

Guide to Chapter Six of Gareth Evans' *The Varieties of Reference*

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6.0 What Happens in Chapter Six

The main topic of this chapter is Evans' account of demonstrative thought, though he produces an account of here-thoughts along the way. Here is a summary. First Evans gives a theory of egocentric space, the space in which the objects of our perception and action are located. This space includes locations that could be thought about as here, there, and so forth for many many locations, but our experience of egocentric space is much more rich and fine grained than what can be captured linguistically. The account of egocentric spatial experience is that it is underwritten by a rich set of interconnections between perception and action. To see something as being to the left is to be disposed, upon getting information about the object, to act in various ways towards it, such as turning to the left to foveate it. A special location in egocentric space is here. Evans gives an account of our here-Ideas as an Idea of a location whose CC is fed by information links that provide information about one's surroundings. For example, when I open my eyes and see blackness, this information is fed into the CC in such a way that I judge it is dark here.

When you perceive an object, the ILs with that object not only provide information about it, but they also often allow you to place that object in egocentric space. You can see, or feel, where it is. But location in egocentric space is not enough for discriminating knowledge. The fundamental ground of difference of material objects is location in objective space. If a subject has a cognitive map – a representation of objective space – that can be brought into coordination with egocentric space, then locating an object in egocentric space will also locate it in objective space. And the subject will then have a fundamental Idea of the object. Evans allows that in certain cases, the subject may not be able to place the object at a determinate location in egocentric space, and also might be lost and hence unable to coordinate objective and egocentric space. But so long as the IL allows the subject to discover the object's location, and so long as the subject has the ability to coordinate egocentric and objective space, the Idea will be adequate (if not fundamental).

Evans then discusses the fact that his view explains why demonstrative thoughts and here-thoughts are “immune to error through misidentification.” Many thoughts are such that I can question them in the following way: I go to the parking lot and see a dented car and say “My car has been dented.” But it makes sense for me to ask “Some car is dented, but is it my car that is dented?” because I realize I may have misidentified that car as my car. But demonstratives and here-thoughts are immune to this sort of error (provisos are discussed in the chapter): when I open my eyes and see darkness, it would be anomalous to wonder, on the basis of the apparent darkness “Somewhere it is dark, but is it here that

it is dark?"; and if I am watching a log burn and think "that log is burning", it would be anomalous to wonder "Something is burning, but is it that log that is burning?"

The explanation is that because that-Ideas and here-Ideas are such that they are functionally tied to information links such that when predicative information comes in through the link it is automatically placed in the CC if that Idea, there is no intermediary identification. To feel hotness just is to feel as though it is hot here. It is not to feel that it is hot somewhere, in such a way as to require one to marshal resources to infer that that somewhere is here.

6.1 Demonstrative identification and perception

This chapter is concerned with the thoughts that underlie the semantic category of demonstratives¹, and in this section, Evans explores briefly the connection between demonstrative identification (in thought) and perception, since to a first approximation it seems that in order to understand a sentence using a demonstrative one must be able to perceive the referent. First, he points out a couple of ways in which the notion of perception is vague: do we perceive the stars, when the light we see has been traveling for thousands of years; do we perceive objects through information transmission media such as recordings; do we perceive an entire object when only a part is affecting our senses? Second, he makes some remarks concerning the relation between the theoretical notion of demonstrative identification and the occurrence of demonstrative expressions in natural language. These are prologues to the material in subsequent sections.

In Evans' hands, Demonstrative identification is a theoretical notion — one of the three kinds of identification of objects (the other two being description, and recognition-based) that suffices for satisfying RP. A demonstrative identification is a way of knowing what object one is thinking about, a way that makes possible a *demonstrative thought*. Evans will argue that the semantics of demonstratives as a semantic category is to be explained in terms of this sort of thought, a *demonstrative thought*, that one must have in order to understand a sentence using a demonstrative expression.

Evans begins by pointing out the oft-noted relation between 'demonstrative identification' and perception, and gives Strawson's rough characterization that it involves perceptually picking out or perceptually discriminating an object. Two points about this are first, the characterization is vague in a number of ways, and second that as a matter of theory, we want to know what it is about perception that allows it to underwrite demonstrative thought. This latter point is to be understood in the light of Chapter 4. If we are to be able to think of objects 'demonstratively' this means that there must be something about this perceptual contact provides (or is a necessary part of the provision of) an Idea of the object, a fundamental Idea that will allow us to distinguish the object from all other objects.

¹ I have published, with Amanda Brovold, an account of demonstrative semantics which differs from Evans' account in key respects. In particular we argue that perception is not the primary notion. Though it is a special case of the key notion. In any case, going into that is beyond the scope of this guide. Interested readers should consult Brovold and Grush (2012), especially Section 4.

Two sorts of vagueness that Evans discusses concern i) information links that are long (seeing the stars) or circuitous (seeing a person via their image on TV); and ii) the relation between being in perceptual contact with a part of an object and the entire object.

The suggestion is going to be that the theoretical considerations concerning the ability of perception to play a role in enabling a certain kind of thought about objects will go some way to helping us clarify the various vagaries. That is, if we have a theoretically motivated account of what a demonstrative Idea is and how it makes thought possible, this might tell us what sorts of perceptual contact are sufficient for the job.

Evans closes by raising a point about taking 'this' and 'that' in English as indicators of natural semantic kinds. He brings up a case of what he calls (following Quine) deferred ostension. The example is using 'that man' when pointing at a car to refer to the car's owner. In this case the speaker is not in any sort of perceptual contact with the referent. Evans claims that in this case the referent is thought about by description, as something like 'the owner of this car'. In any case, it points to a need for greater theoretical clarity on the relation between perception and thought (and also between demonstratives as a grammatical category and demonstratives as a semantic category).

6.2 Information-links are not sufficient

There are **five** strands to this section. **First**, we have a characterization of information-links (ILs), which is Evans' term for, roughly, perceptual contact with objects. **Second**, there is a remark on the relation between ILs and demonstrative Ideas. In particular, an Idea's having a controlling conception that is fed with information from an IL is part of what makes the Idea a demonstrative Idea. **Third** some considerations aimed at showing that ILs are not by themselves sufficient to sustain demonstrative thoughts (though they are necessary). Essentially they don't guarantee satisfaction of the GC. **Fourth**, Evans discusses what else, besides an IL, is required to sustain such thought. The subject must have a fundamental Idea of the object. **Finally** (the last paragraph), Evans claims that cases of identification involving long time-lags and such appear to be *sui-generis*, and neither genuinely demonstrative nor descriptive.

First (in the first paragraph) we get a characterization of ILs. They are causal links between objects and thinkers that provide the thinkers with information about the objects. These links are actually somewhat sophisticated, as they require perceptual mechanisms that isolate objects from background noise, and also allow for the tracking of objects over time. Just having sense receptors sensitive to certain kinds of causal impingement is not enough. An IL is a sort of maintained conduit through which a subject gathers information from an object.²

Second (in the paragraph bridging 146-7) is a point of major importance. Evans tells us that it is part of a functional characterization of demonstrative Ideas that their CCs (controlling conceptions, aka dossiers) are mainlined information from an IL. And moreover that any information derived from this

² It will turn out that in some cases (*here*-thoughts and *I*-thoughts) an IL can be quiescent, delivering no information but still being maintained such that if any information arises it will make its way through the conduit.

link, because it is mainlined into the Idea's dossier, will be treated as immediately germane to one's thought about that object. For example, information coming in through the IL to the effect that redness is instantiated is treated as immediately germane to the thought that the object is red. Having such a dossier fed by an active information-link is a necessary condition for a demonstrative thought. This will be discussed in great detail later. Footnote 10 provides for a bit of an update on the notion of an information-based thought. The basic idea is that such thoughts should now be understood as thoughts employing an Idea that is (or was) functionally connected to an IL in the way just described.

Third (from the top of p. 147 to the bottom of p. 148) Evans provides an argument to the effect that an information link is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain demonstrative thought. The brief version of the argument is that a constraint on thought is the Generality Constraint, and that merely having an active information link with an object does not guarantee satisfaction of the GC. Less briefly: In order to have a thought, one must identify the object. A mere IL may not do this. I might see a television image of hundreds of Coke cans moving along a conveyor belt, but even if I focus on one of the cans in the image, this doesn't let me know which Coke can in the world this is – at least not in the way that a normal demonstrative does. I may have no idea where the camera is (China? Canada?). And if the identification is made descriptively, as *the can that is the causal source of this image* (or whatever), then the thought is descriptive — it no longer has the 'conceptual simplicity' of a demonstrative thought.

This brings us to the **fourth** topic (from the top of p. 149 through the last full paragraph of p. 150). In order to have a thought about an object, one must have an adequate Idea of the object — an adequate Idea being what allows the subject's thought to satisfy the GC, an Idea combinable with all allowable predicates. Evans has argued that there are two ways for a subject to have an adequate Idea of an object. Either one's Idea can involve a fundamental identification, or one would have to know what would make an identity proposition between one's idea and a fundamental identification true. An information link by itself does not provide this.

In a normally functioning demonstrative identification, the IL with the object not only provides information about the object (in the sense of what properties it instantiates — *the Coke can is red*), but this link allows one to locate the object in space. Recall that for material objects, location in space at a time is their fundamental ground of difference. Having an Idea of an object as the occupier of a spatial location at a given time is a fundamental identification of such an object. With normally functioning demonstrative identifications, there are two possibilities. First, one's information link with the object is such that it just puts one in a position to know where the object is in egocentric space — one can see it directly in front of one, for example. This would be a fundamental identification of the object. Or, the information link, while not immediately allowing one to place the object in egocentric space, is such that the subject could use the information link to locate the object. If the information link has this character, then the subject will know what it is for his Idea of the object to be identical to a fundamental identification of a material object, it is his ability, or practical capacity, to locate the object in egocentric space, even if he does not at the time know exactly where it is. (This paragraph has been a quick gloss, that leaves out a number of central themes, on an account that will be spelled out more fully in 6.3.)

The mere existence of an information link, however, doesn't always allow the subject to locate the object in space (or better: need not be such as to allow the subject to engage any practical capacities to locate the object in space). In such a case, the subject will not have an adequate Idea of the object, and

hence will be unable to think thoughts about it (at least unable to think *demonstrative* thoughts — the subject of course could still think about the object by description, as the object that is the source of a given body of information). I will make a few more remarks about this argument in the next section.

Fourth and finally, Evans comments that certain sorts of case, those involving large time-lags, seem to be neither demonstrative, nor descriptive, but *sui generis*. There is little argument or discussion here, and nothing hangs on this point for later purposes.

Evans' argument in this section will probably strike many as unconvincing. I will try to make it as convincing as possible. This will involve a few steps. First, one can plausibly take it that one's grasp of certain concepts is manifested in an ability to decide their applicability. For example, suppose that while in a paint store one day, I overhear someone saying they want teal paint. I infer correctly that teal is a shade of color, but do I have the concept of *teal*? It seems plausible to say that I simply don't. If given a bunch of color chips, in conditions as favorable as one likes, I couldn't tell you which were teal and which not, nor even come close, then I simply don't know what teal means — I don't have the concept *teal*. I might repeat the words 'The house is teal, the cat is teal, the box is teal' to myself, but I would not be able to think the thought 'the house is teal'. (Of course, I can think the thought *the house is some color or other*, and if I know that I don't know what 'teal' means but know that it is a shade of color, and take 'teal' as a place-holder for 'some color or other', then I can think this other thought. But thinking that the house is *some color or other* is not the same as thinking that the house is *teal*. I think many who find this argument unconvincing are allowing themselves, amazingly, to slide from *some color or other* to *teal* as though this were not an unacceptable thing to do.) The next step in the reconstructed argument is to take an example similar to Evans' example of the soccer player on the television, but which is more convincing (this example is due to Adrian Cussins). Imagine a television with an image of an assembly line along which hundreds of Coke cans are moving along. The subject points to one (or perhaps merely fixes his attention on the image of one) and wonders whether than can will be purchased by a movie star. In such a case, the subject is in a position with respect to that coke can that the subject in the teal example was with respect to teal. The subject simply has no idea what it would mean for *that can*, rather than any other can of coke, to be purchased by a movie star, he has no idea of *that can* that distinguishes it from any of hundreds or thousands of other coke cans. Now again, there are thoughts similar to the attempted demonstrative thought that the subject can very well entertain (and it is this fact that, I think, makes people more willing than they should be to credit the subject with an ability to entertain a demonstrative thought about that coke can). For example, the subject can think that *some coke can or other will be purchased by a movie star* (an existential coke can thought), and the subject can think the descriptive thought that *the coke can that is producing this image will be purchased by a movie star*. But though there are relations between the existential thought and the descriptive thought, they do not amount, individually or jointly, the purported demonstrative thought.

6.3 Egocentric spatial thinking: 'here'

Section 6.1 posed the question How does perception make a thought possible? We will now get an answer to this. Perception will make a demonstrative thought possible by allowing the subject to place the perceived object at a location in space at a time. In so doing, perception provides a fundamental identification of the object, and this makes thought about it possible. This section spells out how this

*happens — how perception allows us to locate something in space. This chapter is one of the longest in the book and could easily have been broken into two or more. Six topics can be discerned. **First**, a gloss on what is needed for a fundamental identification of a material object — the ability to make such an identification being crucial for demonstrative identification. This turns out to be objective space. **Second**, there is a long discussion of egocentric spatial representation. The upshot is that an experiential episode carries egocentric spatial content if that experience is hooked up in the right way with the complex web of perception-action connections that a subject has. Thus, in the normal case, perception of an object makes its location in egocentric space manifest. **Third**, there is a discussion of our ability to bring egocentric space into coordination with objective space, thus allowing us to locate perceived objects in objective space and hence to have a fundamental identification of them. **Fourth**, there is a discussion of 'here' aimed at showing that even 'here' thoughts require more than an information link. **Fifth**, a brief comparison between the demonstrative identification of places and of objects. And **sixth**, an argument that demonstrative thoughts about places are Russellian. In order to try to keep things manageable and clear, I will number these six topics in this section as 6.3.1 - 6.3.6, and treat them as distinct subsections.*

6.3.1. Introduction (top of p. 151 to bottom third of p. 152)

The fundamental ground of difference of physical objects is their spatial location at a time, so in order to have any adequate Idea of an object for use in demonstrative identification, we must either be able to locate the object (or location, if we are attempting a thought about a place) in space, or know what would make such an identification of its location with a location in objective space true. Either way, what is crucial is the ability to represent spatial locations. In particular, what is needed is a representation of objects' locations in *objective space*. Objective space contrasts with egocentric space in that the latter represents objects' locations relative to oneself. Locations-from-a-point-of-view, or egocentric spatial locations, do not provide fundamental identifications of objects. This is because knowing where something is *in relation to me* does not necessarily tell me where the object is located in objective space, and thus does not serve to distinguish it from all other things of its type. In objective space, all objects are located in a 'cognitive map' in which there is no privileged point. It is a representation of the spatial relations between the objects in the world as well as the landmarks that establish their objective location. Though the sort of spatial representation that provides for fundamental Ideas of physical objects is objective space, knowing the location of something in egocentric space is the first step towards knowing where it is in objective space. If something is located in egocentric space, and if in addition the subject has the capacity to align her egocentric space with an objective cognitive map, then the subject will *ipso facto* have the capacity to locate the perceived object in objective space, and will have an adequate Idea of it. It is to the notion of egocentric space that we turn first, and especially to *here*-thoughts.

6.3.2. Egocentric Space (bottom third of p. 152 to the top of p. 162)

As a prelude to the discussion of egocentric space, Evans begins with a discussion of *here*. The first point is that *here*-thoughts differ from normal demonstrative thoughts in that we need not be receiving information from our current location in order to think of it as *here*. Evans' example is of someone in a sensory deprivation tank. Even so, Evans does not think that our *here*-thoughts are descriptive, as 'the location where I am'. One reason is that that approach would completely sever the connection between

here-thoughts and perception (and action, more about that soon), and Evans does not think that is right either, as he will argue. A second reason is that doing so would require that *I* has primacy over *here*, and Evans doesn't think that's right either. Evans' point here seems to be that indexicals including 'I', 'here' and 'now' are inter-defined: they form a local holism. One does not define some of them on the basis of the others, but rather the three are given together.³

Evans then points out that 'here' is part of a cluster of related spatial notions, including 'there', 'to the left', etc. The manifold of these constitute egocentric space, or as Evans will later call it, *behavioral space*. What makes these notions as a group available, and what distinguishes each of them from the others, are interconnections between perception and action. The position is summed up nicely in the first full paragraph on page 154:

Egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the content of our spatial experiences would be formulated, and those in which our immediate behavioural plans would be expressed. This duality is no coincidence: an egocentric space can exist only for an animal in which a complex network of connections exists between perceptual input and behavioural output. (p. 154)

The first part of the argument for this hinges on drawing a distinction between i) being selectively sensitive to something at a location, and ii) experiencing that sensitivity *as* concerning a location in egocentric space. To take a simple example, I might arrange things such that you hear a particular beep in your left ear whenever an object enters a certain location two meters behind you. If this were the case, you'd be selectively sensitive to objects at that location. But it is entirely possible, especially if I don't tell you about what I've done, that you will just experience this as random tones that you hear, with no spatial significance at all. The question is, what needs to be added to your experience such that the beep is not experienced by you as a beep in your left ear but as, so to speak, *an object behind you*? Evans' answer is that it is only when that input gets connected to dispositions for behavior — such as *automatically* turning around to see what is there when you hear the beep — that the experience starts to take on spatial significance.⁴

As Evans puts it:

This point also comes out very clearly if we reflect upon how we might specify the spatial information which we imagine the perception to embody. The subject hears the sound as coming from such-and-such a position, but how is the position to be specified? Presumably in egocentric terms (he hears the sound as up, or down, to the right or to the left, in front or behind). These

³ Evans' remarks on the brain in a vat example could be made more strongly. Imagine someone in the situation described in *The Matrix*, who, while still in the virtual reality program, is appraised of her situation. She might come to believe (truly) that what she would have identified as her brain before being appraised of her situation is not the thing sustaining her thoughts. It is just one more illusory construct of the Matrix. She might be able to think that there is such a brain, somewhere (though it is not anywhere in the universe as she knows it) — something that sustains her thoughts. But it is pretty clear that thinking of such a place as 'here', in the same way that I might think of my bedroom as 'here' when I wake up in the darkness, is out of the question. The relation of this line of thought to the claim that *here*-thoughts are not descriptions of the form 'where I am' is not entirely direct, since 'where I am' and 'where the organ sustaining my thoughts is' are not the same. But the point that *here*-thoughts are constitutively linked to possibilities of sensation and action should be clear enough.

⁴ I have written extensively on this account of egocentric spatial perception. See Grush (2007).

terms specify the position of the sound in relation to the observer's own body; and they derive their meaning in part from their complicated connections with the subject's actions. (p. 155)

At the bottom of page 157, and continuing to the middle of p. 159, Evans turns to arguments to the effect that having an egocentric space, and having the ability to perceive things in egocentric space, does not yet provide for a notion of experience (and I think that Evans means to be using 'experience' in the thick, Kantian sense of 'experience of an objective world'). Merely having the machinery required for an egocentric space does not give one experience of an objective world, nor is it experience *for a subject*.

To take that next step, something else is required. Evans considers and rejects a proposal that what is required are metathoughts, thoughts that self-ascribe such egocentric 'experiences'. Rather, Evans argues that it is not that the candidate subject have metathoughts, but rather that he have *some* thoughts, thoughts about the objective world. This will happen for a being that has not only the sort of egocentric representational machinery described, but also has what Evans calls a concept-applying, reasoning system, into which the first sort of mechanisms feed. This reasoning superstructure would allow one to make judgments based upon the deliverances of the infrastructure. (This discussion is important for understanding Evans' notion of *nonconceptual content*: a topic that has gained much momentum and sparked much debate since Evans' death. Since this topic is not central to the ideas of this book, I won't elaborate on it.)

Evans returns to the main line of argument — the egocentric spatial content of perception — at the middle of page 159. He there remarks that the sort of content in question concerns a number of simultaneous locations or objects; it provides one with a single, unified representation of a number of simultaneously existing locations. (This fact will be of importance later, when the topic of aligning one's egocentric space with a cognitive map of objective space comes up. It is also an issue that is closely connected to Evans' papers 'Things without the mind', and 'Molyneux's question'.)

Finally, Evans turns to the following important and interesting point, which is that it is possible (though more difficult) to maintain the sort of perceptual and behavioral dispositions with respect to a place even in absence of input from it. It is not that the possibilities of action and perception are completely missing. They are there, but they are merely *potential*. But so long as these potential patterns of dispositions are maintained, they can provide for the sort of spatial content in question. For example, I can have a thought about a particular place that I am not currently receiving any information from, such as a spot just behind my head, provided I am attentionally tuned to any information that might be forthcoming from that location — part of maintaining a complex dispositional connection to the place. In such a case, one might say that I am maintaining an information link with that location even though no information is being passed through that link. (This is the import of footnote 20.) This will be discussed in more depth starting on p. 164, when he turns specifically to *here*-thoughts.

The basic idea of this subsection is that an ability to have experience with egocentric spatial content is made possible by the complicated web linking perceptual input with behavioral dispositions manifested in sensorimotor skills. Another way of putting it is as follows: an experience *E* has egocentric spatial import for a creature if that experience automatically (noninferentially) keys spatial-behavioral dispositions with respect to it.

6.3.3. Objective space (top of p. 162 to middle of p. 164)

The discussion of egocentric space is only a preliminary, for being able to locate some place or object in egocentric space does *not* give one a *fundamental identification* of it. A fundamental identification of a material body (or a place) places it at a position at a time, and the positions and times must be *objective* positions and times in the single unified world order. Representing something as being *in front of me now* does not by itself constitute locating it in this stronger objective sense. So how do we do it? Evans takes it for granted that we have the ability to form a cognitive map of the world — we do not represent the entire universe of course, but anything in the universe is representable in it. That there is such a thing that is separate from our representation of egocentric space is clear enough. It is why “You are here” does not count as an answer to the question “Where am I?” when I am lost. Knowing where something is in egocentric space — including knowing that I am at the center of my egocentric space — is no help when I am lost precisely because being lost is a matter of not knowing where I am in objective space.

So here is how to conceive of the problem. I have Ideas of locations in egocentric space. Call such an idea p . Such Ideas are not fundamental. The fundamental ground of difference of locations is a holistically determined objective matter, not a matter of my own perceptual/behavioral dispositions. In order for an Idea p to be adequate, I need two things. First, I need Ideas of places that are fundamental. This is my cognitive map. Second, I need a capacity to coordinate my egocentric space with this objective space. This latter capacity is an ability for me to know what it would be for a location p identified egocentrically to be identical to a location identified objectively, π . In other words, I must know what it would mean for propositions of the form $[p = \pi]$, where p is an Idea of a place in egocentric space, and π is a fundamental Idea of a place in objective space, to be true. Note that it follows that any coordination of my egocentric space and cognitive map involves placing myself on the map, as one object among others.

Now on Evans' account, one does not *in fact* have to have one's egocentric space coordinated with a cognitive map in order for one to think objectively about locations in egocentric space. What one needs is the *ability* to so coordinate. If the spaces are coordinated, then one is in fact identifying a place via a fundamental identification. If one is not at the time coordinating them, then provided that one has the ability to do so, one at least knows what it would mean for such an identity proposition to be true. Either way, one has an adequate Idea p of the place. (Recall that an adequate Idea just is, in Evans' terminology for an Idea that is either fundamental, or is such that one knows what an identity proposition between it and a fundamental Idea would consist in.)

At the top of p. 164 Evans brings up an interesting possibility, a subject who, in thinking about a location in egocentric space, is not identifying a single location in objective space. For example, if the subject is moving but is not aware of this, he might think there is one location he is thinking of with a here-thought, but there is not. In such a case Evans claims that the subject is not in fact thinking a here-thought. But the upshot is that such thoughts are Russellian. This will be taken up at the bottom of p. 169.

6.3.4. 'Here' (middle of p. 164 to the middle of p. 168)

This subsection is aimed at showing that information-links with a place are not sufficient for thoughts about that place, because they may not allow the subject to locate the location in objective space. The example constructed is that of a person who is remotely operating a submarine, and whose sensory input and motor output are as closely linked to the sensors (video cameras, etc.), and effectors (propulsion, excavators, etc.) as one likes. As Evans points out, it might be possible for the subject to throw oneself into the situation, so to speak — paying less and less attention to what is happening in the vicinity of her biological body and being sucked into the situation of the submarine.

Let us suppose that the subject thinks 'it's mucky here.' There are several possibilities to consider concerning how the subject might be thinking of that location.

First, the subject may have no idea where the sub is either in objective space or relative to her biological body on the ship. And no way of determining its location. In this situation the subject's Idea of the location p is not adequate.

Second, she might think about the location descriptively as *the location of submarine that I am informationally linked to*. This would allow the subject to sustain a thought about the location, but in a way very unlike what our here-thoughts are like.

Third, she may know where the submarine is, say, *about a mile out that way and straight down*. She could then more or less direct a thought at that location. But notice that this way of thinking of the location would be as a spot in the egocentric space of her biological body on the ship, not as the 'here' of the sub. This would be an adequate Idea, but a different sort of adequate Idea. It would be more felicitously expressed as "it's mucky there."

The fourth possibility is that she has a cognitive map that she can coordinate with the 'egocentric' space of the submarine. This is the sort of case Evans discusses on the central paragraph of page 167. If she does this, then she can identify the here-Idea p with a location π in a cognitive map. But note that more is going on here than just an information link. It is an information link together with the subject's cognitive map and self-locating skills that are making the fundamental identification of the rock possible. (But notice that on this last possibility, the subject's biological body (including her brain) would now be the entity whose location is in question.)

The point of this section is that merely having an information link does not guarantee that one will be able to, even hypothetically, locate the object or place that is the source of the information in objective space, and hence does not guarantee an ability to have an adequate Idea of it, and hence does not guarantee the ability to entertain thoughts about it (except, at best, descriptive thoughts).

6.3.5. Demonstrative identification of places vs. objects (top of p. 169 to bottom third of p. 169)

This subsection is brief. Evans is merely comparing demonstrative thoughts of places with those of things. The commonalities are that each requires at least that one maintain a stable disposition to receive information about (and maintain some set of dispositions toward) the identified place or thing. Often these dispositions are actualized and one is in fact getting information from or behaving towards

the place or thing, but maintaining the dispositions even if their execution is latent is what is key. The difference is that it is typically much easier to maintain such stable dispositions with respect to places — at least large places, and especially 'here'. In order to maintain them with respect to objects, we typically need to stay in informational contact with the object (as it moves, or as we move) in order to maintain the right set of dispositions. (But Evans will remark later that when it comes to finer distinctions in egocentric space, maintaining stable dispositions with respect to them is very difficult, and is usually pulled off by maintaining a disposition with some object at the place or in some stable spatial relationship to the place.)

6.3.6. Demonstrative thoughts about locations in egocentric space are Russellian (bottom third of p. 169 to end of section)

Evans here argues that the sort of thoughts discussed in this section — thoughts about egocentric locations, especially 'here' — are Russellian. The first step in the argument is to point out that they are not descriptive (Evans here is at least in part, no doubt, in agreement with Perry's points in 'The Problem of the Essential Indexical').

The argument for the Russellian status is in the final paragraph of the section. Here is what he says, in full:

If there is no place thought about, there is no thought at all — no intelligible proposition will have been entertained. If, for example, the subject is moving, unbeknownst to himself, so that there is no one place which he is disposed to treat as the object of his thought, then it will be quite impossible to excogitate, out of, for instance, his gestures, any intelligible thought-content for the 'here'-thoughts he essays. To do this would require us to be able to formulate a *condition* for a place to be the object of his thought, even though no place is the object of his thought, and to suppose that his thought is that *the place that meets that condition is F*. But this would be possible only if he identified the place by description, which, as we have seen, he does not do. (p. 170)

Here is a stab at filling this argument about. We can follow Frege, as surely Evans does, in saying that a thought is that for which the question of truth arises, and the content of the thought is the condition under which it is true — its *truth condition*. Now let us flesh out Evans' example: a blindfolded subject is on a very quiet hospital gurney, and is moving down a hallway without realizing it because the gurney is being pulled by ropes. He takes himself to be stationary. Let us also imagine that the hallway is full of people who are mostly quiet, but by coincidence as the gurney approaches people they begin chatting, and as it passes and moves from them, they stop talking. To the subject on the gurney it sounds as though a continual conversational din is surrounding him, when in fact a wave of chatter happens to be pacing the gurney in an otherwise quiet hallway. The subject, believing himself to be immobile, thinks *It is quite noisy here*.

We can assume that in fact there is not any one location toward which the subject has maintained a stable disposition. There are two possibilities. First, we can formulate a condition that would provide for a genuine content and truth condition, such as 'There was noise in the vicinity of the gurney', which has a clear truth condition, and would even be true in the circumstances envisioned. If this were the thought essayed by the subject, there would be a thought with a definite content, and no problem. But by hypothesis, the subject is not thinking of the location description.

Second, if there were a place with which the subject maintains stable informational and behavioral dispositions, we could also provide truth conditions: the thought would be true if that place was noisy. But in the given case this does not work. There is no *actual place* to provide the content of the thought, and there is no description that reflects the content of the attempted here-thought. So we are left with the conclusion that the thought attempt, because of the sort of attempt it is (non-descriptive) is such that in the absence of an object (a single location), there is no specifiable truth condition that reflects the content of the attempted thought. And hence there is no content, and hence no thought. Of course, there are a number of *very similar* thoughts that the subject might have thought, and even thought truly, such as the descriptive one. (See Section 6 of the Appendix of this chapter for more argument on this point.)

6.4 Demonstrative identification of material objects

Evans explores two main threads in this section. The first is a discussion of the relation between identification of places and identification of things, in particular he argues that our idea of a demonstratively identified object is not a description based on a prior identification of a place, along the lines of 'the object at p' — our ability to represent locations is not more basic than our ability to represent objects. Second, he discusses the essential temporal extension of demonstrative thoughts, their essential reliance on abilities to keep track of objects over time. Between these two discussions, Evans provides an argument to the effect that demonstrative thoughts about material objects are Russellian (this argument is parallel to that at the end of 6.3).

Evans begins by summarizing the theory of demonstrative identification of material objects:

We are now in a position to answer the question what makes demonstrative identification of ... material objects possible. In the ordinary perceptual situation, not only will there be an information-link between subject and object, but also the subject will know, or will be able to discover, upon the basis of that link, where the object is. Given the subject's general knowledge of what makes propositions of the form $[\pi = p]$ true, for arbitrary π , when p is an Idea of a position in his egocentric space, and given that he has located, or is able to locate, the object in his egocentric space, he can then be said to know what it is for $[\text{This} = \text{the object at } \pi \text{ now}]$ to be true (for arbitrary π). Hence he can be said to have an adequate Idea of the object. [pp.170-1]

So the information link will allow the subject to locate the object in egocentric space, providing an Idea p . This Idea will be adequate if the subject has the capacity to effect a coincidence between egocentric space and objective space, giving the subject the wherewithal for a fundamental Idea of the object.⁵ The IL's provision of an ability to locate the object is in addition to its acting as a source of information about the object that is shunted into its Idea's CC.

⁵ Notice that the doctrine is that the IL will allow the subject to "know" or "be able to discover" the object's location. The second disjunct will come up a few times in the text, e.g. the beetle example, and the fishing line example. Neglect of this second disjunct is why a recent criticism of Evans views on this

The bulk of page 171 covers points made elsewhere — that information links are not sufficient, and that the notion of understanding an utterance is fundamental.

From the bottom of page 171 to the top of page 173 Evans discusses the relation between a genuine demonstrative identification of an object and a descriptive identification of an object as ‘the object at p ’, which rests on a prior identification of a place. Evans’ first argument against this proposal is that, unlike his own proposal, it does not seem able to account for cases such as the beetle, whose location we are not immediately in a position to know. Second, we seem able to demonstratively identify objects when, because the object is moving so quickly, we are unable at any moment to assign it a definite location (imagine a fly quickly buzzing about one’s head, before one can latch on to a determinate location, the fly has moved on). His final argument is that we seem to be able to make more demonstrative object discriminations than we are able to make reliable spatial discriminations. A given pill-sized region of a billiard table is not the sort of thing that we can reliably re-identify or even maintain a firm hold on over a span of time; whereas an actual pill at that location, even if surrounded by many similarly shaped and colored pills, is easy to maintain attention on. Indeed, this sort of case seems to suggest that in some cases at least, it is the location of places that is dependent on a prior identification of objects.

The bottom of page 173 is an argument that demonstrative thoughts about material bodies are Russellian. This argument parallels the one at the end of 6.3 (which concerned ‘here’ thoughts) in structure. The argument depends on the premise that demonstrative ID of material bodies is *not* by description, and two different suggestions to the effect that such identification is by description are discussed and rejected. The first (discussed from the bottom of page 171 and continuing to the top of page 173) is the suggestion that a demonstrative identification of an object is a description of the form ‘the object at p ’. That case has already been dealt with. The second (discussed in footnote 44) is the suggestion that it is a description of the form ‘the object I now have my gaze fixed on’.

The argument against this latter proposal is densely packed into footnote 44. The structure of the argument is this: Evans claims that it is the *fact* that my gaze is fixed on O that determines it as the object of my thought, not the ‘idea’ or ‘conception’ of my gaze being fixed on O . By this he simply means that no description of the form ‘The one I have my gaze fixed on’ is in play. Evans constructs a dilemma for his opponent: either “my gaze is fixed on ξ ” entails “I am thinking of ξ ” or it does not. A. Suppose it does. In this case, I cannot meaningfully raise the question “Am I thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on?” This is as it should be (though why it is won’t be apparent until Section 6.6.) But it fails to provide an answer as to why it is that my thought concerns that object, since the answer would be circular. (Why am I thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on? Because (by definition) I am thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on.) B. Suppose that my gaze being fixed on ξ does not entail that I am thinking of ξ . If this is so, then the question “Am I thinking of the object that my gaze is fixed on?” should make sense. A similar question might be OK in cases where I am tracking an object and momentarily lose track of it — I am watching an object which goes behind an occluder and then comes out the other end, and I wonder “Is this the object I had my gaze fixed on?” But this won’t work

topic, by John Campbell (1999) misses the mark. For a treatment of Campbell’s criticisms and why they misfire, see Grush (2016, section @)

in the case of a present-tense judgment. This argument is dense, but it will make more sense if one returns to it after Section 6.6. The basic form is that the question “Is this the object I have my gaze fixed on?” shouldn't make sense. We need an account that provides substantive answers to two questions: Why is it that I am thinking of the object that I have my gaze fixed on?; and, Why is it that the question “Am I thinking of the object I have my gaze fixed on?” is meaningless (in the sense of 6.6)? The proposal under consideration cannot do both simultaneously. Evans' proposal will do both.

From the top of page 174 to the top of page 176, Evans discusses the temporally extended character of demonstrative identification. This is material that is also treated (though the application is different) in the first section of the Appendix to this chapter. He first points out a third contribution made by the information link, in addition to the two mentioned above (I am listing these in an order different from that in which Evans lists them at the top of p. 174), to the effect that i) it allows the subject to locate the object in egocentric space, and thus is an enabling condition for having an adequate Idea of the object; and ii) it is the source of the information that goes into the controlling conception. The third contribution is that the information link provides for a temporally continuous stream of information from the object and allows the subject to track the object over time.

The point here seems to be that a demonstrative Idea appears to be one that has a certain kind of temporal thickness. The argument here is that the thought ‘This will be F (in a fraction of a second)’ (e.g. ‘This pencil will drop (in a fraction of a second)’ thought when one sees a pencil rolling toward the edge of a table) is a thought that is confirmed when, in a fraction of a second, the pencil drops (or disconfirmed if it does not). The relationship between this later thought and the earlier thought cannot be analyzed in terms of an *identification* of the earlier demonstratively identified object with an object demonstratively identified later, for no such articulation appears to be possible in the normal case. The same demonstrative Idea spans the temporal gap, so to speak. Given this, demonstrative Ideas must inherently be able to exploit continuing information links of the sort capable of delivering a temporally extended stream of information. Crucial aspects of this argument will be explained in more detail later in the chapter. (Note that this position requires taking punctate perceptual objects, such as slashes or bangs, to be the sorts of things amenable to thought primarily via what he calls “past tense demonstratives.”)

The final paragraph of this section is not directly tied to any crucial inferential moves in the book, but expresses an interesting kind of conviction that Evans' takes over from his teacher Peter Strawson. In *Individuals* and *The Bounds of Sense*, Strawson articulated a sort of Kantian analysis of the conceptual scheme of our ordinary thought. This scheme, according to Strawson, has a number of components such as the subject having a bodily presence in the world among other objects, of tracing out a continuous path within them, and of being able to holistically re-identify objects and places. If Evans had had more time, it is likely that he would have treated these topics in more detail.

6.5 Some consequences

This section touches on three consequences of the view as presented so far. The first concerns the limits of demonstrative identification. This is a follow-up to Section 6.1, where Evans claimed that a theoretical understanding of how perception of an object allows us to satisfy Russell's Principle will

shed light on some of the vagaries that were raised concerning the limits of demonstratives. The second has to do with the role that sortals play in demonstrative identification. The doctrine is that while a sortal is not required for a demonstrative identification, it will be required for any fundamental Idea of the object identified. The third point is that errors of both sortal identification and predicative information are compatible with demonstrative identification.

The **first** consequence discussed by Evans is concerns what the theory as presented so far says about the boundaries of demonstrative identification, questions that were raised in 6.1. The first kind of case mentioned concerns part-whole relations. Evans points out that because his account relies on the notion of an information link, rather than the more philosophically unclear notion of perception (perception being one kind of information link), cases that puzzled Moore become less puzzling. I often have an information link to an entire object even in cases where in some overly strict philosophical sense I might be said to be perceiving only part of it.

Examples of the second sort of case involve attempted demonstrative identifications of a city or house when sitting in a closed-up room. Evans claims that since one is not in informational contact with a city even when one is within the city if one is sitting in a closed-up room, one cannot strictly demonstratively identify it as 'this city'. Any attempt to think of the city would have to be descriptive, along the lines of 'the city in which I am now situated'. One might wonder what the relationship is between 'this city' and 'here', since Evans allows that one can have 'here' thoughts even in absence of any actual information. The next two topics — sortals and kinds of allowable error — were probably initially raised here as Evans was writing because he saw them as offering an answer to this question. I will return to a few speculations as to what this might have been in my discussion of part 2 of the Appendix.

The second issue has to do with sortals, and raises a third respect in which an Idea may be adequate though not fundamental. The first two, which I mentioned in the discussion of 6.4, are that one's information link may not immediately locate the object in perception (the sound of the beetle), but the Idea is adequate so long as one has the capacity to locate it in egocentric space on the basis of the information link; secondly, one may be lost, and hence not able to place the egocentrically located object in objective space, but the Idea is adequate so long as one has the capacity to figure out where one is, and effect a coincidence between egocentric and objective space. The third way is as follows: in Section 4.4 where Evans introduced and explained fundamental Ideas, it was claimed that fundamental ideas of physical objects involve location in space at a time and a sortal. We now are told that the Idea can be adequate (though not fundamental) so long as there is a way of finding out what kind of thing one is identifying demonstratively. The demonstrative Idea of the object p need not involve a sortal, but its path to adequacy requires an *ability* to determine a sortal.

The third issue concerns another kind of potential error. When one thinks 'this G is F ' one can be mistaken not only about the fact that it is a G (one may have the wrong sortal, as discussed above), one might also be mistaken about its being F . The most obvious application of this is in Donnellan type cases, where one sees a woman in the corner drinking water and thinks 'the man in the corner is drinking a martini'. Evans here allows that the demonstrative identification is adequate, even though one is mistaken both about the sortal and the attributed property. This issue will be returned to in Section 2 of the Appendix.

6.6 Immunity to error through misidentification

*This section brings up an issue that is a result of the kind of analysis Evans has provided of 'this'-Ideas and 'here'-Ideas: the fact that they give rise to judgments that have the peculiar property that they are 'immune to error through misidentification', or as Evans will call it, identification-free.⁶ The phenomenon was first articulated by Wittgenstein, who noted that some self-thoughts had the following feature, that one could not feel tired, and then on the basis of this feeling sensibly wonder "Someone feels tired, but is it me who feels tired?" Demonstratives and here-thoughts have similar features: If I am looking at something as see it turn red, it would make no sense for me to wonder "Something is turning red, but is it **that** that is turning red?" Reasons for the inclusion of this discussion here would seem to be first that the phenomenon is a recognized and important one, and it is not insignificant that Evans' analysis of 'this'- and 'here'-Ideas predicts and accounts for the phenomenon. Second, Evans has a novel and powerful analysis of the phenomenon in general. And third, the phenomenon will be playing a significant role in the next chapter, and setting it up here correctly will aid that discussion.*

From the bottom of p. 179 to the middle of p. 181 Evans has an initial discussion of the difference between two kinds of 'knowledge'. Though this discussion is often put in term of 'knowledge', the cases discussed need not involve veridicality, and hence 'judgments' or even 'thoughts' might be better. I will use the expression 'thoughts' in my discussion. The point will be to make a distinction between two kinds of thoughts, those that are identification-dependent and those that are identification-free. Starting with identification dependent thoughts: a thought that *a* is *F* is identification-dependent if it can be resolved into two thoughts of the form *b* is *F* and *a* = *b*. So for example, when I see someone I take to be an acquaintance named 'Bob', see that this person is sunburnt, and think 'Bob is sunburnt', my thought can be seen to result from two distinct thoughts: 'this person is sunburnt'; and 'this person is Bob'. Such a thought might be false not because I have mistaken the blush for a sunburn, but because the identity does not hold: the person I am looking at is not in fact Bob. And because this is a liability, upon seeing the sunburnt person I take to be Bob, I might sensibly wonder: *Someone is sunburnt, but is it **Bob** who is sunburnt?*

By way of contrast, the Ideas involved in 'here'-thoughts and this'-thoughts are Ideas that are constitutively tied to certain ways of gaining information — that is, certain information links. A 'here'-Idea is one that a subject has in virtue of mainlining information gained about his immediate vicinity to the controlling conception of his 'here'-thoughts; and a 'this'-Idea is one such that the information link with the object demonstratively identified is mainlined directly into the controlling conception of that Idea.

One way to put this is that part of what makes both of these Ideas the Ideas that they are is that they have a certain kind of functional connection to information-links. It is partially constitutive of

⁶ *I discuss Evans' notion of identification freedom at length in Grush 2007. Among the points made there is that interpretations of Evans' that take the key notion to be one of an object-dependent information channel (see Campbell (1999) are mistaken.*

here-Ideas that one is disposed to take *predicative* information gained about one's environment (that hotness is instantiated, for example) and shunt it directly into the GC of that Idea. And it is partially constitutive of a demonstrative Idea that that it rests on an information link the deliverances of which are are shunted directly into the GC of that Idea.

Thus, such thoughts do not involve an identification component, and hence are identification-free. My thought that 'here it is dark' cannot be resolved into two thoughts of the form 'it is dark at location p ' and ' p is here'. Rather, when the information links that are constitutive of my 'here'-Idea, most relevantly information I gather through vision, register a paucity of illumination — that is, when they carry information to the effect that the predicate '... is dark' is instantiated — this information is mainlined directly into my 'here'-Idea in such a way that I am disposed to judge that '*here* is dark'. By way of contrast, if I am watching a video monitor that is displaying a feed from a video camera that I know to be trained on location q , and the information on the monitor makes it manifest that it is dark at location q , then, supposing I believe myself to be located at location q , I could entertain the thought *here is it dark*, and in this case my thought would be identification-dependent. The information link in this case, the feed through the video camera, is not one of the links that is constitutive of my 'here'-Idea. Thus my thought can be resolved into *it is dark at q* ; and *q is here*.

Evans then points out that there are some thoughts, such as those involving Julius, that do not involve identifications, and so these too will be identification-independent (And hence "Somebody invented the Zip, but was it Julius who invented the zip' is anomalous for anyone who understands the name 'Julius'). However, the interesting class of identification-free thoughts are those that are information-based. So 'identification-free' in the *wide sense* simply means not identification-dependent', and thus includes Julius-thoughts as well as 'here'- and 'this'-thoughts. Identification-free' in the narrow sense will be taken to mean 'identification-free and information-based', thus ruling out cases such as the Julius thoughts. It is the latter class of thoughts that Evans is concerned with.

From the middle of p. 181 to the bottom of p. 181 Evans discusses a sense in which identification-free knowledge is basic. The argument here is quick. It is that if there is to be any singular knowledge at all, then not all thoughts can be identification-dependent. An identification-dependent thought, a is F is one that can be analyzed as the result of two thoughts: b is F and $a = b$. But if there are no identification-independent thoughts, then the first of these — b is F — must itself rest on two thoughts, such as c is F and $b = c$. And the infinite regress is off. At some point there must be knowledge that is identification-free if there is to be any singular knowledge at all. (An argument similar to this, but given more detailed treatment, is provided by Shoemaker in the articles Evans cites in footnote 55.)

The top paragraph on p. 182 discusses 'this'-thoughts and their identification-free status. Again, the point is that because 'this'-Idea involved in the subject's thought about *this* (a particular demonstratively identified object) constitutively involves a number of continuing information links, information from any of these links to the effect that property F is instantiated is shunted directly into the controlling conception of the demonstratively identified object with the result that the subject has information to the effect that *this is F*.

The second half of p. 182 to the top of p. 184 discusses 'here'-thoughts and their identification freedom. There are two sides to a 'here'-Idea: an informational aspect, and an 'action' aspect (see 6.3).

The informational aspect, involving as it does the requirement that a subject have certain information links tied to his 'here'-Idea, works in a way entirely parallel to 'this'-Ideas, with the difference, inessential for current purposes, that in the case of 'here'-Ideas the information links need not be continually delivering information. The action component, which is discussed at the top of p. 184, makes possible a kind of specification of actions that are free from identification errors. So for example, my intention to paint my car results in my decision to paint *this* car, and my belief that *this* car is *my* car. One can imagine how this might go wrong. Nevertheless, there is specification of my action, my painting of *this* car, which is not liable to any sort of identification error (though of course it is liable to other sorts of error, such as doing a bad painting job).

From the second paragraph of p. 184 to the bottom of p. 188, Evans discusses a potential objection to his claim that here-thoughts are identification free. The objection is that since it seems that there are cases in which the information links do not automatically bring forth the corresponding judgment, such thoughts are not identification free after all. The example is the subject who suspects that he may be wearing ultra-lightweight earphones, and so although he is getting information to the effect that '... is noisy' is instantiated, he does not automatically judge that 'here it is noisy'. If the subject then decides that the noisiness is not the result of the earphones, he might judge that 'here it is noisy', but then this might seem like a thought that can in fact be resolved into two thoughts: one of which involves attributing a property to some place, 'location q is noisy'; and another that involves an identity such as 'location q is here'.

Evans has a number of responses to this line of thought. The first involves putting pressure on the cogency of the supposed identity component. The 'location q ' component seems only to be identifiable as the causal source of the information. This is fine (note that in the video monitor example, that is how we would identify the location being displayed on the monitor: it is the location that the video camera is trained on, and hence is the causal source of the information displayed on the monitor), but it cannot generally serve as supplying the content of our 'here'-thoughts.

The second component of the identification, 'here', is an Idea that cannot be had if the only kinds of thoughts into which it can enter are identification dependent, that is, if there are no identification-free thoughts of the form *here it is F*, based only on information, gained in the appropriate way, that F ness is instantiated. Evans' argument here, I think, is as follows: If Evans' proposal that the content of 'here'-Ideas is involved with their provision of the possibility of identification-free thoughts, then the alternative must assume that this content is rather something like 'where I am'. But our 'I'-Ideas are bound up with our 'here'-Ideas in a way that renders this move impossible. The kind of identification-freedom that underpins 'here'-thoughts also underpins 'I'-thoughts.

Evans closes this discussion by pointing out that the case with the subject and the earphones shows that our normal 'here'-thoughts do rest on an *assumption*, but the assumption is not an identity assumption. Rather, it is the assumption of the normal working of our perceptual systems. These systems deliver information in such a way that it is shunted directly into the controlling conception of our 'here'-Ideas, whether we like it or not. We can question whether things really are as they seem, but in so doing we are not questioning an identity assumption but questioning the functioning of our perceptual systems. But even in such a case, because the information is received from a channel that is shunted directly into his here-Idea, it will *seem* to him as though it is F here. And if there is a question,

it will be whether things are as they seem. The phenomenon is not one in which it would *seem to the subject* that *it is F somewhere*, and the question is whether that somewhere is here.

From the bottom of p. 188 to the end of the section, Evans discusses the relationship between his notion of identification free knowledge, and Shoemaker's notion of immunity to error through misidentification. The notions are closely related. For both Evans and Shoemaker, the core notion is that of a contrast between two kinds of thoughts: those that involve an identity judgment and those that do not. The difference is reflected in their criterial tests. In Shoemaker's case the criterion is this: A subject's judgment that *a is F* is immune to error through misidentification if it does not make sense for the subject to wonder 'something is *F*, but is it *a* that is *F*?' So for example, when I feel a toothache and think *I have a toothache*, it would seem to be senseless for me to wonder 'someone has a toothache, but is it I who have a toothache?' Whereas in the right circumstances it might seem perfectly reasonable for me to think *I have a bump on my forehead* upon seeing a reflection in a mirror, and yet go on to wonder 'someone has a bump on his forehead, but is it I who has a bump on his forehead?', perhaps because I know that there are a lot of mirrors around at odd angles, and I may have been seeing someone else's reflection.

But Shoemaker's criterion will not work for Evans, for it will disqualify some cases that Evans will want to maintain are identification-free. For example, the subject who believes he may in fact be fitted with the earphones might, upon hearing sounds that make it appear as though it is noisy where he is, can wonder 'somewhere it is noisy, but is it *here* that it is noisy?' More generally, Shoemaker's criterion disqualifies as IEM *all* cases in which one may raise a question about the correctness of the presumed applicability of the predicate of the judgment to the object (or location) that is the subject of the judgment. Evans, by contrast, wants only to rule out cases in which a question about the applicability of the predicate to the object of judgment is raised because there is an intervening identity claim that can be questioned. But he does not want to rule out cases in which the question can arise for other reasons, such as the suspicion that one's perceptual system is malfunctioning. Shoemaker's criterion can't distinguish these two cases. So Evans suggests the following criterion for capturing what he means by identification-free:

What we should say is that a judgement is identification-free if it is based upon a way of knowing about objects such that it does not make sense for the subject to utter 'something is *F*, but is it *a* that is *F*?', when the first component expresses knowledge which the subject does not think he has, or may have, gained in any other way. A way of capturing the point of this revised criterion is this: the utterance 'something is *F*, but is it *a* that is *F*?' needs a special background, in the view, of course, of the person who utters it; he has to suppose that the knowledge expressed in the first component was not gained, or may not have been gained, in the way with which the Idea involved in the second component is associated. If the situation is perfectly normal, and the subject does not take it not to be normal, the utterance does not not make sense. [p.189-90]

Note that there is a significant typo in the text: The last sentence contains one too many 'not's. It should read: 'If the situation is perfectly normal, and the subject does not take it not to be normal, the utterance does not make sense.' Effectively this revised criterion modifies Shoemaker's criterion by adding a special background, that of an assumed normal functioning of the informational systems. The effect is that more judgements turn out to be identification-free, namely all those that Shoemaker's criterion would rule out as IEM because the subject can wonder about the identity because the subject can question the normal functioning of ways of gaining knowledge.

6.A1 Appendix Section 1

As McDowell notes, this material is drawn entirely from Evans' article 'Understanding Demonstratives'. Its purpose is to fill out a few discussions that were treated quickly in the text of Chapter 6. Specifically, those parts where the issue was either a) a subject's capacity to keep track of objects as they or the subject moves, either through space or time; or closely-relatedly b) the fact that demonstrative Ideas are temporally extended and involve a continuing information link. The point of the section is the notion of a **dynamic Fregean thought**, a kind of thought which is a) graspable only via the orchestration of capacities that manifest over time; and b) Fregean in that it is a particular way of thinking of an object that can be employed by more than one subject and be conventionalized so as to support a notion of Fregean sense (and also because Evans attributes the insight to Frege).

I will start with a sort of quick walk-through of this section of the appendix, and then move on to some remarks about the way in which it fits with various of the issues in Chapter 6.

Evans discusses Frege's remark that a subject can have, on day d_2 , the same thought she had on the previous day d_1 . On d_1 the subject thinks 'today is fine', and on d_2 thinks 'yesterday was fine', and thereby expresses the same thought. Evans will argue that although this could *seem* to be a slip towards inconsistency on Frege's part (for it can seem to be saying that the thought is the same so long as the object is the same, which cuts against all of Frege's discussion of Sense), it could also be seen as an initial step in the direction of an analysis of a very important and interesting conception of how thought relates to the world, especially for thoughts about the world that are dependent upon the subject's spatiotemporal location in the world.

Evans will argue that in the case above, the subject is thinking of the day in the same way in at least one relevant sense. First, however, he counters an argument to the contrary. The argument is that in such a case, it would seem that the intuitive criterion of difference could be used to individuate the thoughts as distinct, for surely it might be possible for a subject to affirm 'today is fine' on d_1 , and deny or be agnostic about 'yesterday was fine' on d_1 . Evans points out that strictly speaking this won't work, for the intuitive criterion of difference is defined only for a subject at a given time. It is not obvious how to extend it to the case of a given subject at two different times. Given that people change their minds about things, or remember or forget, it will be always be possible to find a difference of attitude at different times even in cases where there are clearly no new thoughts involved. (I might be agnostic on d_1 concerning the Goldbach conjecture, and accept it on d_2 . Surely this fact cannot be combined with the intuitive criterion of difference to argue that there were two different thoughts on the two days.)

Next Evans points out that the contrary position, a temporally punctate account of thought grasping, is untenable. Such an account would claim that a sequence of thoughts that might be expressed as *it will be F in a moment, it is F now, it was F a moment ago*, are all completely different thoughts, and hence different beliefs (whereas on the account Evans is attributing to Frege, they are manifestation of the same underlying dynamical belief state). Evans argues that the ubiquitous succession from the thoughts of the first sort to thoughts of the second, and then the third, cannot be explained on the atomistic conception. Evans claims that the transition cannot be by inference. Presumably the inference would be something like t_1 is F , (thought at t_1); therefore t_1 was F (thought at t_2). But in order for this inference to work, it must be possible for the subject to think of t_1 in the same

way at at the two different times, otherwise the inference is invalid, since it would be employing ambiguous terms. But this ability is exactly what the atomistic theorist denies.

Next, Evans argues that the atomistic conception requires that the atoms are perfectly coherent, whereas the dynamic conception treats them as slices of the same persisting belief. The argument is essentially the claim that the atomic conception fails to capture the plausible idea that the very meaning of words (and Ideas) like *now*, *today*, *yesterday*, *tomorrow*, *in a moment*, are holistic in that they are inter-defined. The atomistic approach has no explanation for this fact, and indeed is consistent with its denial. Whereas the doctrine Evans is proposing explains why this is so.

Evans turns to analogies with spatial thought, and how our ability to think of objects and places is dependent on our ability to keep track of the objects, places, and ourselves as any or all of them move about. Rhetorically the idea seems to be that these cases are much more intuitively clear and less controversial, and the temporal case can be understood on analogy with the spatial cases.

Now to the connections between this material and that presented in Chapter 6 proper. Evans has maintained that Ideas of objects are underwritten by controlling conceptions, and in the case of demonstrative Ideas, these are information-based thoughts whose controlling conceptions are necessarily fed by a continuing information link. The fact that the Ideas give rise to thoughts that are identification independent means that they are such that the subject's receiving information that *F* is instantiated through the appropriate information link is sufficient for the subject to be disposed to think that the demonstratively identified object is *F*. But clearly this requires that the Idea be temporally extended, for clearly as time progresses, provided we have not lost track of the object, we will continue to get information through the information link, and it is only if this information is fed into the same temporally extended Idea that it can be taken to concern a single object.

The full picture, which Evans never got to articulate, is this: our indexical and demonstrative thoughts, including *this-*, *here-*, *now-*, *I-*, *then-*, *there-*, and so forth are underwritten by Ideas that have several features. First, they are associated with CCs that are constitutively tied to certain information links or (more generally) information channels. The CCs of these Ideas receive information via these channels over time in such a way that the Ideas involved must have a certain temporal extension. This ought to be unobjectionable enough. Such thoughts concern the spatiotemporal world around us, and surely this requires the accommodation of temporal flow at the ground level. Second, these Ideas and their CCs have a certain kind of default tie to our spatiotemporal situation. In the spatial case, they are tied to (better, *an aspect of*) our capacity to keep track of where we are and how our relation to various places alters as we move about. In the case of objects, they are tied to our capacity to keep track of objects over time, as they and we move about. In the temporal case, they are tuned to track the normal passage of time (to within some degree of accuracy or other).

6.A2 Appendix Section 2

This section concerns the role that sortals play in demonstrative identification of objects, in cases like 'that G is F'. It is closely connected to the material in 6.5. The upshot is that in cases where the sortal identification is not based on content from the information link, the thought is a composite of a descriptive component and a purely demonstrative component, something like 'the G that is identical to that'. When the sortal identification is based on content from the IL, the demonstrative thought is

conceptually simple in that it is not a composite. In these latter cases, the integrity of the thought content is robust to a certain degree of error in the sortal, but not to a high degree of error.

When one uses a sortal as part of a demonstrative identification of an object, it is often the case that the information-link is providing content that is the basis for the sortal identification. When I see something and think *that apple is red*, my identification of the object as an apple is typically based in large part on information about the object's properties that gets to me through the information link. We might say that in such a case I *see* the object *as an apple*.

One can imagine cases in which, while I don't perceive the object *as a G*, I nevertheless and inclined, for one reason or another, to take it to be a *G*. Or even more minimal situations in which I am merely prepared to take it to be a *G*. Consider the example of the person in a windowless room who thinks 'this city is noisy' when there is little information coming in through the IL that would identify the source as a city. I take the object of my thought to be a city, but this is not based on any information coming to me through any information links. It might be an inference or a presumption. Recall, this was one of the examples, mentioned in 6.1, of how the boundaries of demonstrative identification were unclear.

The suggestion is that in the case where one is taking the object as a *G* (but not perceiving it *as a G*), the content of the thought can be analyzed as the product of two components, a purely demonstrative component and a sortal identifying component: *that is F*, and *that is a G*, the justification for the latter being something other than information from the relevant ILs. And if that is the case the content of the thought *that G is F* is as partially descriptive: *the G that is identical with that is F*. If there is nothing corresponding to the *that*, then there is no thought content available, because *that*-Ideas are Russellian. However, there is a thinkable content if the object is not a *G*, as with any definite description.

Whereas in the case where one perceives the object *as a G*, the thought is not articulated in that way, it is rather simply *that G is F*. And one can't capture this descriptively in any faithful way. In this case, it is also true that if there is no object, there is no thought. But what if it isn't a *G*? This may undercut the thought attempt as well.

It might help to see the issues here. On the one hand, there are examples like 'this city is F' said of the person in a windowless room, in which it can seem as though the subject can't really issue a conceptually simple *this city* thought. The suggestion is that a person wouldn't be employing a demonstrative Idea of a city in such a case, but a descriptive thought about a city, anchored to this room, something like *the city in which this room is located*, or *the city that is here*.

On the other hand it seems plausible that if one is looking at a woman in the corner and thinks *that man is drinking a martini*, then the thought will have the same conceptual simplicity of the thought *this apple is red*, even though the sortal is wrong.

The two upshots seem to be:

1. In cases where there is no information about the correct sortal, then the thought has a descriptive element if one takes it to concern an object of some type. It isn't a conceptually simple demonstrative thought about a *G*. If the sortal is wrong, then the thought still has a content, but it is just false.

2. The conceptually simple cases will be those where there is a sortal identification, and it is made on the basis of information from the IL. There would seem to be three possibilities:

2a. The sortal is right. In this case, everything is fine.

2b. The sortal is wrong, but not outlandishly so. In such a case there is a legit demonstrative thought, except that it is 'mistaken' in its sortal.

2c. The sortal is outlandishly wrong. In this case Evans says that it seems right to say that there is no coherent thought content.

6.A3 Appendix Section 3

In this section Evans discusses the phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification in the case of information-based descriptive thoughts (these were discussed in Chapter 5). He provides an account of their IF status in a way that is oddly different from the account provided in the case of demonstrative thoughts and here-thoughts. I provide a guess as to why Evans is here offering this puzzling account.

Evans has previously argued for two claims. First, that the phenomenon of identification-free thoughts is a result of the way information-based thoughts work. In cases where an information link is such that its provision of information to the effect that property F is instantiated is directed directly into the controlling conception of some object, then the possibility of identification-free thought about that object is provided for. Examples of this are demonstratives, *here*-thoughts, and *I*-thoughts (see Chapter 7). Second, Evans has argued that there are cases of information-based thoughts whose mode of identification involves descriptive content. Such thoughts were used as examples in Chapter 5.⁷

But given that identification-freedom comes from being information-based and having appropriate kinds of information links, it should be possible for there to be identification-free thoughts whose mode of identification is other than demonstrative or indexical, namely, information-based descriptive thoughts.

Take as an example of an information-based thought that exploits descriptive material in its satisfaction of Russell's Principle 'that φ was F .' In Chapter 5 the example involved seeing a big blue bird, and issuing an information-based thought about it later. The point here is that even though there is descriptive material showing up in the determination of the thought's content, it is still an information-based thought. Recall from Chapter 5 that this was the difference between '*the* φ was F ' and '*that* φ was F '. Since we are assuming here (an assumption we need, but which Evans does not explicitly flag in this appendix) that the predicate is being ascribed on the basis of information received

⁷ The fact that the word 'identification' is showing up in both claims is doing a disservice, for it means two different things. In the case of 'identification-free' it means that the thought in question cannot be discerned into two thoughts one of which expresses an identity. In the case of 'mode of identification' it is concerned with the resources the subject brings to bear in satisfying Russell's Principle. Evans argued in Chapter 6 that there are thoughts that are identification-free (in the identity-claim sense), and whose mode of identification (in the Russell's Principle sense) is demonstrative.

along an appropriately situated information link (and not on the basis of an inference from general principles, for example, see the previous section of this Appendix), the information underlying the descriptive content φ , as well as the information to the effect that the object is F , was mainlined into the controlling conception of the object.

That's the background. Evans then starts, in the second paragraph, to provide an explanation for why these thoughts are IF. This is odd, for one might wonder why a new explanation needs to be provided. Wouldn't the explanation be the same? The implication seems to be that either Evans thinks it is not, or thinks that the explanation he is about to give is something of a supplement to the explanation in the case of demonstratives and indexicals. I'll return to this at the end.

An explanation of the sort already discussed in Chapter 6 for demonstrative and here-thoughts applied to this case would be straight-forward. My thought "That big blue bird was squawking" is IF because only one Idea is involved. The information to the effect that squawking was instantiated was mainlined directly into the CC of the Idea I had of *that bird*. And at no point was there a mediating Idea *a* linking *a is squawking* with *that big blue bird is a*. The fact that I am now remembering the event changes none of that. It is true that because it is past tense, there is no longer an information-link actively feeding the CC. The functional features of the idea have changed. But none of that changes the fact that the information got into the CC in an identification-free way. At no point did a mediating Idea *a* get introduced. That seems to work fine.

The explanation Evans gives here is surprising. He says that an information-based descriptive thought's status as IF is a result of the over-riding goal that the thought be well-grounded. Evans says:

This secures that the thinking, if it nets an object at all, nets the object which is the source of the information; so that one cannot intelligibly wonder whether it is the object netted by this thinking to which the information relates. (p. 197)

This is odd to say the least, in part because it can't possibly be a correct analysis of the situation. If that explanation were sufficient to secure the IF status of such thoughts, it would be sufficient to secure the IF status of any information-based thought whatsoever, whether there was an intermediary identification component or not, since it is an over-riding goal of *all* information-based thoughts that the thought concern the object that is the causal source.

So what is going on here? Here is my best guess. McDowell states that this section of the Appendix is based on notes aimed at making a clearer connection between the discussion of IF in Section 6.6, and the discussion of information-based descriptive thoughts in Chapter 5. Recall, though, that Chapter 5 had its own Appendix, the upshot of which was to alter the account of the sort of Idea involved in thoughts of the form *that* φ . The body of Chapter 5 treated the Idea corresponding to the descriptive component φ as though it were a regular descriptive Idea, and treated the information as something that played a role only in providing the content for the description in the Idea's GC. That is, the information link provided the information, and also the fact that the thought was information-based entailed that the subject would have as an over-arching goal to think about the object that was the causal source of the information. Now on this conception of thoughts of the form *that* φ was F , there will be a problem with their status as being IF, because a description can of course net an object other than the one that is the causal source. In other words, if the Idea corresponding to *that* φ is just a

descriptive *the* φ -Idea plus the proviso that the content is based on information, then it will be possible to wonder if the φ is in fact the causal source of information – ‘Something is F , but is it *the* φ that is F ?’ And so it wouldn't seem to even be IF.

The best hope of making such a thought IF would be by trying to introduce some sort of ground-level requirement that that causal source must be the object identified in the descriptive component, such that if that requirement is not met the thought attempts fails. Having an over-riding goal of being well-grounded does just that. So the proposal here makes sense if Evans wrote these notes in an attempt to understand the IF status of information-based descriptive thoughts as these thoughts were analyzed in the body of Chapter 5.

However (and here is my guess as to what happened), at some point after he wrote these notes, Evans realized that the better route was to alter his account of information-based descriptive thoughts, which is what he did in the notes that became the Appendix to Chapter 5. By recognizing that being information-based is constitutive of the Idea even in these cases, the IF status of relevant thoughts employing those Ideas is immediately secured in the same way it is for demonstratives and indexicals. The improvement made in the notes that became the Chapter 5 Appendix solved the problem that Evans had tried to work on with the earlier notes that formed the basis of this section of this Appendix. Evans just never erased these older, now obsolete notes. That, in any case, is one possibility.

6.A4 Appendix Section 4

The topic of this section concerns demonstrative identification of abstract objects. Evans will argue that there are cases in which demonstrative identification of a token of a type can be a way of demonstratively identifying the type by putting the subject in mind of the properties that constitute the fundamental ground of difference of that type.

Here we get a very brief discussion of a topic that would require a good deal more. But it is suggestive nevertheless. The question is whether there can be anything like demonstrative identification of abstract entities. Evans focuses on *types* as abstract entities, and suggests that in some circumstances the demonstrative identification of a token of that type counts as a demonstrative identification of the type.

Evans begins by pointing out that on his account, one manages to think of an entity via the employment of an Idea of that entity. Such Ideas can be fundamental or non-fundamental. Evans' first move is somewhat questionable: he claims that the fundamental ground of difference of a type entity is the set of properties possessed by all tokens that instantiate that type. This isn't a great way to put it for various reasons, one being that all tokens of a type might have properties that are incidental to their fundamental ground of difference. In any case, this issue seems avoidable, for we can rephrase the criterion in a way that matches Evans own formulation in Chapter 4 as: the fundamental ground of difference of a type entity will be those properties that distinguish it from all other types of the same superordinate type. For example, the fundamental ground of difference of triangles (as a type) will be the geometric properties that distinguish them from all other shapes.

One way one can be made mindful of the properties that comprise the fundamental ground of difference of a type is by perceiving those properties instanced in a token of that type. The suggestion then is that a demonstrative identification of such a token is providing the subject with a fundamental Idea of the abstract object, and this counts as a demonstrative identification of the abstract object. (Notice the difference between, when pointing at an albino tiger: *That animal is recovering from an illness* vs *That animal is on the endangered species list*.)

Next, Evans tries to distinguish this sort of identification of a type from a descriptive identification, which would be something like 'the type of which this is a token'. The only consideration here is that there are cases in which perception of the token may be required for correctly understanding the remark, for having a fundamental Idea of the type. Telling the clerk that I want paint of a color that is the same color as the chip in my hand (when I do not show the clerk the chip), may allow the clerk to think true descriptive thoughts of that type. But exactly because it will not give him a fundamental Idea of the type, he will not understand the remark in the same way he might if I show the chip to him.

In closing let me point out that Evans might have been able to make his point more strongly. Many instances of such demonstrative identification of types do not involve identification of tokens that exhibit the relevant distinguishing property. In tutoring someone in mathematics, I might direct a student to some marks on a page and say 'this function, but not that one, converges'. I have put us both in mind of the correct mathematical function by identifying the appropriate symbols on the page — symbols which, of course, do not instantiate any relevant properties of the mathematical functions. Nevertheless, it remains true that I manage to get us to think of the relevant fundamental ground of difference of these functions via the symbols, and this seems to be the relevant factor. If this line of thought were continued, it might open up the possibility for Evans' account here to make fuller contact with Dummett's account of identification of abstract objects via a preferred set of symbols. Evans' account could explain what is right about Dummett's account but would be more powerful, because more general. (See Brovold and Grush (2012, section 4) for an account of demonstrative semantics that, while not framed in these terms nevertheless provides a basis for an account such as this.)

6.A5 Appendix Section 5

This section rehearses five reasons that people find the Russellian status of demonstrative identification Evans has argued for in Chapter 6 (and previous chapters) difficult to accept. All five of these are discussed elsewhere in the text, but it is rhetorically helpful to have them discussed together.

The first is just the fact that some people do not distinguish demonstratives as a lexical type from demonstratives as a semantic category, and thus assume that all cases in which a lexical demonstrative, like 'this' or 'that' is used in English, the semantic category of demonstrative must be in play. Since such expressions are used in a great variety of cases, many of which resist analysis in terms of the apparatus Evans has developed, it may seem as though his analysis is unworkable. But if one distinguishes lexical from semantic categories, this problem is more tractable. Evans is giving a theory that recognizes and analyzes a certain semantic category. He need not assume that this semantic category is always and only marked by a lexical 'demonstrative expression'.

The second is a failure to distinguish what Evans calls 'situation-specifying' descriptions of mental states from 'content-giving' specifications. The hallucinator who thinks (as we might describe it) that the man in front of him is charging, can have his mental state described via a description of the sort of situation such that, were that situation actual, his mental state would have a genuine content. Such a description is a good description of the hallucinator's state of mind. This is probably the biggest cause of resistance, for it seems like there is a perfectly legitimate thought there, contrary to the supposition that such expressions are Russellian. The most convincing argument for Evans' position here is probably to be found in the Appendix of Chapter 5. But clearly a fuller defense of Evans' program here would be well advised to begin with this issue. For it seems quite natural to say that in describing the situation that 'approximates' the hallucinator's state of mind we are in fact giving the conditions that would render his mental state (to use a term not loaded as 'thought' is) *true*. And if this is correct, then it would seem that one is in fact giving the content of that mental episode despite there being no object.

The third is the failure to distinguish cases of misidentifying something that one successfully demonstratively identifies from cases where one fails to demonstratively identify anything at all. The idea seems to be that some people feel that "That fish is white" said of a pebble lacks an object and yet qualifies as a thought. Evans says that in such case the thought has an object, it has just been misidentified. The distinction is one Evans has discussed in Chapter 6 as well as Part 2 of this Appendix.

The fourth are cases where entities that do not exist are discussed using demonstrative expressions. Again, this seems to be in conflict with their Russellian status. We might talk about 'that spy' after seeing a movie. To some extent such cases will be discussed in Chapter 10, where an account of pretence is developed primarily to explain negative existential statements.

The fifth source of resistance is adherence to a sort of representationalism that rejects externalism of the kind embraced by Evans' position. This sort of representationalism holds that mental states, including thoughts, are internal states such that a) one knows whether or not one has that mental state, and b) whether or not one has it cannot be altered by changing external factors of which one is not aware. Evans' position denies both of these, for the existence or not of an appropriate object, whether the subject can tell the situations apart or not, determines whether or not the subject can have a demonstrative thought. Thus, I might take myself to be thinking a thought when I am not, and whether or not I am thinking this thought is partially determined by factors external (in some sense) to my mind.

Evans suggests that considerations such as the argument from illusion are responsible for the tight grip this kind of representationalism exercises. And there are some moves here aimed at discrediting the argument from illusion. The argument from illusion is this: cases of illusion seem to the subject to be just like cases of veridical perception of a different state of affairs. Seeing a straight stick partially submerged in water looks like seeing a bent stick, for example. One explanation for this is that the subject has an inner representational state, a state proprietary to the subject's mind that determines the content of the subject's mental goings-on. Illusions are cases where external factors of one type cause representational states in a subject whose content would be specified via a situation of a different type. The partially submerged straight stick causes an inner representational state that, on its own, has a content that would be specified in terms of a situation involving a bent stick. Veridical perception on this model occurs when the external factors cause representational states whose content matches the external conditions in the relevant respects.

The relevant passage in which Evans responds to this line of thought is here:

If after it has been acknowledged on all sides that it seems to the hallucinator that he is confronting something, and to the person who sees a stick in water that he is confronting something bent, one says that it seems reasonable to the generality of mankind to suppose that the hallucinator is actually confronting something, and that the person who sees a stick is confronting something that is actually bent, then one is attempting to double-count the fact that has already been acknowledged. (p. 200)

To be fair it can be said that this argument fails to join issue with the representationalist. In positing representations, the representationalist is not trying to double-count the fact that has already been accounted for — the fact that it seems to the subject as though he is confronting something. Rather, the representationalist is offering an *explanation* of this fact. The reason, the representationalist claims, that it seems to the subject as though he is confronting a bent stick when he is not is that a certain kind of representational state with a certain kind of content — a state normally or veridically caused by the perceptual presence of a bent stick — is being entertained by the subject. Now this is not to say that other explanations of why it seems to a subject as though he is confronting something might not be offered, but no such alternate explanation is provided here.

6.A6 Appendix Section 6

In this section Evans approaches the internalist position, which was discussed in the previous section of the Appendix, from a different path. Rather than discuss the similarities in mental states between a subject who is hallucinating and the same subject when not hallucinating, or the argument from illusion, the issue now is the similarity between two subjects in different but analogous situations. The internalist argues that the similarity between my own thought that it is hot here and the thought of my doppelganger on twinearth that it is hot here is that they share a representational content. Evans argues that this cannot be right. Essentially on grounds that representational content is singular in a way that is not capturable on this scheme.

Evans begins by recapping one feature of his account of thinking of an object in a particular way. This account was that a subject S is thinking of x at time t in a particular way iff $R(S, x, t)$. This is part of Evans' account of a theory of Fregean sense for demonstrative expressions. Another subject S' is then thinking of x in the same way as S if $R(S', x, t)$.

But there is another sense of 'thinking of something in the same way' that can be articulated. It might be claimed that S' is thinking of x' in the same way that S is thinking of x if $R(S, x, t)$ and $R(S', x', t)$. With the identification of this new kind of propositional function $R(\xi, \zeta, t)$, it certainly is true that a given subject may not be able to tell the difference between his satisfaction of two different instances of this. For example if I (S) think *it is warm here*, thus satisfying $R(S, x, t)$, I might be instantly transported to some other warm location x' , and satisfy $R(S, x', t)$. And I might not know that a change had occurred.

Given this, it might be suggested that a purely psychological aspect of 'a way of thinking' can be extracted from this propositional function. This idea would be that $R(S, x, t)$ could be analyzed into two components: a purely psychological component $\psi(S, t)$, and a non-psychological component $R'(S, x, t)$. This psychological component would be something I share with my doppelganger on twinearth, and would also have in situations of hallucination or illusion as well as the counterpart veridical situations. The proposal that this psychological component by itself counts as thinking. Evans will call this putative sort of thinking M-thinking. He will argue that this purely psychological M-thinking cannot really be thinking, indeed cannot even be contentful.

The argument is simple to state: a thought, or any representational state, is a contentful state. And having truth conditions is necessary for having content. But M-thoughts are not assessable as true or false. This is easily seen by noting that the same schema will apply in veridical and counterpart nonveridical situations; as well as to myself and my doppelganger. The point hinges on singular content of demonstrative thoughts (and less obviously the singular content involved in almost all of our thinking, whether overtly demonstrative or not). My singular demonstrative thought to the effect that this coin is valuable is, let us suppose, true. But exactly because the purely psychological component would be the same if the coin were switched out for an identical valueless coin, the psychological schema of this thought — the schema I share with my doppelganger on Twinearth who happens to be looking at a quite valueless coin — has no truth value. It gets a truth value only when combined with the contextual element.

Evans then considers the following issue: historically such internalism was often motivated by a strong kind of mentalism, prototypically Cartesian dualism. On such a view the mind, conceived as entirely distinct from the body and world, is the self-sufficient repository of the meaningful. But contemporary versions are motivated by completely different factors including entirely materialistic factors having to do with the role of representations — understood as cognitive states with a purely neural instantiation base — play in the production and explanation of behavior. On this view, since it seems that I and my doppelganger, or I in the veridical and hallucinatory situation, will do identical things, we must have identical representational states. Evans points out that this argument works only by individuating the behavior that is caused or is to be explained in a question-beggingly individualistic way. Described in another way, the same behavior is not caused or in need of explanation at all: I seek a buyer for *this valuable coin*, whereas my doppelganger seeks a buyer for *that valueless coin*.

Evans closes with a rather cryptic argument that, I believe, more or less restates the essential point of the prior argument. Evans admits that part of the explanation for why I have the context-specific thoughts and intentions I have is that there are schematic dispositions that I share with my doppelganger. There is of course a kind of description of the brains of myself and my doppelganger that will yield the result that we are in identical states (of some sort), and these states will obviously play some role in determining the specific context-dependent thoughts and dispositions we have. But there is no argument for locating representational content or thought at this level as opposed to the contextually specified level.

It's not entirely clear what hangs on this. One might be of the opinion that its a stipulative matter whether we want to insist that representational content must be singular, and hence must be truth evaluable. Recall that Evans himself, in Section 5.2, went to pains to describe a type of content that can be specified by an open sentence in one or more variables, as $\text{Red}(x) \ \& \ \text{Ball}(x) \ \& \ \text{Yellow}(y) \ \& \ \text{Cube}(y) \ \& \ \text{On top of } (x,y)$, and that this is the sort of content carried by informational states. This

content, Evans argues, is not singular. It is precisely the sort of schematic content Evans is here deriding as not being genuinely representational. One might conclude that this is just a matter of where one feels comfortable using the word 'representation'. But so long as all sides agree that there are the two kinds of content specification (broad and narrow, as it was once called) and how they function, perhaps the rest can be treated as a terminological dispute.

Also, it is not obvious that if the schematic sort of content were allowed to characterize thought, that the expressions of natural language that Evans is keen to analyze would fail to be Russellian. M-thoughts would fail to be Russellian, but it would require further argument to show that the semantics of expressions as publicly used could be explained in terms of the M-thoughts one has in understanding them, as opposed to the singular counterparts of those thoughts.