of the thing that is sustaining my thoughts" is not at all like thinking of such a place as 'here' (e.g. the way that I might think of my bedroom as 'here' when I wake up in the darkness). The relation of this line of thought to the claim that "here"-thoughts are not descriptions of the form 'where I am' is not entirely direct, since 'where I am' and 'where the organ sustaining my thoughts is' are not the same (See Grush 2016). But the point that "here"-thoughts are constitutively linked to possibilities of perception and action should be clear enough.

experiencing that sensitivity *as concerning a location in egocentric space*. To take a simple example, I might devise a situation, perhaps in a psychology lab, such that you hear a beep of a certain pitch (middle C, say) whenever an object enters a location two meters behind you. If you can discern Middle C from other pitches (you have perfect pitch, say), you'd be selectively sensitive to objects two meters behind you. I could train you to press a button when and only when an object is 2 meters behind you. But it is entirely possible, especially if I don't tell you about the experimental set-up, that you will just experience this as a beep that you hear, with no spatial significance at all. The question is, what needs to be added to your experience such that the beep is not experienced by you as just a beep but as, so to speak, an object behind you? Evans' answer is that it is only when that input gets connected to dispositions for behavior — such as automatically turning around to see what is there when you hear the beep — that the experience starts to take on spatial significance.⁴ As Evans puts it:

This point also comes out very clearly if we reflect upon how we might specify the spatial information which we imagine the perception to embody. The subject hears the sound as coming from such-and-such a position, but how is the position to be specified? Presumably in egocentric terms (he hears the sound as *up*, or *down*, *to the right* or *to the left*, *in front* or *behind*). These terms specify the position of the sound in relation to the observer's own body; and they derive their meaning in part from their complicated connections with the subject's actions. (p. 155)

At the bottom of page 157, and continuing to the middle of p. 159, Evans turns to arguments to the effect that having an egocentric space (and having

⁴ I have written extensively on this account of egocentric spatial perception. See Grush (2007).

the ability to perceive things in egocentric space) does not yet provide for conscious experience. One interesting thing about this discussion is that it is common for philosophers to argue against the theory of egocentric spatial content Evans is describing here by pointing to blindsight — exactly the example Evans is bringing up here. What Evans is saying is that the connections to behavior are not sufficient to provide conscious experience of space to a subject, just necessary. (The blindsight cases at best demonstrate that such connections are not sufficient.)

To take that next step, something else is required. Let's call the state in question an *experience**, the asterisk indicating that we are allowing that the state might not be consciously experienced, and the question is, what is involved in making an *experience** (e.g. of a location in egocentric space) an *experience* — that is something *consciously* experienced? Evans considers the proposal that the subject must self-ascribe the experience, that is, the subject must have a thought of the form "I am having *this experience**". On this proposal, what is needed is that one attach an "I think" to the experience, one might say.

Evans rejects this. Rather, he claims that what is required is that the *experience** be the *experience** of a thinking, reasoning person. That is, if there is a person capable of thinking and reasoning about the world and their actions in it, and if their thinking and reasoning is guided by the *experience**, then we can attribute that *experience* to them. It is not that they think about the *experience**, but that they think about the world in a way that is guided by the *experience**. (This discussion is important for understanding Evans' notion of nonconceptual content: a topic that has gained much momentum and sparked much debate since Evans' death. Since this topic is not central to the ideas of this book, I won't elaborate on it.)

Evans returns to the main line of argument — the egocentric spatial content of perception — at the middle of page 159. He remarks that the sort of content in question concerns a number of simultaneous locations or objects; it provides one with a single, unified representation of a number of simultaneously existing locations. (This fact will be of importance later, when the topic of aligning one's egocentric space with a cognitive map of objective space comes up. It is also an issue that is closely connected to Evans' papers 'Things without the mind', and 'Molyneux's question'.)

Finally (at the top of p. 161) Evans points out that it is possible (though more difficult) to maintain the sort of perceptual and behavioral dispositions with respect to a place even in absence of input from it. It is not that the possibilities of action and perception are completely missing. They are there, but they are merely potential. But so long as these potential patterns of dispositions are maintained, they can provide for the sort of spatial content in question. For example, I can have a thought about a particular place that I am not currently receiving any information from, such as a spot just behind my head, provided I am attentionally tuned to any information that might be forthcoming from that location — part of maintaining a complex dispositional connection to the place. In such a case, one might say that I am maintaining an information link with that location even though no information is being passed through that link. (This is the import of footnote 20.) This will be discussed in more depth starting on p. 164, when Evans turns specifically to here-thoughts.

A lot has gone on in this sub-subsection. What is important is this: we receive a lot of information, and what makes (some of) it seem to us to have egocentric spatial significance is that the information link — whether information is currently coming through it or not — be connected to behavior in the right way. Suppose I have two information channels, one is

giving me information that loudness and brightness is instantiated, and the other that quietness and darkness is instantiated. This can underwrite my perceptual experience to the effect that it is loud and bright *to my left*, and quiet and dark *to my right*, if the information channels are appropriately linked to behavior. For example, if I want to look at the bright light, or see what is making noise, I will move my head to the left. Though Evans doesn't put it this way, one can say that two elements of what makes an Idea a "here"-Idea is that it have certain connections to perceptual input (some information links are functionally connected to it); and that it have certain connections to behavioral output. What will distinguish a "here"-Idea from a "there"-Idea, a "left"-Idea, "behind"-Idea, and so forth, are that these all have dedicated information links and connections to output, but the specific links and types of output are different. (Note that more is required for an Idea to be a "here"-Idea, but these are two of the requirements.)

6.3.3. Objective space (top of p. 162 to middle of p. 164)

The discussion of egocentric space is only a preliminary, for being able to locate some place or object in egocentric space does not give one a *fundamental* identification of it. A fundamental identification of a material body (or a place) places it at a location at a time, and the locations and times must be *objective* locations and times in the single unified world order. Representing something as being *in front of me now* does not by itself constitute locating it in this stronger objective sense. So how do we do it? Evans calls our ability to understand the spatial relations of the world apart from our location in it a *cognitive map* — we do not represent the entire universe of course, but anything in the universe is representable in it. That there is such a thing that is separate from our representation of egocentric

space is clear enough. It is why "You are here" does not count as an answer to the question "Where am I?" when I am lost. Knowing where something (including myself) is in egocentric space is no help when I am lost precisely because being lost is a matter of not knowing where I am *in objective space*.

So here is how to conceive of the problem. I have Ideas of locations in egocentric space. Call such an idea p . These Ideas are not fundamental. In order for an Idea p to be adequate, I need two things. First, I need Ideas of places that *are* fundamental. This is my cognitive map, my knowledge of the objective spatial world. Second, I need a capacity to coordinate my egocentric space with this objective space. This latter capacity is an ability for me to know what it would be for a location p identified egocentrically to be identical to a location identified objectively, π . In other words, I must know what it would mean for propositions of the form $[p = \pi]$, where p is an Idea of a place in egocentric space, and π is a fundamental Idea of a place in objective space, to be true. Note that it follows that any coordination of my egocentric space and cognitive map involves placing myself on the map, as one object among others.

Now on Evans' account, one does not in fact have to have one's egocentric space coordinated with a cognitive map in order for one to think objectively about locations in egocentric space. What one needs is the *ability* to so coordinate. If the spaces are coordinated, then one is in fact identifying a place via a fundamental identification. If one is not at the time coordinating one's egocentric spatial experience with a cognitive map (i.e. one is lost), then provided that one has the ability to coordinate them, one at least knows what it would mean for such an identity proposition to be true. Either way, one has an *adequate* Idea p of the place. (Recall that an *adequate* Idea just is, in Evans' terminology for an Idea that is either fundamental, or

is such that one knows what an identity proposition between it and a fundamental Idea would consist in.)

At the top of p. 164 Evans brings up an interesting possibility, a subject who, in attempting to think about a location in egocentric space, is not identifying a single location in objective space. For example, if the subject is moving but is not aware of this, he might think there is one location he is thinking of with a “here”-thought when there is not.⁵ In such a case Evans claims that the subject is not in fact thinking a “here”-thought. This means that a “here”-Idea (or any Idea about an egocentric spatial location) may or may not be *adequate*, depending on circumstances. If the subject’s ability to coordinate egocentric and objective space and track locations isolates one location, then it is adequate. If this is not the case, then the Idea is not adequate. I’m not here defending the doctrine, just trying to make it clear. The doctrine has the consequence that thought about egocentric locations is Russellian. If there is no (single) location that is the ‘object’ (that is, the *accusative*) of the thought, then there is no thought.

6.3.4. ‘Here’ (middle of p. 164 to the middle of p. 168)

This subsection is aimed at showing that information-links with a place are not sufficient for particular-thoughts about that place, because they may not allow the subject to locate the place in objective space. The example constructed is that of a person who is remotely operating a submarine, and

⁵ Of course, if a subject is knowingly moving, they have the skill to dynamically update the Ideas they use: as I walk, I think ‘it is loud up ahead’, and then ‘it is loud here’, and then ‘it is loud back there’. I can track a single object or location. But the example Evans is discussing is one where such tracking skills aren’t deployed because the subject doesn’t know they are moving, and so they don’t track a single object/location.

whose sensory input and motor output are as closely linked to the sensors (video cameras, etc.), and effectors (propulsion, excavators, etc.) as one likes. As Evans points out, it might be possible for the subject to throw oneself into the situation, so to speak — paying less and less attention to what is happening in the vicinity of her biological body and being sucked into the situation of the submarine. Let us suppose that this subject thinks ‘it’s mucky here.’ There are several possibilities to consider:

1. The subject has no idea where the sub is, either in objective space or relative to her biological body on the ship. And she has no way of determining its location.

1a. The subject attempts a “here”-thought, that is, she mobilizes the psychological mechanisms that would, in normal circumstances with her biological body, allow her to think a “here”-thought. In this situation the subject’s Idea of the location p is not adequate. (She can’t coordinate the egocentric space with a cognitive map.)

1b. The subject could think an existential thought: “there is a place where it is mucky”. This is fine.

1c. The subject could think a thought by description: “the place where the sub is is mucky”. This is also fine.

2. She may know where the submarine is in the egocentric space defined by her biological body on the ship, say, *about a mile out that way and straight down*. She could then more or less direct a thought at that location: *it is mucky down there*. But notice that this way of thinking of the location would be as a spot in the egocentric space of her biological body on the ship, not as the ‘here’ of the sub. This would be an adequate Idea, but a different sort of adequate Idea. It would be more felicitously expressed as “it’s mucky *there*.”

3. She has a cognitive map that she can coordinate with the ‘egocentric’ space of the submarine. This is the sort of case Evans discusses on the

central paragraph of page 167. If she does this, then she can identify the “here”-Idea p with a location π in a cognitive map. She can think of the sub’s location as *here*. But note that more is going on here than just an information link. It is an information link together with the subject's cognitive map and self-locating skills that are making the fundamental identification of the rock possible. (But notice that on this last possibility, the subject’s biological body (including her brain) would now be the entity whose location is in question, and possibly unknown.)

The point of this section is that merely having an information link does not provide everything necessary for a person to think of a location as *here*, or *there*, or any other egocentrically specified location. At best it might underwrite an existential thought (there is a place where it is mucky), or a descriptive thought (the location where this information is coming from is mucky). But an information link, by itself, would not provide the materials required for the subject to think of that location as here (or there, to the left, etc.).

Evans’ discussion about whether there can be two ‘here’s is interesting but nothing in the rest of the book depends on it.

6.3.5. Demonstrative identification of places vs. objects (top of p. 169 to bottom third of p. 169)

This subsection is brief. Evans is merely comparing the Ideas involved in thought of (egocentric) *locations* (*here, there*) with the Ideas involved in demonstrative thought of *things* (*this, that*). I will regiment some language Evans uses to try to make the points more clear. Evans’ uses both ‘information link’ and ‘information channel’, seemingly as synonyms. Evans

tends to use 'information link' in contexts where what is at issue is the continuing receipt of information from an object. And Evans in this section is pointing out that demonstrative Ideas depend on this sort of link, an ongoing receipt of information. On the other hand 'information channel' tends to be used in contexts where a conduit is maintained for the receipt of information, but there may or may not actually be information coming through it. Evans argues in this section that such information channels underwrite Ideas of locations in egocentric space. You have a high-bandwidth conduit capable of providing information about *here*, and that channel is open even if there is no information coming through (it is dark and quiet, no smells, etc.). But for objects one is perceiving, not only does one have to contrive a situation where one can demonstratively identify an object when there is no actual information, even in such cases, one wouldn't really know there was an object there (it would be a guess).

6.3.6. Demonstrative thoughts about locations in egocentric space are Russellian (bottom third of p. 169 to end of section)

Evans here argues that the sort of thoughts discussed in this section — thoughts about egocentric locations, especially 'here' —are Russellian. The first step in the argument is to point out that they are not descriptive (Evans here is at least in part, no doubt, in agreement with Perry's points in 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical').

The argument for the Russellian status is in the final paragraph of the section. Here is what he says, in full:

If there is no place thought about, there is no thought at all — no intelligible proposition will have been entertained. If, for example, the subject is moving, unbeknownst to himself, so that there is no one place which he is disposed to treat as the object of his thought, then it will be quite impossible to excogitate, out of, for instance, his gestures, any intelligible thought-content for the 'here'-thoughts he essays. To do this would require us to be able to formulate a condition for a place to be the object of his thought, even though no place is the object of his thought, and to suppose that his thought is that the place that meets that condition is *F*. But this would be possible only if he identified the place by description, which, as we have seen, he does not do. (p. 170)

Here is a stab at filling this argument in. We can follow Frege, as surely Evans does, in saying that a thought is that for which the question of truth arises, and the content of the thought is the condition under which it is true — its truth condition. Now let us flesh out Evans' example: a blindfolded subject is on a very quiet hospital gurney, and is moving down a hallway without realizing it because the gurney is being pulled by ropes. He takes himself to be stationary. Let us also imagine that the hallway is full of people who are mostly quiet, but by coincidence as the gurney approaches people they begin chatting, and as it passes and moves from them, they stop talking. To the subject on the gurney it sounds as though a continual conversational din is surrounding him and filling his stationary 'here', when in fact a wave of chatter (among a changing set of people) happens to be pacing the gurney in an otherwise quiet hallway. The subject, believing himself to be immobile, thinks *It is very noisy here*. We are assuming that in fact there is not any one location toward which the subject has maintained a stable disposition.

There are two possibilities. First, we can formulate a condition that would provide for a genuine content and truth condition, such as 'There was noise in the vicinity of the gurney', which has a clear truth condition, and

would even be true in the circumstances envisioned. If this were the thought essayed by the subject, there would be a thought with a definite content, and no problem. But by hypothesis, the subject is not thinking of the location by description.

Second, if there were a place with which the subject maintained stable informational and behavioral dispositions, we could also provide truth conditions: the thought would be true if *that place* was noisy. But in the given case this does not work. There is no actual place to provide the content of the thought, and there is no description that reflects the content of the attempted here-thought. So we are left with the conclusion that the thought attempt, because of the sort of attempt it is (non-descriptive) is such that in the absence of an object (a single location), there is no specifiable truth condition that reflects the content of the attempted thought. And hence there is no content, and hence no thought. Of course, there are a number of very similar thoughts that the subject might have thought, and even thought truly, such as the descriptive one. (See Section 6 of the Appendix of this chapter for more argument on this point.)

6.4 Demonstrative identification of material objects

First, Evans outlines his own proposal about demonstrative identification of material objects, which is that it involves an IL with the object, that provides information about it, as well as giving us an ability to locate the object in space, and hence have an adequate Idea of the object. He then clarifies that this account is not descriptive — it does not treat our thought about an object in terms of the object at

location p . He then argues, in a way parallel to the argument concerning "here"-thoughts, that demonstrative thoughts are Russellian. The final substantive point is one that is picked up in later sections, and emphasizes that demonstrative thought is temporally extended, and requires the tracking of objects through time and through changes in relative location.

6.4.1 Summary and discussion (beginning of section to bottom of p. 171)

Evans begins by summarizing the theory of demonstrative identification of material objects:

We are now in a position to answer the question what makes demonstrative identification of ... material objects possible. In the ordinary perceptual situation, not only will there be an information-link between subject and object, but also the subject will know, or will be able to discover, upon the basis of that link, where the object is. Given the subject's general knowledge of what makes propositions of the form [$\pi = p$] true, for arbitrary π , when p is an Idea of a position in his egocentric space, and given that he has located, or is able to locate, the object in his egocentric space, he can then be said to know what it is for [This = the object at π now] to be true (for arbitrary π). Hence he can be said to have an adequate Idea of the object. [pp.170-1]

So the information link with object o will allow the subject to locate the object in egocentric space, which has its own Idea p . This Idea p will be adequate if the subject has the capacity to effect a coincidence between egocentric space and objective space, giving the subject the wherewithal for a

fundamental Idea of the location π . This, in turn, provides for a fundamental identification of the object, as the object at π .⁶

Evans closes these introductory remarks with two points. First, he states again that ILs are not sufficient for thought, since the information link by itself doesn't guarantee the ability to know where an object is. Second, he points out that given the account he has just outlined, it is clear that the primary sense of 'knowing which' in play for material objects is in terms of spatial location as indicated by information links, as opposed to the speaker's ability to 'identify' the object. Evans' example is someone who is blindfolded pointing in front of them and saying "That person is *F*."

6.4.2 Demonstrative identification vs. descriptive identification (bottom of p. 171 to top of p. 173)

From the bottom of page 171 to the top of page 173 Evans discusses the relation between a genuine demonstrative identification of an object and a descriptive identification of an object as 'the object at *p*', which rests on a prior identification of a place. Evans' first argument against this proposal is that it, unlike his own proposal, does not seem able to account for cases such as the beetle, whose location we are not immediately in a position to know. Second, we seem able to demonstratively identify objects when, because the object is moving so quickly, we are unable at any moment to assign it a definite location (imagine a fly quickly buzzing about one's head, before one can latch onto a determinate location, the fly has moved on).

⁶ Notice that the doctrine is that the IL will allow the subject to "know" *or* "be able to discover" the object's location. The second disjunct will come up a few times in the text, e.g. the beetle example, and the fishing line example. Neglect of this second disjunct is why a recent criticism of Evans views on this topic, by John Campbell (1999) misses the mark. See Grush (2018)

His final argument is directed against someone who claims that we can demonstratively identify an object even when not receiving information from it because demonstrative identification is based on a description making reference to a location (*the object at p*). His response is that this seems implausible because we seem to be able to make more demonstrative object discriminations than we are able to make reliable spatial discriminations. A given pill-sized region of a billiard table is not the sort of thing that we can reliably re-identify or even maintain a firm hold on over a span of time; whereas an actual pill at that location, even if surrounded by many similarly shaped and colored pills, is easy to maintain attention on.

These remarks help to clarify Evans' proposal. On both Evans' account and the descriptivist account he is describing as a contrast, there is an aspect corresponding to the object, and an aspect corresponding to location. The descriptivist account takes the location as independently given, and usable as a conceptual anchor for thought about the object. This places high demands on our ability to isolate stable locations. Evans proposal is more subtle. The connection to location is an *ability* to locate the object. It is part of the substructure that makes the Idea of the object adequate. It does not require that one actually know the location (e.g. the beetle example). Nor does it require that one's ability to isolate locations is independent of the ability to track objects.

6.4.3 Demonstratives are Russellian (bottom half of p. 173)

The bottom of page 173 is an argument that demonstrative thoughts about material bodies are Russellian. This argument parallels the argument at the end of 6.3 (which concerned 'here' thoughts) in structure. The

argument depends on the premise that demonstrative identification of material bodies is not by description. Evans establishes this by examining two different suggestions to the effect that demonstrative identification is by description, and he rejects both. The first proposal is the one he just dealt with (discussed from the bottom of page 171 and continuing to the top of page 173). It was the suggestion that a demonstrative identification of an object is a description of the form 'the object at p '.

The second (discussed in footnote 44) is the suggestion that it is a description of the form 'the object I now have my gaze fixed on'. The argument against this latter proposal is densely packed into footnote 44. And it will be easier to discuss this argument after going through Section 6.6, since it makes reference to something that is the focus of that section. I will revisit this argument then.

6.4.4 Demonstratives are temporally extended (top of p. 174 to top of p. 176)

From the top of page 174 to the top of page 176, Evans discusses the temporally extended character of demonstrative identification. This is material that is also treated (although the application is different) in the first section of the Appendix to this chapter. This is another discussion that touches importantly on the topic of Section 6.6, and so I will put off discussion until then.

6.4.5 Strawsonian connections (last paragraph on p. 176)

The final paragraph of this section is not directly tied to any crucial inferential moves in the book, but expresses an interesting kind of

conviction that Evans takes over from his teacher Peter Strawson. In *Individuals* and *The Bounds of Sense*, Strawson articulated a sort of Kantian analysis of the conceptual scheme of our ordinary thought. This scheme, according to Strawson, has a number of components such as the subject having a bodily presence in the world among other objects, of tracing out a continuous path within them, and of being able to holistically re-identify objects and places. If Evans had had more time, it is likely that he would have treated these topics in more detail.

6.5 Some consequences

This section has four related topics, all addressing the limits of demonstrative identification with respect to the following two issues that have been raised earlier: can we demonstratively identify a whole object, or only a part?; and what kinds of vagueness or errors in the sortal employed are consistent with successful demonstrative identification? The first topic concerns the part-whole question. The crucial notion for Evans is information, and causal contact even with a part often provides information about the whole. Hence Evans' account allows that, in many cases at least, there can be successful demonstrative identification of wholes even when only in direct causal contact with a part.

The second topic concerns what sortals are licensed in demonstrative thought, and a key issue seems to be whether information (or misinformation, see topic 3 below) from the IL is the basis for the sortal.

The third issue has to do with the role that sortals play in demonstrative identification. The doctrine is that while a sortal more specific than 'physical object' (or something like that) is not required for a demonstrative identification, it will be required for any fundamental Idea of the object identified. But one doesn't need to

know the sortal — one's Idea will be adequate so long as one has a capacity to learn the right sortal.

The fourth point is a sort of summary of the sorts of errors one can make concerning the object one thinks about consistent with having an adequate Idea of the object. Not knowing where an object is, or not knowing the appropriate sortal, are not necessarily barriers for thought about an object, so long as one is able to learn the location, or the right sortal.

This section has four topics. The first topic (from the beginning of the section to the bottom of p. 177) concerns part-whole relations. Evans points out that we often have information about entire object even in cases where, in some overly strict sense, I might be said to be 'perceiving' only part of it. For example, even though only one side of a tomato is currently reflecting light into my retinas, the information I receive can be about the entire tomato. The information can be that the tomato (as a whole, not just its facing surface) *is rolling, is being given to John, or is ripe* (surely, one wouldn't claim I only come to know that the facing surface is ripe). This point applies to features of objects and their locations. This works both ways: when we don't get information about the whole from the IL, we may not be able to demonstratively **refer to it**:

Sitting in a room in a house, a subject is not in informational contact with a city; if he believes there is a city around him, this belief cannot be based solely upon what is available to him in perception, nor can he make judgements about the city on that basis (save, perhaps, judgements which hold good of it in virtue of the condition of its parts).
(p. 177)

The second topic (from the top of p. 178 to the top of p. 179) concerns sortals. So far the discussion of demonstrative identification has focused on spatial location, and so has defaulted to thinking of the relevant sortals as just generic *physical object* or *material body*. But in Chapter 4 it was clear that sortals were an important aspect of fundamental identifications. The general suggestion here is that one's Idea of the object will be adequate so long as one has the capacity to learn the correct sortal, to "discover the sort of thing" that something is. The topic of sortals will be raised again — in the second section of the Appendix to Chapter 6, as well as in later chapters. And so, except for one issue that is connected to the final part of this section, I won't go into more detail here, but will rather expand on the discussion as the book progresses.

The third topic, from the top of p. 179 to the end of the section, discusses the kinds of error one can be in consistent with making a successful demonstrative identification. There are three categories that are relevant: errors about an object's properties; errors about an object's location; and errors about the appropriate sortal. As for the first — the object's properties — Evans points out that successful demonstrative identification is consistent with significant errors of this sort. The trickier cases are location and sortals, since these play a role in the fundamental ground of difference of objects, and hence in the satisfaction of Russell's Principle.

In both cases, the claim is that one's Idea can be adequate, even if not fundamental, so long as one is able to discover the location, or the sort of thing the object is. In the case of location, there are two issues. First, one may not know where an object is in egocentric space, as in the examples of the beetle and the fish on the end of the line. So long as one has a practical capacity to locate the object, the Idea can be adequate. Second, one might be

lost, and so even if one knows the egocentric location, one might not thereby know the object's location in the cognitive map. But again, the doctrine is that so long as one has a practical capacity to learn one's location, the Idea will be adequate. The doctrine about sortals is similar. Evans' discussion of 'learning the sort of thing' an object is is analogous to learning an object's location, or learning where one is on a cognitive map.

But there is a topic that isn't as clearly addressed as one might like. In the cases of both location and sortals, it is one thing to be mistaken, and another to simply not know the specifics. In the case of the fish on the line and the beetle, the subject knows they don't know the location; and in Evans' example of Trinculo seeing Caliban for the first time, Trinculo knows that he doesn't have the right sortal, so he starts with something very general, and tried to get more specific. It makes sense in such cases to speak of the subject as 'homing in' on the right location or sortal. But what if the subject is mislocating the location or misidentifying the sortal? Evans doesn't directly address the issue for space. And in the case of sortals, the doctrine seems to be that some errors are deal-breakers and others are not. For instance, seeing the corner of a buried trunk as a pyramid seems to rule out demonstrative identification *of the trunk*. (See also the discussion from Chapter 5 is mistaking a rock for a woman vs. mistaking a man for a woman.)

6.6 Immunity to error through misidentification

In this section Evans points out that the analysis he has provided of 'this'-Ideas and 'here'-Ideas entails that they provide for judgments that are what he calls

*identification-free (IF).*⁷ Evans' notion of IF is similar to a phenomenon was first articulated by Wittgenstein, who noted that some thoughts about oneself have the following feature: that I could not feel tired and on that basis judge that I am tired, and then go on to sensibly wonder "Someone feels tired, but is it me who feels tired?" Demonstratives and "here"-thoughts have similar features: If I am looking at something and watch it turn from blue to red, it would make no sense for me to wonder "Something is turning red, but is it that that is turning red?" Reasons for the inclusion of this discussion here would seem to be first that the phenomenon is a recognized and important one, and it is not insignificant that Evans' analysis of 'this'- and 'here'-Ideas predicts and accounts for the phenomenon. Second, Evans has a novel and powerful analysis of the phenomenon. And third, the phenomenon will be playing a significant role in the next chapter, and setting it up here correctly will aid that discussion.

The first topic, from the beginning of the section to the top of p. 184, brings out a consequence of Evans analysis, namely that "this"-Ideas and "here"-Ideas support thoughts that are *identification-free*. In both cases, the Ideas are *constitutively tied* to certain information channels. This means that any information that comes in from one of these channels is just automatically deposited into the controlling conception of that Idea. (Sometimes Evans refers to this 'automatic' connection as a 'functional' connection, or a 'dispositional' connection. What is important is that the depositing of information happens automatically, and not as the result of an inference or decision on the part of the thinker.)

⁷ I discuss Evans' notion of identification freedom at length in Grush 2007. Among the points made there is that interpretations of Evans' that take the key notion to be one of an object-dependent information channel (see Campbell (1999)) are mistaken. The discussion in that article goes into more depth than is required for the goals of this guide.

It is important to recall that the information that is collected from these information channels is, so to speak, information about property instantiation, something that might be characterized as "... is red" or "... is round". The attribution of the property to an object is something that happens as a result of the fact that this information is mainlined into an Idea of an object. And moreover, the Idea is the Idea it is in part because of this connection to this IL.

Consider the way that one's here-Idea is constitutively tied to certain ways of gaining information. A 'here'-Idea counts as a 'here'-Idea in part because of functional (not inferential) connections from information-channels poised to deliver information about one's vicinity to the controlling conception of his 'here'-thoughts.

Suppose I think a thought about *here*, and that thought is based on information I receive from one of these information channels that is directly connected to my "here"-Idea. For instance, I look at my feet and see dozens of rats, and I think *here is rat infested*. (This would be expressed in English felicitously by "It is rat infested here", but I will use here *here is rat infested* because this tracks the usual subject-predicate order.) The information link itself only provided information to the effect that a lot of rats are being seen. And it is because this IL is functionally tied to my "here"-Idea that it results in my judgment that "here is rat infested." My thought that 'here is rat infested' is not the result of two thoughts of the form 'location *p* is rat infested' and '*p* is here'.

Contrast this with a different sort of case. Suppose I am watching a video monitor so closely that I lose track of what is going on around me. The monitor displays a video feed from a camera that I know to be trained on location *q*. Suppose that the information on the monitor makes it manifest that it is location *q* is rat-infested. So I think *location q is rat-infested*. Now,

suppose that someone tells me that *q is here*. I still stay focused on the video monitor, and don't look around me. But even so, I can now judge that *here is rat infested*, but now my thought would be the result of two beliefs: *location q is rat-infested*, and *location q is here*. The key is that in this case, the information link, the feed through the video camera, is not one of the links that is constitutive of my 'here'-Idea.

Evans is making a distinction between thoughts that are *identification-dependent*, and thoughts that are *identification-free*, henceforth *IF*. (In the current context, "identification" does not mean the subject's ability to identify the object of thought. This was the sense of "identify" important for satisfaction of Russell's Principle. In this context, "identification" means an identity judgment, such as "location q is here.") This phenomenon if IF is very similar to a phenomenon Wittgenstein first brought attention to, and which has been discussed under the heading of '*immunity to error through misidentification*' (IEM). For Wittgenstein, the diagnostic test for whether a thought such as *a is F* is IEM is whether it makes sense for the thinker of *a is F* to wonder "*Something is F, but is it a that is F?*" So if I look at my feet and see a bunch of rats, and think "here is rat infested", it doesn't make sense to wonder, upon seeing rats at my feet "*Somewhere it is rat infested, but it is here that is rat-infested?*" But in the case of the video monitor, I can wonder "*Somewhere it is rat infested, but is it here that is rat infested?*", and that question makes sense because the identity judgment "location *q* is here" is one I need not endorse. Maybe the person who told me that the camera is pointed at my current location lied.

Evans argues that his analysis shows that "that"-Ideas and "here"-Ideas are IF. And he will discuss how his notion of identification freedom compares to the standard notion of IEM (basically, Evans argues that what

people have thought of as IEM is really a confused way of getting at his notion of IF.)

It is important to note that in all these cases *the predicate part has no special status*. Whether any of these locations actually have rats isn't the issue. Maybe they do, or maybe they are clumps of lint that look like rats. The only special status for IEM or IF thoughts concerns the subject component (*here, or that*).

Evans then points out that there are some thoughts, such as those involving Julius, that do not involve identifications, and so these too will be identification-independent (And hence "Somebody invented the zip, but was it Julius who invented the zip" is anomalous for anyone who understands the name 'Julius'). However, the interesting class of IF thoughts are those that are information-based. So 'identification-free' *in the wide sense* simply means not identification-dependent', and thus includes "Julius"-thoughts as well as 'here'- and 'this'-thoughts. 'Identification-free' *in the narrow sense* will be taken to mean 'identification-free and information-based', thus ruling out cases such as the Julius thoughts. It is the latter class of thoughts that Evans is concerned with.

From the middle of p. 181 to the bottom of p. 181 is Evans' claim that identification-free knowledge is basic. The argument here is quick. It is that if there is to be any singular knowledge at all, then not all thoughts can be identification-dependent. An identification-dependent thought, *a is F* is one that can be analyzed as the result of two thoughts: *b is F* and *a = b*. But if there are no identification-independent thoughts, then the first of these — *b is F* — must itself rest on two thoughts, such as *c is F* and *b = c*. And the infinite regress is off. At some point there must be knowledge that is identification-free if there is to be any singular knowledge at all. (An

argument similar to this, but given more detailed treatment, is provided by Shoemaker in the articles Evans cites in footnote 55.)

From the top of p. 182 to the bottom of p. 183 Evans discusses the analysis I gave above, explaining why “here”- and “this”-Ideas are IF, specifically, because they are based on information that is coming from a channel that is functionally tied to that Idea. I moved that discussion to the front for clarity.

At the top of p. 184 Evans makes a point that won't figure much in the rest of the book, but is still fascinating. There are two sides to a 'here'-Idea: an informational aspect, and an 'action' aspect (see 6.3). The informational aspect, involving as it does the requirement that a subject have certain information links tied to his 'here'-Idea, works in a way entirely parallel to 'this'-Ideas, with the difference, inessential for current purposes, that in the case of 'here'-Ideas the information links need not be continually delivering information. The action component, which is discussed at the top of p. 184, makes possible a kind of specification of *actions* that are free from identification errors. So for example, my intention to paint this car (one in front of me) results in my decision to paint *my* car, and my belief that *this* car is *my* car. One can imagine how this might go wrong. Nevertheless, there is specification of my action, my painting of this car, which is not liable to any sort of identification error — though of course it is liable to other sorts of error, such as doing a bad painting job. (Section 9.2 makes a similar point about a speaker's intended referent.)

In the second part of this section (from the second paragraph of p. 184 to the bottom of p. 188), Evans discusses a potential objection to his claim that here-thoughts are identification free. This discussion is crucial since it gets into the details of his notion of IF, and how it differs from IEM. The objection is this. It seems that there are cases in which the information links

do not automatically bring forth the corresponding judgment. The example is the subject who suspects that he may be wearing ultra-lightweight earphones, and so although he is getting information to the effect that '... is noisy' is instantiated, he does not automatically judge that 'here is noisy'. If the subject then satisfies himself that the noisiness is not the result of the earphones, he might judge that 'here it is noisy'. But in this case it seems as though the thought can in fact be resolved into two thoughts: one of which involves attributing a property to some place, 'location q is noisy'; and another that appears to involve an identity such as 'location q is here'. And so the objection is that our here-thoughts are not IF after all.

Evans has a number of responses to this line of thought. The first is that even if the analysis is correct for this case, it can't be generalized to all "here"-thoughts. In the situation as described, when I come to suspect that I am wearing lightweight earphones that are feeding me information that is not information from my surroundings, I framed that suspicion as the possibility that the earphones were giving me information about a different location, and I called that location q . 'Location q ' seems only to be identifiable by me as *the causal source of the information*. This is fine on a case by case basis (note that in the rats on the video monitor example above, that is how we would identify the location being displayed on the monitor: it is the location that the video camera is trained on, and hence is the causal source of the information displayed on the monitor).

But this sort of identification of a place cannot serve as the default analysis of all our here-thoughts. The reason is that the second component of the identification, 'here', is an Idea that cannot be had if the only kinds of thoughts into which it can enter are identification dependent — that is, if there are no identification-free thoughts of the form *here is F* , based only on information, gained in the appropriate way, that F -ness is instantiated.

Evans' argument here, I think, is as follows: If Evans' proposal that the content of 'here'-Ideas is involved with their provision of the possibility of identification-free thoughts, then the putative alternative to Evans' view must assume that this content is descriptive, such as 'where I am'. But our 'I'-Ideas are bound up with our 'here'-Ideas in a way that renders this move impossible. The kind of identification-freedom that underpins 'here'-thoughts also underpins 'I'-thoughts.

Evans closes this discussion by pointing out that the case with the subject and the earphones shows that our normal 'here'-thoughts do rest on an assumption, but the assumption is not an identity assumption. Rather, it is the assumption of the normal working of our perceptual systems. These systems deliver information in such a way that it is shunted directly into the controlling conception of our 'here'-Ideas, whether we like it or not. We can question whether things really are as they seem, but in so doing we are not questioning an identity assumption (that we had been surreptitiously making without realizing it) but rather we are questioning the functioning of our perceptual systems. But even in such a case, because the information is received from a channel that is shunted directly into the "here"-Idea, it will seem as though *it is F here*. And if there is a question, it will be whether things are as they seem. The phenomenon is not one in which it would seem to the subject that *it is F somewhere*, leaving it as an open question whether that *somewhere* is *here*.

The third topic (from the bottom of p. 188 to the end of the section) is a focused discussion of the relationship between Evans' notion of IF knowledge, and Wittgenstein's/Shoemaker's notion of IEM. The notions are closely related. For both Evans and Shoemaker, the core notion is that of a contrast between two kinds of thoughts: those that involve an identity

judgment and those that do not. The difference is reflected in their criterial tests. In Shoemaker's case the criterion is this:

A subject's judgment that *a* is *F* is immune to error through misidentification if it does not make sense for the subject to wonder 'something is *F*, but is it *a* that is *F*?'

So for example, when I feel a toothache and judge on that basis that *I have a toothache*, it would seem to be senseless for me to wonder 'someone has a toothache, but is it *I* who have a toothache?' Whereas in the right circumstances (e.g., seeing a reflection in a mirror) it might seem perfectly reasonable for me to think I have a bump on my forehead, and yet go on to wonder 'someone has a bump on his forehead, but is it *I* who has a bump on his forehead?', perhaps because I know that there are a lot of mirrors around at odd angles, and I may have been mistaken someone else's reflection for my own.

But Shoemaker's criterion will not work for Evans, for it will disqualify some cases that Evans will want to maintain are identification-free. Here is one way to see Evans' analysis. There are *two different situations* that can license a subject's uncertainty about the identity of the object of thought.

1. One's judgment that *a* is *F* is based on two judgments: *b* is *F*, and *a* = *b*. And the subject can question the truth of the identity claim. I might, in the basis of seeing someone at a fair, think *Obama is wearing a white suit*, and then, when someone tells me that there are Obama impersonators around, I can wonder: *someone is wearing a white suit, but is it Obama that is wearing a white suit?* And this will be because I am questioning the identity judgment *that person* (who I can see) *is Obama*.

2. I suspect that my senses aren't functioning normally, specifically, cases where I come to suspect that an information channel that is functionally connected to a "here"-Idea or a "this"-Idea is providing information that is not derived from the object (*this*) or place (*here*). The earphone case is an example.

By Shoemaker's test, anything that falls into (1) or (2) can't be IEM. And (2) is pretty broad, since one can decide to wonder, just by cranking up one's paranoia coefficient, whether about any of one's information channels are functioning normally.

But for Evans, what is important is distinguishing a class of judgments that isn't based on an identity judgment, as per (1). The upshot is that there are many judgments that are IF, but aren't IEM, namely those questionable only via (2). Evans suggests the following criterion for capturing what he means by identification-free:

What we should say is that a judgement is identification-free if it is based upon a way of knowing about objects such that it does not make sense for the subject to utter 'something is F, but is it a that is F?', when the first component expresses knowledge which the subject does not think he has, or may have, gained in any other way. A way of capturing the point of this revised criterion is this: the utterance 'something is F, but is it *a* that is *F*?' needs a special background, in the view, of course, of the person who utters it; he has to suppose that the knowledge expressed in the first component was not gained, or may not have been gained, in the way with which the Idea involved in the second component is associated. If the situation is perfectly normal, and the subject does not take it not to be normal, the utterance does not not make sense. [p.189-90]

Note that there is a significant typo in the text: The last sentence contains one too many 'not's. It should read: 'If the situation is perfectly normal, and the subject does not take it not to be normal, the utterance does not make sense.' Effectively this revised criterion modifies Shoemaker's criterion by adding a special background, that of an assumed normal functioning of the informational systems.

Before closing, I want to return to two discussions from Section 6.4 that I shelved until we had 6.6 in the bag. The first concerned an argument from Subsection 6.4.3, especially footnote 44. This was Evans' argument against the suggestion that 'this' can be analyzed as a description of the form 'the one I have my gaze fixed on'.

The structure of the argument is this: Evans claims that it is *the fact that* my gaze is fixed on O (there is an information link between O and me) that establishes O as the object of my thought, not the 'idea' or '*conception*' of my gaze being fixed on O. By this he simply means that no description of the form 'The one I have my gaze fixed on' is in play. Evans constructs a dilemma for his opponent: either "having my gaze fixed on ξ " entails "I am thinking of ξ " or it does not. The argument from both horns depends on the IF discussion in 6.6, which is why I put it off until now. In particular, Evans is using the fact that demonstrative thoughts are IF as a premise in both.

A. Suppose "having my gaze fixed on ξ " entails "I am thinking of ξ ". This would explain why demonstratives are IF — I would not be able to meaningfully raise the question "Am I thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on?" But it fails to provide an answer as to *why* it is that my thought concerns that object, since the answer would be circular. (Why

am I thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on? Because (by definition) I am thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on.)

B. Suppose “having my gaze fixed on ξ ” does *not* “I am thinking of ξ ”. If this is so, then the question “Am I thinking of the object that my gaze is fixed on?” should make sense. But it doesn't (because such thoughts are IF).

We need an account that provides substantive answers to two questions: Why is it that I am thinking of the object that I have my gaze fixed on? and, Why is it that the question “Am I thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on?” is meaningless? The proposal under consideration cannot do both simultaneously. Evans' proposal does both.

Next, I want to pick up a suggestion Evans made in 6.4.4. He points out that the IL provides for a temporally continuous stream of information from the object and allows the subject to track the object over time, and feeds information into the Idea's governing conception. The point here is that a demonstrative Idea appears to be one that has a certain kind of temporal thickness. Consider a case where I have a demonstrative thought about a pencil, the information coming in from the IL leads me to think that *that pencil will roll off the edge of the table momentarily*. Now suppose that a second later, I see the pencil roll off the edge of the table. Evans' point is that so long as I was in informational contact with the object the whole time (I didn't go away and come back to the table later) it is the same Idea of an object I am using before and after it rolls off the edge. The Idea itself persists temporally. I don't have a thought using one Idea at t_1 (*this₁* pencil), and a different Idea at t_2 (*that₂* pencil), and then judge that *this₁* pencil = *that₂* pencil.

The thought ‘*That* pencil will drop (in a fraction of a second),’ thought when one sees a pencil rolling toward the edge of a table, is *the very thought*

that is confirmed when, in a fraction of a second, one sees *that* pencil drop (or disconfirmed if it does not). The relationship between the first thought and the second thought cannot be analyzed in terms of an identification judgment involving two different demonstrative Ideas. That is, such judgments are IF. My thought *this pencil will roll off the table*' is not shorthand for *something (x) will roll off the table*, and *this pencil is x*. Hence, when I see the pencil fall, it would not make sense to wonder "Something was about to fall off the table, but was it *this* pencil (the one currently falling) that was about to fall off the table?" The same demonstrative Idea spans the temporal gap, so to speak.

6.A1 Appendix Section 1

This section of the appendix spells out what might be thought of as a generalization of a "way of thinking" to something that is capable of providing for a more robust notion of Fregean Sense. A "way of thinking", as so far discussed, has been temporally punctate, meaning it is a description of a process whose primary application is at a time, and whose application across time would have to be conceived of as a number of successive applications of that process. The alternate view is described as a "way of tracking", which is a skill whose primary application is a temporally extended process (though of course that process might manifest only for a moment). Evans in this section argues that the latter conception, though not fully worked out, has advantages. First, it provides tools for addressing situations where it seems one can grasp the same thought at different times. Second, it does so in a way that the temporally punctate approach seems unable to address.

The example Evans opens with is Frege's remark that a subject can think on d1 'today is fine', and on d2 have the very same thought, about d1, in thinking 'yesterday was fine'. It seems on the face of it that one is not thinking about the object (the day) in the same way on the two days, and so a notion that the two thoughts could manifest the same Fregean sense seems to get little grip. If the only way of addressing Fregean Senses were in terms such as this, one might be forced to either deny that the same thought could be grasped on different days, or claim that the only thing required for sameness of thought is sameness of referent. The latter is essentially abandoning the apparatus of Sense.

But Evans suggests that there is a third option. As Evans puts it:

Might Frege not have had in mind an idea of a thought the grasp of which, on a later day, requires just as specific a way of thinking of a day as does its grasp on an earlier day namely, as the preceding day? (p. 192)

Rather than requiring one think about the object *in the same way*, or abandoning all restrictions on how one thinks of the object, perhaps there are specific requirements which are different at different times (or more generally, from different perspectives). In particular, keeping track of something as time passes (or one moves about) is a process that requires different things at different times, but is still specific in terms of what is required at any time. As I track the object, my eyes move from the left to the right; as I move myself, my focus on "here" requires different kinds of perceptual receptiveness as "here" becomes "there." If this suggestion is workable, then one might grasp a "dynamic" Sense, by tracking objects and oneself in space and time.

Evans contrasts this with the opposing view, according to which it is not possible to think of the same day in the same way at different times. (Note

that though this is the example, the lessons apply, more or less in parallel fashion, to “here” thoughts, and demonstrative thoughts.)

The opposing view might begin by pointing out that it seems as though they must be different thoughts, by the intuitive criterion of difference. That is, it might be possible for a subject to affirm ‘today is fine’ on d_1 , and deny or be agnostic about ‘yesterday was fine’ on d_1 .

Evans points out that strictly speaking this suggestion won't work, for the intuitive criterion of difference is defined only for a subject *at a given time*. It is not obvious how to extend the intuitive criterion of difference such that it is still useful if we allow it to range over a single subject at different times. Pretty much any thought that a subject takes to be true at one time, might be questioned or denied at a different time. I might be agnostic on d_1 concerning the Goldbach conjecture, and accept it on d_2 . Surely this fact cannot be combined with the intuitive criterion of difference to argue that there were two different thoughts on the two days.

On the contrary position, each thought about “now” would be a stand-alone thought, independently coherent, and graspable only at the time it is tokened. (The example is in terms of “today” and “yesterday”, but it applies equally to “now” and “a moment ago.”) Such an account would claim that a sequence of thoughts that might be expressed as *it will be F in a moment, it is F now, it was F a moment ago*, are all completely different thoughts, and hence different beliefs. But Evans argues that the ubiquitous succession from the thoughts of the first sort to thoughts of the second, and then the third, cannot be explained on the atomistic conception. The argument is compressed. it seems to be this. The data are:

At d_1 , I judge Today is F.

At d_2 I judge Yesterday was F.

But on what grounds do I judge the thought on d_2 ? The only option, on the view we are considering, would seem to be an inference, like

1. If I thought 'Today is F' one day ago, then it is now true that 'Yesterday was F'.
2. I did think 'Today is F' one day ago.

Therefore 3. Yesterday was F

But this proposal assumes that today, d_2 , I can grasp the same thought I had yesterday. Since the thought I had yesterday shows up in Premise 2, and also in the antecedent of Premise 1. As Evans put it:

One belief cannot give rise to another by any inference, since the identity belief that would be required to underwrite the inference is not a thinkable one; no sooner does one arrive in a position to grasp the one side of the identity than one has lost the capacity to grasp the other. (p. 194)

Next, Evans argues that the atomistic conception requires that the atoms are independently coherent, whereas the dynamic conception treats them as slices of the same persisting belief. The argument is essentially the claim that the atomic conception fails to capture the plausible idea that the very meaning of words (and Ideas) like now, today, yesterday, tomorrow, in a moment, are holistic. Or to put it in another way, if there were a subject who claims to think *Today is fine*, but never on the subsequent day assented to the thought *Yesterday was fine*, doesn't really understand what 'today' or

'yesterday' mean, or both. My grasp of temporal concepts depends on the automaticity of these transitions.

Evans turns to analogies with spatial thought, and how our ability to think of objects and places is dependent on our ability to keep track of the objects, places, and ourselves as any or all of them move about. Rhetorically the idea seems to be that these spatial cases are much more intuitively clear and less controversial, and the temporal case can be understood on analogy with the spatial cases.

Now to the connections between this material and that presented in Chapter 6 proper. The most obvious connection is with the discussion from the top of p. 174 to top of p. 176, what I called Subsection 6.4.4. Evans has maintained that Ideas of objects are underwritten by controlling conceptions, and in the case of demonstrative Ideas and "here"-Ideas, these are information-based thoughts whose controlling conceptions are necessarily fed by a continuing information link. The fact that the Ideas give rise to thoughts that are identification free means that they are such that the subject's receiving information that F is instantiated through the appropriate information link is sufficient for the subject to be disposed to think that the demonstratively identified object is F. But clearly this requires that the Idea be temporally extended, for as time progresses, provided we have not lost track of the object, we will continue to get information through the information link, and it is only if this information is fed into the same temporally extended Idea that it can be taken to concern a single object.

The full picture that Evans is getting at is this: our indexical and demonstrative thoughts, including "this"-, "here"-, "there"-, "now"-, and "then"-thoughts are underwritten by Ideas that are tuned to the spatiotemporal realities of human existence. The CCs of these Ideas receive information via these channels over time in such a way that the Ideas

involved must have a certain temporal extension. This ought to be unobjectionable enough. Such thoughts concern the spatiotemporal world around us, and surely this requires the accommodation of temporal flow and spatial movement at the ground level. Second, these Ideas and their CCs have a certain kind of default tie to our spatiotemporal situation. In the spatial case, they are tied to (better, an aspect of) our capacity to keep track of where we are and how our relation to various places alters as we move about or as time passes. In the case of objects, they are tied to our capacity to keep track of objects over time, as they and we move about. In the temporal case, they are tuned to track the normal passage of time (to within some degree of accuracy or other).

6.A2 Appendix Section 2

This section concerns the role that sortals play in demonstrative identification of objects, in cases like 'that G is F'. It is closely connected to the material in 6.5, but also with a discussion from Section 5.4. The upshot is that in cases where the sortal identification is not based on content from the information link, the thought is a composite of a descriptive component and a purely demonstrative component, something like 'the G that is identical to that'. When it is based on content from the IL, the demonstrative thought is conceptually simple in that it is not a composite. In these cases, the integrity of the thought content is robust to a certain degree of error in the sortal, but not to a high degree of error.

This section provides some further exploration of the role of sortals in demonstrative thought. There are two reasons this is important. One sort of issue concerns the case where a subject is closed up in a room and thinks *this*

city is F. Can the person have a thought about 'this city' in such a case? In 6.5 Evans has suggested that the answer is 'no'. Another issue is one that comes up in Donnellan cases, so-called demonstrative uses of descriptions, such as 'The woman in the corner drinking a martini is a spy' said while looking at a man in the corner drinking water from a martini glass. What is the impact of a thinking employing the wrong sortal? It seems that in this case, the subject can have a thought about that man, even though the sortal is wrong. What considerations might be responsible for these assessments (can't think about *this city*, but can think about *that woman*)?

There are several reasons why one might employ a sortal *G* as part of one's demonstrative thought. In one sort of case, the information-link is providing content that is the basis for the sortal identification. When I see something and think that apple is red, my identification of the object *as an apple* is typically based in large part on information about the object's properties that gets to me through the information link. We might say that in such a case I see the object *as an apple*. Of course, the information might be misinformation: a man dressed as a woman would be a case where my sortal is based on information from the object, but (some of it) it is misinformation, and the sortal it induces me to employ would be wrong.

But in other cases, while I don't perceive the object *as a G*, I might nevertheless be inclined, for one reason or another, to take it to be a *G*. Or even more minimally I might be merely prepared to take it to be a *G*. Consider the example of the person in a windowless room who thinks 'this city is noisy' when there is little or no information coming in through the IL that would identify the source as a city. Suppose that in this situation I was drugged and kidnapped and just woke up. I would be perfectly prepared to believe that I am in a city; or I might even arrive at that sortal via an inference that has nothing to do with information I am getting from

information channels dedicated to my 'here'-Idea: perhaps I recall one of the kidnappers saying they were going to take me to 'the city' just before they gave me the drugs.

The suggestion is that in the latter sort of case, where the sortal *G* is arrived at through supposition or inference (but not perceiving it as a *G*), the content of the thought can be analyzed as the product of two components, a purely demonstrative component and a sortal identifying component: *here is F*, and *here is a G*, . For example, my thought *this city is hot* would be the result of *here it is hot*, and *here is a city*.

And if that is the case, the content of the thought *this/that G is F* is partially descriptive: *the G that is identical with that/here is F*. If there is nothing corresponding to the *that/here*, then there is no thought content available, because that-Ideas are Russellian. However, if there is an object, but it isn't a *G*, there is a thinkable content, as with any definite description.

Whereas in the case where one perceives the object *as a G*, the thought is not articulated in this way, it is rather simply *that G is F*. Evans' suggestion is that in this sort of case that some degree of mistake concerning the sortal is tolerable, but a great degree is not.

The two upshots seem to be:

1. One does *not* see *x as a G*. This is most likely to happen when the information coming in through the link does not provide sortal-identifying information. The thought *this G is F* would involve an articulation into a demonstrative component and a descriptive component. If the sortal is wrong, then the thought still has a content, but it is just false.
2. One sees *x as a G*. Most likely because of information coming in through the IL. (But not entirely — if I have a strong fear of spiders,

then I might see any black spot *as a spider* as a result of psychological bias, with little prompting from information from the IL.) There are three possibilities:

2a. The sortal is right. In this case, everything is fine.

2b. The sortal is wrong, but not outlandishly so. In such a case there is a legit demonstrative thought, except that it is 'mistaken' in its sortal.

2c. The sortal is outlandishly wrong. In this case Evans says that it seems right to say that there is no coherent thought content.

Evans nowhere discusses what makes a sortal outlandishly wrong as opposed to tolerably wrong. One suggestion (following up on my comments on Section 5.4, taking the structure of one of Evans' arguments as a clue) might connect the issue to fundamental grounds of difference. Suppose I see x *as a G*, and judge *that G is F*. But x is really an H . In such a case, the question is, is the fundamental ground of difference of H 's such as to be able to combine with my understanding of the predicate F to yield a thought? For instance, the predicate "... is drinking" is one that can apply equally to men and women, so misidentifying the sortal doesn't impair my understanding of how the predicate can apply to the object. But that predicate is not appropriate for rocks — anyone who thinks that (non-anthropomorphized) rocks can drink doesn't understand the predicate "... is drinking."

6.A3 Appendix Section 3

In this section Evans discusses the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification in the case of information-based descriptive thoughts (these were discussed in Chapter 5). He provides an account of their IEM status in a way that is

oddly different from the account provided in the case of demonstrative thoughts and "here"-thoughts. I provide a guess as to why Evans is here offering this different and puzzling account.

Evans has previously argued for two claims. First, that the phenomenon of identification-free thoughts is a result of the way certain information-based thoughts work. In cases where an information link is such that its provision of information to the effect that property *F* is instantiated is shunted directly into the controlling conception of some object, then the possibility of identification-free thought about that object is provided for. Examples of this are demonstratives, "here"-thoughts, and "I"-thoughts (see Chapter 7). Second, Evans has argued that there are cases of information-based thoughts whose mode of identification involves descriptive content, e.g. *That big blue bird is building a nest*. Such thoughts were used as examples in Chapter 5.⁸

Recall from Chapter 5 that this was the difference between a genuine definite description '*the* ϕ was *F*' (not based on information) and '*that* ϕ was *F*' (the 'that' indicating that the thought is information-based). For simplicity, let's assume that the information underlying the descriptive content ϕ , as well as the information to the effect that the object is *F*, all derived from the

⁸ The fact that the word 'identification' is showing up in both claims invites confusion, for it means two different things. In the case of 'identification-free' it means that the thought in question cannot be articulated into two thoughts one of which expresses an *identity*. In the case of 'mode of identification' it is concerned with the resources the subject brings to bear in satisfying Russell's Principle. Evans argued in Chapter 6 that there are thoughts that are identification-free (in the identity-claim sense), and whose mode of identification (in the Russell's Principle sense) is demonstrative.

information links and were mainlined into the controlling conception of the object.

Now such information-based descriptive thoughts, like thoughts employing demonstrative modes of identification, seem to be IF: if yesterday I had a demonstrative thought to the effect that *that blue bird building a nest*, it would make no sense for me to wonder (today) *something was building a nest, but was it that big blue bird that was building a nest?* The issue is explaining how this is how. Why is it that such thoughts can be IF.

That's the background. Evans then starts, in the second paragraph, to provide an explanation for why these information-based thoughts are IF. This is odd, for one might wonder why a new explanation needs to be provided. Wouldn't the explanation be the same, or analogous, to the case of demonstrative and "here"-thoughts? If there needs to be a different explanation, it would seem that the reason would have to be some key difference between i) the Idea used in the information-based descriptive thought, and ii) demonstrative and "here"-Ideas.

My theory is that Evans wrote the notes that became this section of the appendix before he wrote the notes that became the appendix for Chapter 5. The reason is that in the Appendix to Chapter 5 Evans modifies the conception of the Idea involved in an information-based descriptive Idea. The modification is a change from conceiving of such an Idea as i) employing a mode of identification that is more or less exactly like a definite description, to ii) a mode of identification that, while it incorporates descriptive elements, has its status as information-based built into the Idea. As Evans put it:

When, in the description-based case mentioned above, we say that the subject believes that *that φ was F*, we use 'that φ ' in such a way that

nothing could be *that* φ unless it was the source of the retained information on which the thought is based. (VR p. 139)

If we read the current section of the Chapter 6 Appendix as having been written while Evans was still thinking of the information-based descriptive Ideas along the lines of (i), then this appendix makes perfect sense. It's an attempt to show that an Idea that is essentially a definite description could still result in a phenomenon that is similar to IEM. But once the move is made from (i) to (ii), then no new account is necessary. That move, when combined with the material in Section 1 of Chapter 6 appendix (in dynamic Fregean thoughts), yield an explanation of the IF status of these thoughts that is essentially similar to the account in the case of demonstrative and "here"-thoughts.

Here is how the explanation would go, after the move from (i) to (ii). My thought "That big blue bird was squawking" is IF because only one Idea is involved. The information to the effect that squawking was instantiated was mainlined directly into the controlling conception of the Idea I had of *that bird*. At no point was there a mediating Idea of any other object *a* linking *a is squawking* with *that big blue bird is a*. The fact that I am now remembering the event changes none of that. It is true that because it is past tense, there is no longer an information-link actively feeding the CC. The functional features of the idea have changed. But this is as expected, given a modification of my Idea along the lines of the material in 6.A1 and 6.4. But none of that changes the fact that the information got into the CC in an identification-free way. At no point did a mediating Idea *a* get introduced. That seems to work fine.

But that isn't the explanation Evans gives here. Here he says that an information-based descriptive thought's status as IF is a result of the overriding goal that the thought be well-grounded. Evans says:

This secures that the thinking, if it nets an object at all, nets the object which is the source of the information; so that one cannot intelligibly wonder whether it is the object netted by this thinking to which the information relates. (p. 197)

This is odd to say the least, in part because it seems as though it can't be a correct analysis of the situation. If that explanation were sufficient to secure the IF status of such thoughts, it would be sufficient to secure the IF status of any information-based thought whatsoever, whether there was an intermediary identification component or not, since it is an overriding goal of *all* information-based thoughts that the thought concern the object that is the causal source.

Moreover, even if that weren't an issue, the sort of IEM that would be provided for by this sort of argument is much more akin to the standard version of IEM, and not IF as Evans has analyzed it for demonstrative and "here"-thoughts. The analysis of IF is primarily a psychological one, being based on the idea that a functional connection between the Idea and relevant information channels removes the need for an identity claim. The phenomenon discussed here has nothing to do with that, and instead is just an observation that, unless the mode of identification in fact nets the causal source, the episode doesn't qualify as a thought. This might be correct (and an explanation for why some thoughts are IEM), but it is quite unlike the IF analysis. (See Grush 2007 for more on Evans' notion of IF and its relation to IEM.)

6.A4 Appendix Section 4

The topic of this section concerns demonstrative identification of abstract objects. Evans will argue that there are cases in which demonstrative identification of a token of a type can be a way of demonstratively identifying the type by putting the subject in mind of the properties that constitute the fundamental ground of difference of that type.

Here we get a very brief discussion of a topic that would require a good deal more discussion. But it is suggestive nevertheless. The question is whether there can be anything like demonstrative identification of abstract entities. Evans focuses on *types* as abstract entities, and suggests that in some circumstances the demonstrative identification of a token of that type can allow one to demonstratively identify the type.

Evans begins by pointing out that on his account, one manages to think of an entity via the employment of an Idea of that entity. Such Ideas can be fundamental or non-fundamental. Evans' first move is somewhat questionable: he claims that the fundamental ground of difference of a type entity is the set of properties possessed by all tokens that instantiate that type. This isn't a great way to put it for various reasons, one being that all tokens of a type might have properties that are incidental to their fundamental ground of difference (all tokens of *mammal* have the property of being on a planet orbiting our sun, but surely that is not part of their fundamental ground of difference). In any case, this issue seems avoidable, for we can rephrase the criterion in a way that matches Evans own formulation in Chapter 4 as: the fundamental ground of difference of a type entity will be those properties that distinguish it from all other types of the

same superordinate type. For example, the fundamental ground of difference of triangles (as a type) will be the geometric properties that distinguish them from all other shapes.

One way one can be made mindful of the properties that comprise the fundamental ground of difference of a type is by perceiving those properties instanced in a token of that type. The suggestion then is that a demonstrative identification of such a token is providing the subject with a fundamental Idea of the abstract object, and this counts as a demonstrative identification of the abstract object. (Notice the difference between, when pointing at an albino tiger: *That animal is recovering from an illness* vs *That animal is on the endangered species list*.)

Next, Evans tries to distinguish this sort of identification of a type from a descriptive identification, which would be something like 'the type of which this is a token'. The only consideration here is that there are cases in which perception of the token may be required for correctly understanding the remark, for having a fundamental Idea of the type. Telling the clerk that I want paint of a color that is the same color as the chip in my hand (when I do not show the clerk the chip), may allow the clerk to think true descriptive thoughts of that type. And this is exactly because it will not give him a fundamental Idea of the type — he will not understand the remark in the same way he might if I show the chip to him. Compare this to McDowell's remark, in the context of a discussion of Evans' notion of non-conceptual content:

But why should we accept that a person's ability to embrace colour within her conceptual thinking is restricted to concepts expressible by words like "red" or "green" and phrases like "burnt sienna"? It is possible to acquire the concept of a shade of colour, and most of us have done so. Why not say that one is thereby equipped to embrace

shades of colour within one's conceptual thinking with the very same determinateness with which they are presented in one's visual experience, so that one's concepts can capture colours no less sharply than one's experience presents them? In the throes of an experience of the kind that putatively transcends one's conceptual powers—an experience that *ex hypothesi* affords a suitable sample—one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly as fine-grained as the experience, by uttering a phrase like “that shade”, in which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the sample. (McDowell, *Mind and World*, pp. 56-7)

6.A5 Appendix Section 5

This section rehearses five reasons that people find the Russellian status of demonstrative identification Evans has argued for in Chapter 6 (and previous chapters) difficult to accept. All five of these are discussed elsewhere in the text, but it is rhetorically helpful to have them discussed together.

The first is just the fact that some people do not distinguish demonstratives as a *typographical* or *phonological* type from demonstratives as a *semantic* category, and thus assume that all cases in which the words ‘this’ or ‘that’ is used in English, the semantic category of demonstrative must be in play. Since such words are used in a great variety of cases, many of which resist analysis in terms of the apparatus Evans has developed, it may seem as though his analysis is unworkable. But Evans is giving a theory that recognizes and analyzes a certain semantic category. He need not assume that this semantic category is always and only marked by a lexical demonstrative expression. And this isn't just Evans, pretty much anyone working in any area of semantics has to recognize the divergence between

semantic categories and typographical categories, and even grammatical categories.

The second is a failure to distinguish what Evans calls 'situation-specifying' descriptions of mental states from 'content-giving' specifications. This is extremely important, and is probably the biggest source of resistance. It is important enough that I will expand upon it here and also in later chapters. To adapt an example that Evans will use from Chapter 10, suppose someone you are with is hallucinating a little green man, and they point to what you see is empty space and say "that man looks dangerous." Evans is pointing out that there is a difference — perhaps difficult to discern but crucial — between these two things:

1. Specifying the content of the 'thought' the hallucinator is having. Or to put it another way, the truth condition: *the conditions that would make the thought true.*
2. Specifying the sort of situation such that, had it obtained, the thought-attempt would have content. Or to put it another way: *the conditions, such that had they been actualized, there would have been a thought content.*

The point is that in the normal case, where someone is making a successful demonstrative reference, we're not doing (2). In the successful case, the content is specified by appeal to the object that is identified: the thinker is thinking that *that man* is angry — and here 'that man' is being used in a way that makes a demonstrative reference to a person in the shared perceptual environment. In this case, one isn't just *describing the situation* whose obtaining makes (or would have made) the demonstrative reference possible.

But in the case of the hallucinator, that is precisely what one is doing. By surreptitious appeal to (2) people think that there is a perfectly good thought attempt where there is no object, which, if it worked, would show that such expressions are not Russellian. Evans goes into more detail in Chapters 9 and 10 on this topic, and I will discuss it more later.

The third is the failure to distinguish cases of misidentifying something (in the sense of getting the wrong sortal) that one successfully demonstratively identifies from cases where one fails to demonstratively identify anything at all. The idea seems to be that some people feel that "That fish is white" said of a pebble lacks an object and yet qualifies as a thought. Evans says that in such case the thought has an object, it has just been misidentified. So the fact that there is a thought even though there is no fish does not impugn the Russellian nature of the thought, since there is still an object there. The distinction is one Evans has discussed in Chapter 6 as well as Part 2 of this Appendix.

The fourth are cases where entities that do not exist are discussed using demonstrative expressions. Again, this seems to be in conflict with their Russellian status. We might talk about 'that spy' after seeing a movie. To some extent such cases will be discussed in Chapter 10, where an account of pretense is developed primarily to explain negative existential statements.

The fifth source of resistance is adherence to a sort of representationalism that rejects externalism of the kind embraced by Evans' position. This sort of representationalism holds that mental states, including thoughts, are internal states such that a) one knows whether or not one has that mental state, and b) whether or not one has it cannot be altered by changing external factors of which one is not aware. Evans' position denies both of these. The doctrine is that the existence (or not) of an appropriate object, whether the subject can tell the situations apart, determines whether

the subject can have a demonstrative thought. Thus, I might take myself to be thinking a thought when I am not, and whether or not I am thinking this thought is partially determined by factors external (in some sense) to my mind.

Evans suggests that considerations such as the argument from illusion are responsible for the tight grip this kind of representationalism exercises. And there are some moves here aimed at discrediting the argument from illusion. The argument from illusion is this: illusions seem to the subject to be just like cases of veridical perception. Seeing a straight stick partially submerged in water seems to the subject like a situation in which they are seeing a bent stick, for example. One explanation for this is that the subject has an inner representational state, a state proprietary to the subject's mind that determines the content of the subject's mental goings-on. Illusions are cases where external factors of one type cause representational states in a subject whose content would be specified via a situation of a different type — a straight-stick situation is causing a representation whose content would appeal to a bent-stick situation. Veridical perception on this model occurs when the external factors cause representational states whose content matches the external conditions in the relevant respects.

The passage in which Evans responds to this line of thought is here:

If after it has been acknowledged on all sides that it seems to the hallucinator that he is confronting something, and to the person who sees a stick in water that he is confronting something bent, one says that it seems reasonable to the generality of mankind to suppose that the hallucinator is actually confronting something, and that the person who sees a stick is confronting something that is actually bent, then one is attempting to double-count the fact that has already been acknowledged. (VR p. 200)

To be fair it can be said that this argument fails to join issue with the representationalist. In positing representations, the representationalist is not trying to double-count the fact that has already been accounted for — the fact that it seems to the subject as though he is confronting something. Rather, the representationalist is offering an explanation of this fact. The reason, the representationalist claims, that it seems to the subject as though he is confronting a bent stick when he is not is that a certain kind of representational state with a certain kind of content — a state normally or veridically caused by the perceptual presence of a bent stick — is being entertained by the subject. Now this is not to say that other explanations of why it seems to a subject as though he is confronting something might not be offered. My point is just that the representationalist need not be interpreted as trying to double-count.

My own take is that the better argument against the representationalist position is one that keys on the fact that for some thoughts the content specification requires the object. The next section of the appendix follows up on this issue.

6.A6 Appendix Section 6

In this section Evans approaches the internalist position, which was discussed in the previous section of the Appendix, from a different path. Rather than discuss the similarities in mental states between a subject who is hallucinating and the same subject when not hallucinating (the argument from illusion) the issue now is the similarity between two subjects in different but analogous situations. The internalist argues that the similarity between my thought that it is hot here and the thought of my doppelganger on twinearth that it is hot here is that they share a representational

content. Evans argues that this cannot be right. Essentially on grounds that representations must be the sorts of things that are either true or false, and hence have a singular content (a content that can only be expressed in terms of specific objects) that is not capturable on this scheme.

The point of this section of the Appendix is to defend Evans' externalism, specifically the doctrine that the relevant thoughts are Russellian. The position is that if the object of a an attempted thought does not exists (as in cases of illusion or hallucination), then the thought attempt fails, no thought is grasped. In my discussion I will not so much walk through Evans' own text, as I usually do, but will try to re-express the same argument in a slightly different way.

We can start with the idea that motivates the internalist. The motivating intuition is that there is something in common between me when I see a cat, and me when I hallucinate a cat; and something in common between me thinking of my location as "here" and my doppelganger on Twinearth when he thinks of his location as "here."

What is common in these cases are what we might call narrowly psychological factors. It includes, as Evans says, anything the subject could be aware of, but it can also include a great deal of subconscious psychological machinery as well. Evans calls these "M-states". The contrast is with states specified by a combination of such narrowly psychological factors and external factors. I will follow philosophical tradition in calling these states "wide". So while my doppelganger on Twinearth and I share an M-state when we think about the stuff in lakes, we are in different wide states — I am thinking a "water" thought, and he is thinking an "XYZ" thought.

Now interestingly Evans' own program will make use of M-states. The account of pretense he develops in Chapter 10, for instance, is an account according to which we pretend to have a thought by mobilizing the same narrowly psychological machinery we would mobilize if there were an object. But the question explored here concerns the question of whether these M-states are thoughts. The resistance to Evans' program of treating some thoughts as Russellian has, as a major motivating force, the intuition that the narrowly psychological stuff can be a thought even in absence of an object, and hence such thoughts are not Russellian.

The short version of Evans' argument hinges on placing a heavy emphasis on the idea that thoughts are necessary contentful, and content must be specified in terms of truth conditions. And M-states by their nature do not specify truth conditions. Therefore, they don't really have content, and hence aren't thoughts.

The reason these M-states don't specify truth conditions is that they don't have a specific object. I share an M-state with my doppelganger, but it is not about *water*, nor is it about *XYZ*. Its 'object' (so to speak) is what Evans calls a "schema." Call this schema α . When we are having thoughts about the stuff we drink, my doppelganger and I are both in M-states that satisfy the schema " α is F." But because α is a schema, it doesn't support truth-evaluable contents. Note that "water contains hydrogen" is true, whereas "XYZ contains hydrogen" is false. Given that, is " α is F" true or false? It is neither. And it is neither exactly because it is indeterminate, because it is a *schema*.

I will return to this topic in a discussion following Chapter 10.