

Guide to Chapter Two of Gareth Evans' *The Varieties of Reference*

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2.0 What Happens in Chapter Two

First, Evans discusses Russell, and in particular Russell's distinction between names (which refer) and descriptions (which denote). For Russell the former require a referent in order to be meaningful, and if empty atomic sentences employing them will be meaningless. This is because the semantic role of names is to be attached to some particular entity. The latter (descriptions) do not require a referent to be meaningful. They are like quantifiers in that while sentences that employ them are made true (or false) by whether or not there are objects that have the relevant properties, there are no objects *in particular* that need to have those properties – e.g. there is no particular object that needs to be F in order for $\exists x(Fx)$ to be true. Evans credits to Russell what he will call *Russell's Criterion*, which is used to divide NPs into two (presumably exclusive and exhaustive) categories. The question is: if an NP has no referent, would an atomic sentence employing it still be suitable for expressing a thought? If the answer is yes, then the NP must be a description (even if it is masquerading as something else). If the answer is no, then the NP is a genuine name, or as Russell put it, a *logically proper name*. This makes intuitive sense if one thinks that the semantic power of a name is that it is (no more than) a label for a particular object. But Evans will argue that the division marked by Russell's Criterion is not exactly the same as the division marked by names vs. descriptions. There are some NPs that are not descriptions, but still meaningful if empty. Descriptive names, and a few others.

Returning to Russell, it seems that in almost all cases a name might be empty unbeknownst to a subject who is (putatively) thinking a thought whose linguistic expression would employ that name. I might utter the sentence "Obama is President of the US" but because I am the plaything of a Cartesian evil demon, there is nothing answering to the name 'Obama'. Less radical situations can produce the same kind of error, of course. A recent example being "Lennay Kekua", the non-existent girlfriend of a college football player who was the victim of a hoax. Now in such cases, the subjects take themselves to be thinking thoughts. For example, Manti Te'o probably arguably thought "Lennay was in a fatal car accident in California" at some point. This situation presents us with several options:

1. A subject can take themselves to be thinking a thought, but they might be wrong about that, precisely because the name used in their putative thought is, unbeknownst to them, empty.

2. A subject can never be wrong when they are taking themselves to be thinking a thought. So the only possible referents of genuine names (if there are any) are entities such that the subject cannot be mistaken about whether or not that entity exists.

Russell took Option 2, and limited the application of names to private mental items about whose existence the subject could not be mistaken. Evans will agree that there are NPs that are genuine names in the sense of Russell's Criterion, but that they might be empty unbeknownst to the subject. That is, Evans will go with Option 2: a subject might take herself to be thinking a thought of a certain sort, and be wrong about that in that the subject is not in fact thinking such a thought. Evans answers an objection to this proposal.

Second, in Section 2.3 he expands on his discussion of descriptive names — names introduced through a stipulative reference-fixing description — and argues that i) they are referring expressions; ii) they can be meaningful when empty because, though they are not DDs, they are associated with a clear descriptive content that provides a meaning (truth conditions) even when they are empty; and iii) this descriptive content is the Fregean Sense of the name. If Evans is right, then descriptive names are meaningful when empty, but aren't definite descriptions. They are non-Russellian referring expressions, a category Russell didn't recognize.

And in 2.4 he argues at length that descriptions should not be considered to be referring expressions. This is not terribly controversial.

And finally in Section 2.5, Evans argues that the idea that referring expressions can't have a Fregean Sense is misguided. The motivation for the idea derives from a presupposition that Fregean senses contrast with Russellian names in that names are somehow 'direct' in a way that senses are not, that senses are *intermediaries*. Evans points out that Senses need not be intermediaries, and that the thought that they are might derive from an assumption that Senses must be akin to descriptions. But if a Sense is *a way of thinking* of a reference, then it is not an intermediary. The relevant relation is still direct. Here Evans is trying to keep open a space for his own proposals concerning demonstratives and indexicals, which he claims are referring expressions (not descriptions), have a Fregean sense, and are Russellian (meaningless if empty).

2.1 Introductory: Russell's Criterion

This section begins the work of identifying distinct semantic categories within the grammatical category of NPs — an innovation Evans credits to Russell as Frege treated them all the same. Evans introduces Russell's criterion, a semantic test applied to NPs in order to sort them into two semantic kinds. The test is: would the NP's lack of a referent render atomic sentences employing it meaningless? If such matrix sentences can still be meaningful even if the NP is empty, then the NP is not a 'Russellian singular term'. Russell used this test to distinguish 'logically proper names' from definite descriptions, and on this basis he argued that some NPs that looked like singular terms, S/Ns, were in

fact, semantically, S/(S/N)s. Evans explains that for Russell, almost all ordinary grammatical NPs, including all that refer to external objects and people, are not genuine referring expressions by this test, since their emptiness would not render matrix sentences meaningless. Rather, they are covert descriptions. The only genuine names for Russell were essentially mental demonstratives 'pointing' to sense data. [Note: in much of what follows, the terms '(genuine) proper name', '(genuine) singular term', and '(genuine) referring expression' will be used more or less as synonymous.]

Russell, like pre-1890 Frege, held the following view of genuine singular sentences (the modifier 'genuine' will be explained shortly). First, the function of a genuine referring expression (aka *logically proper name*) is to identify an object such that if this object satisfies the predicate of the sentence, the sentence is true, and if the object identified does not satisfy the predicate, then the sentence is false. Second, if no object is identified, then this process doesn't get off the ground and the sentence is 'nonsense'. This was similar to Frege's official view, but it lacked anything analogous to a theory of sense for genuine referring expressions.)

From this vision of the semantic workings of atomic sentences we get what Evans calls 'Russell's Criterion':

The grammatical subject of a proposition is a *genuine* proper name, i.e., a referring expression, only if its failing to have a referent would render the proposition meaningless.

For Russell this *semantic* test was criterial for sorting NPs into two semantic categories: those that passed this test (*passing* means that the matrix sentence would be meaningless if empty) would be genuine referring expressions, aka logically proper names, and receive one kind of semantic analysis; and those that did not were (overt or covert) descriptions, and would receive a very different kind of semantic analysis.

Evans agrees with Russell that expressions of the form 'the φ ' — NPs that have the form of explicit definite descriptions — do not pass this test (i.e. they are not Russellian; they are meaningful even when they lack a referent). Where ' φ ' is a coherent description, sentences of the form 'The φ is *F*' may be understood, i.e. convey a thought, even if nothing satisfies the description, since the description is adequate to specify the truth conditions of the sentence even in absence of a referent, provided the rest of the sentence is up to the task, of course.

But what about other kinds of NP, such as ordinary proper names (e.g. *Cicero*, *Bill Clinton*) and indexicals/demonstratives referring to physical objects or locations? Russell felt that these expressions were all covert definite descriptions. His reasons were based on a number of factors. The first is what Evans will later call **Russell's Principle**: it is not possible for a subject to entertain a thought about an object unless the subject knows which object is in question. And on Russell's view there were two ways that this requirement could be met: either the subject could think of the object as the unique satisfier of some description (corresponding to NPs in the semantic category of definite descriptions), or the subject could be 'acquainted' with the object (corresponding to NPs in the semantic category of genuine referring expressions). For Russell the only legitimate acquaintance relation was between a subject and mental items, including memories of sense impressions. So genuine singular terms were all mental indexicals and demonstratives with 'ideas' as their accusatives. Hence only items in a private mental language would be amenable to the semantic analysis of genuine singular terms described above.

Lacking an appropriate mental accusative, a putative mental demonstrative expression would be meaningless.

Russell felt that ordinary proper names failed this criterion, and hence that the kind of semantic analysis appropriate for singular terms could not be their correct semantic analysis. He thus held that they were covert descriptions, despite their surface form.

Note that given Russell's very restricted understanding of what qualifies as a genuine referring expression, it is no surprise that he had nothing corresponding to Fregean Sense. If the only possible referents were mental items about which subjects have complete access and knowledge, it's isn't clear that there is room for multiple ways of presenting the referent, or 'illuminating the referent from different angles'. For Russell, then, the sort of phenomena that might lead one to recognize a level of Sense were all taken care of by the consequence that all such cases involved overt or covert descriptions.

2.2 Radical Reference Failure

In this section, Evans introduces Russell's reasons for severely restricting genuine reference, namely, Russell's unwillingness to accept the possibility that one can be mistaken about whether one is having a thought. Evans will disagree, and argue that one can be mistaken about whether one has succeeded, on a given occasion, in having a thought. He closes by rebutting an argument to the contrary. This discussion is more important than it might seem at first, since Evans will be arguing in the largest, most central chapters of this book that demonstrative and indexical thoughts have this feature: a subject may believe that she is entertaining such a thought when in fact she is not.

Russell wanted to rule out situations in which a subject thinks that he is having a thought about an object while in fact he is not. Such situations seemed to Russell incoherent. And by limiting the scope of legitimate names to those whose referents were private mental items, a situation could not occur in which the subject is mistaken about the existence of the referent of the name, and hence the subject will never mistakenly take himself to be entertaining such a thought when he is not.

Now, of course Russell would allow subjects to be liable to a mistake of this sort when using ordinary demonstratives or proper names (or entertaining corresponding thoughts). But for Russell such thoughts are analyzable into two components: one purely mental and another nonmental. For example, Russell would agree that a subject might be in error concerning her own satisfaction of the predicate 'ξ is thinking that Bismark is F' (that is, Russell allows that subject might take themselves to be entertaining this thought when in fact they are not, perhaps because the name 'Bismark' has no referent). But Russell would claim that in this case, the predicate breaks down into two components: a purely mental component of the form 'ξ is thinking that the φ is F', and about this one can have infallible knowledge concerning whether or not one is satisfying that predicate. The subject is thinking a thought after all. What one cannot be certain of is what might be called an extra-mental component to the effect that 'Bismark is the φ'.

Russell realized that it could not be the case that all thoughts should rely exclusively on descriptive elements. If all thought was by description, then might not relate to a unique set of objects, since, for

any description, it is a possibility that more than one thing satisfies it. Evans mentions Strawson's notion of 'massive reduplication'. This is the idea that for any description (*the tallest spy*), or set of interconnected descriptions (*the tallest spy in the westernmost city of the country ruled by the most democratically inclined government*) it could be the case that, because our region of the universe is duplicated, more than one object satisfies the description. No matter how complex the description becomes, the reduplication can be made large enough to defeat unique reference. For Strawson the way to avoid this was the recognition that descriptions needed to be *anchored* somehow, such as *the tallest spy in this room*, or *the tallest spy in the country I am living in*, where the terms *this* and *I* are non-descriptively anchored to a specific region or context.

Russell's Cartesian ontology (whereby our own mental states were things that we had immediate and infallible knowledge of) guaranteed that there was a unique set of entities — our own mental contents — to which our system of thought was anchored. This anchoring was carried out by a set of thoughts involving reference to mental entities with which one was directly acquainted. So, for example, a thought that might be expressed in language as "The table is brown" would really be best expressed by a sentence of the form "The ψ is brown", where "the ψ " would be a description like 'the physical object that caused *this*.' And the 'this' that is occurring here is a sort of mental demonstrative pointing to a sense datum, say an impression of brownness. So for Russell ultimately all descriptions are anchored to reference to such mental items which one knows by acquaintance. (Strawson argued that anchoring was needed, but did not think that the anchoring had to be in term of mental items.)

Evans will subscribe to **Russell's Principle**, to the effect that in order for a subject to be credited with thought about an object, the subject must know which object is in question. And furthermore, Evans will argue that in order to understand demonstrative expressions, one must have a certain kind of thought — a demonstrative thought. But like Strawson, Evans wants to extend the legitimate range of possible demonstrative identification beyond Russell's boundaries to regular physical objects, and it is often the case that people take such objects to exist, and take themselves to be referring to them with demonstratives and having demonstrative thoughts about them, when the presumed object does not in fact exist. Thus, Evans is committed to the idea that subjects can be mistaken about whether or not they are entertaining a thought of a certain kind on a given occasion.

This is a very misunderstood point. As Evans points out,

It is not part of this proposal that his mind is wholly vacant; images and words may clearly pass through it, and various ancillary thoughts may even occur to him. (pp. 45-6)

Evans should have put this differently. Strictly speaking whatever is going on in the mind of the subject in such cases might be, in a relevant sense, *precisely the same* as when the subject actually is successfully entertaining the thought. The difference is that in some contexts this psychological/mental stuff qualifies as a thought, and in other contexts this same psychological/mental stuff might not qualify as a thought. This will have to be explained and defended, of course, but this is the best way to understand proposal.

Evans, in the last two paragraphs, closes by rebutting an argument by A.N. Prior aimed at supporting Russell's view. Evans will be arguing that Russell is wrong, and he correctly anticipates that some of the resistance to his view will be based on considerations similar to those Prior voices, so it is worth taking Prior on at this point. Prior's argument is that the thought 'a is F' is a *component* of the

self-ascribing thought 'I am thinking a is F'. So if one lacks the capacity to grasp the thought 'a is F', then one will not be able to think 'I am thinking a is F'. Therefore, if one in fact is thinking 'I am thinking a is F', one must also grasp the thought 'a is F' — that is, one must be correct.

Evans grants that 'a is F' is a component of 'I am thinking that a is F'. Evans' response to Prior, however, is that when one is deceived about one's thought, the thought that is in error is not 'I am thinking a is F' but instead is a thought of the form 'I am thinking a thought of type D'. One can be wrong about this, because the *particular* thought of type D, the grasp of which the subject is unsuccessfully attempting, is not a component of 'I am thinking a thought of type D'.

If you put this point together with the previous points, you get the doctrine that there can be situations in which a subject S has certain psychological/mental things going on which, in some contexts, qualify as grasping a thought of type D, but which in other contexts do not so qualify. In some cases the relevant contextual factor could be the existence of an appropriate object. And in these cases the putative thoughts would be Russellian in that if the object does not exist, then the putative thought is not in fact a thought. So because the subject might be mistaken about the existence of the object, the subject would then be mistaken about whether or not her psychological/mental state qualifies as a thought.

2.3 Russellian singular terms and descriptive names

In this section, we get Evans argument (the conclusion of which he has alluded to multiple times) that there are in fact NP expressions which are non-Russellian, yet are genuinely referring expressions (unlike descriptions). Such expressions are both i) genuinely referring, in that their semantic contribution is not merely descriptive but rather involves a relation of reference to an object, and ii) able to play a role as the grammatical subject in an atomic sentence when empty without rendering the sentence meaningless. The point is to show that the class of referring expressions includes some referring expressions which are not Russellian (and thus that 'referring expression' and 'Russellian singular term' are not co-extensive). But it should be kept in mind that this issue is of peripheral interest to the main project of this book, except that the result gets used in the rest of this chapter.

As a preliminary, it will be useful to rehearse a distinction that sometimes goes under the heading of referring vs. denoting. The quick gloss is this: a referring expression functions by being *attached* to some *particular* entity, and atomic sentences employing it get their truth value established by assessing whether that individual has the property predicated of it. Quantifiers, by contrast, are not connected in this way to particular individuals. If I say "something in the house is burning", the quantified NP *something in the house* plays a role in our ability to know when the sentence is true, but it doesn't do this job by being attached to any particular object. If the sentence is true because it is the cake in the oven that is burning then we can say that the quantified expression 'something in the house' in this context *denotes* the cake. But the expression isn't connected to the cake in the way a proper name is connected to its bearer. The same is true of definite descriptions, which are complex quantifier expressions that are built so that only one thing could satisfy the descriptive content. In metaphorical terms, you might think of names as attached to objects, and descriptions as templates that *fit* (none, or

one, or some, or all) objects, but aren't attached to any of them. The question is going to be whether descriptive names function by referring, or by denoting. Evans will argue that they are referring expressions. OK, preliminary over.

Evans credits Russell with being the first to recognize more than one semantic kind hiding in the intuitive category of referring expression. But Evans doesn't think Russell got the semantic categories exactly right. Russell recognized *names* (which were Russellian in Evans' sense) and *descriptions*, which were non-Russellian. And that's it. Evans will agree that there are descriptions, and they aren't Russellian. That's the topic of the next section. And he will agree that there are Russellian referring terms, for example demonstratives. But he is going to argue in this section that there is also a category of expression that is a referring expression, but is not Russellian.

The example is descriptive names (discussed previously in 1.7 and 1.8), though Evans think that there are other members of this semantic subcategory, specifically what he has called e-type pronouns, and 'deferred ostensions', e.g. 'that guy is going to be upset' said when seeing a car loaded with parking tickets, and referring to the car's owner. Descriptive names are names introduced by some reference fixing description. Evans provides a few examples, including Kripke's example 'Neptune'. At one point disturbances were observed in the orbit of Uranus, and it was hypothesized that these disturbances were the result of gravitational forces by a large planet outside the orbit of Uranus. So, for a time at least, 'Neptune' was a descriptive name, stipulated to refer to the large planet whose gravity was responsible for certain observed disturbances in the path of Uranus.

The first part of Evans' argument is to provide an account of what reference is, and then argue that descriptive names fit that account. Evans claims that a simple way of defining reference is in terms of truth (and satisfaction) according to the following principle:

(P) If S is an atomic sentence in which the n-place concept-expression R is combined with n singular terms t_1, \dots, t_n , then S is true iff (the referent of t_1, \dots the referent of t_n) satisfies R.

Evans thus uses P to determine whether an expression is a referring expression. Thus, 'referring expression' is a semantic category, as its members are discerned by the kind of semantic analysis appropriate for them.

For example, clauses of the form

(1) The referent of 'Aphla' = Aphla

when used to state the contribution of an expression to sentences in which the expression occurs, as in truth theoretic semantics, do so in a way that satisfies P. Evans argues, though, that truth-theoretic clauses for descriptive names will also be in accord with P.

First, note that clauses like

(2) (x) (the referent of 'Julius' = x iff x uniquely invented the zip)

or equivalently,

(3) (x) (the referent of 'Julius' = x iff [Julius] x = Julius)

use only the relation of reference to state the semantic contribution that the expression 'Julius' makes to sentences containing it. The combination of (2) (or (3)), normal satisfaction clauses for atomic concept expressions, and principle (P) yields truth-conditions for sentences of the form

(4) 'Julius is F' is true iff the inventor of the zip is F;

or

(5) 'Julius is F' is true iff [Julius] Julius is F.

In one sense the argument is straight-forward. Given axioms such as (2) and (3), which were introduced in the last chapter, we can trivially see that theorem such as (5) and (6) can be derived, and these are exactly the sort of theorems validated by (P) above.

Here is a more intuitive way to understand it. Descriptions denote individuals, and there is no room for a notion of reference in their function. However, with descriptive names, there is a two-stage process. In the first stage, a description is used to isolate an object – the one that fits the description – and then the reference fixing stipulation attaches the name to this object. Once this is done, the name *refers* to that individual, it does not merely denote it.

But — and this is what separates descriptive names from normal names — because the name is introduced in terms of a description, there is a perfectly legitimate content that is graspable even if the name is empty. The description can serve to specify the conditions under which the sentence would be true even if the name is empty.

One final remark on something that can cause confusion, and will point ahead to topics that will be central in much of the book. Evans says:

In saying that the thought expressed by 'Julius is *F*' may equivalently be expressed by 'The inventor of the zip is *F*', I think I am conforming to common sense. (p. 50)

This might seem an odd thing to say, especially since we have just seen an argument to the effect that these names aren't, semantically, descriptions. To see what is happening here a distinction must be drawn that so far hasn't been drawn. On the one hand, there are considerations concerning expressions in public language – words, predicates, names, and so forth. These are investigations into public things. On the other hand, there are the thoughts and other mental or psychological entities. The point here is that descriptive names, as a type of public object work in a certain sort of way. A way that contrasts with how descriptions work. It is consistent with this that the *thought* grasped by someone who understands a sentence using such a name might be the same thought that is grasped by someone who understands a sentence using the corresponding description in place of the name. The argument to the effect that descriptive names are referring expressions is an argument concerning how the names, as parts of a public language, function. The argument to the effect that they are meaningful when empty is an argument to the effect that the descriptive content associated with the name is sufficient to provide content for thoughts even if nothing answers to that name.

2.4 Definite descriptions

In this section, Evans argues that definite descriptions (DDs) are not referring expressions (REs), but rather quantifiers. The strategy is to run through three of Russell's own arguments to the effect that DDs are not REs. Evans argues that none of Russell's arguments is adequate. Evans then gives two arguments of his own against the claim that DDs are REs. The first is negative — if you try to treat them as REs, you end up with a clumsy and needlessly inelegant theory with some unexplained loose ends. The second is positive — if you treat DDs as quantifiers, then everything works just fine.

Evans rehearses three of Russell's arguments against treating DDs as amenable to the same semantic analyses as REs. The first is that one can fail to know that two DDs have the same referent. This argument depends on the assumption that referring expressions are such as to render knowledge of coreference obligatory. Evans claims that it is not, and provided that referring expressions can have a Sense, there can be such informative identity statements. If Evans' arguments in the prior section are good, then descriptive names would be an example. Evans will later (Chapter 6) give examples of demonstratives that have this property.

The second of Russell's arguments is this:

1. Suppose that 'The φ ' is an RE.
2. For any RE, the negation of 'RE is F' is 'RE is not F'
3. If 'The φ ' is an RE, then the negation of the corresponding sentence must be 'the φ is not F'.
4. Disjoining the two gives us 'The φ is F or the φ is not F'.
5. By the law of the excluded middle, one of these disjuncts must be true.
6. Each disjunct entails that 'The φ ' refers.
7. But 'The φ ' may clearly fail to refer. (DDs often fail to refer).
8. Therefore, (1) must be rejected.

Clearly (2) is the crucial move, and it is what Evans will finger as the bad move. In effect, Evans' objection is that (2) is legitimate only for Russellian singular terms, and so Russell's argument assumes that all REs are Russellian.

This move is legitimate for Russellian singular terms because there are two ways to negate an atomic sentence such as 'a is F'. One way it can be false is if a is in fact not-F. The other is that a may not exist. But in the case of Russellian singular terms, this last option is not an option. Therefore, 'Not(a is F)' must be equivalent to 'a is not-F' only if a is a Russellian singular term.

But for any expressions that can be meaningful if empty (non-Russellian), then there is the possibility of a wide scope negation distinct from the narrow scope negation. So if there are any non-Russellian REs, Russell's argument fails. And again, descriptive names are an example. They are REs, according to Evans, but are not Russellian.

Russell's third argument is that if DDs are REs, then they would be meaningless if empty. They are not meaningless if empty, therefore, they cannot be REs. This argument also assumes an implicit equivalence between referring expressions and Russellian singular terms. Evans insists that if DDs are REs, then they are certainly non-Russellian REs. Evans spells out how someone who thought that DDs were REs would make the case, and as can be seen by (14) in Evans' text, they would not be meaningless if empty on this account.

Though Evans has been criticizing Russell's arguments, he agrees with Russell's conclusion. So next he turns to his own arguments that definite descriptions do not belong to the category of referring expressions (but instead to the category of quantifier expressions). Basically the argument is that treating DDs as referring expressions can be done, but only in a very theoretically inelegant and *ad hoc* way. Specifically, sentences that employ definite descriptions are often ambiguous, and admit of dissonant interpretations. If DDs are REs, then in order to capture different interpretations of DDs, the relation of reference would have to be relativized to worlds, times, and name-assignments. Doing this would provide the needed resources to capture the different readings, since each different reading would result from a different reference relation (e.g., assessed in one world vs a different world). This solution is *ad hoc*, because for other REs, the reference relation is not relativized. They do not produce the sort of ambiguities produced by DDs. Moreover, the solution is inelegant, because treating DDs as being in the same category as quantifiers manages to yield all the various readings in a natural way.

The rest of the section is unnecessary for understanding anything in the rest of the book. Basically, Evans goes through a few different proposals for understanding quantification in natural language.

[Note: If you do work through the remainder of this section, note that there is a typo on page 59. The sentence in the middle of the first full paragraph should read: "This is to regard 'The' not as an $S/(S/N), (S/N)$, but as a 'unary quantifier former' (an $(S/(S/N))/(S/N)$)." The text has an incorrect number of parentheses.]

2.5 'Rigid designation' and Fregean sense

In this section, Evans makes brief remarks about the relation of the views expressed in this chapter to some terminological distinctions employed by Saul Kripke and David Kaplan.

Before getting into this section, a quick preliminary on 'rigid designation' will be helpful. The idea, due to Kripke, is that proper names appear to behave in a certain way in modal contexts. This should be understood as an empirical claim about how people actually use names, assessed through what sorts of sentences seem to native speakers to be felicitous or not. [Note: the empirical nature of the claim is underscored by the finding that in some languages proper names are used differently, see @@.] Specifically, it seems to be the case that proper names name "the same" individual regardless of what possible world is under consideration, and this means that the referent is not determined by any descriptive properties. So for example,

1. If Jimi Hendrix had been born to Tom Cruise's parents and been a movie star, then Jimi Hendrix would have been Tom Cruise.

is supposed to be infelicitous. Notice that the doctrine isn't that people *have the same name* in every possible world. Of course they don't. Even if this person's parents had named him "Tom Cruise", the intuition is supposed to be that he would still be Jimi Hendrix, just in that world people would be calling Jimi Hendrix by the name 'Tom Cruise'. The contrast is supposed to be with descriptions, which can of course denote different individuals in different possible worlds. And this is part of Kripke's larger argument against theories of proper names which treated them as descriptions, or clusters of descriptions. This isn't the place to defend or even get into the various nuances of the doctrine. I just want to get enough of the doctrine out so that sense can be made of what Evans says.

According to Evans, our evaluation of the truth of sentences containing names, pronouns, and demonstratives is exclusively concerned with whether the referent of the term satisfies the relevant predicate. And this holds even when those expressions have their reference *fixed* by description, as is the case with descriptive names. Here Evans is reiterating the lesson of Section 2.3, but it is a worthwhile reiteration. Consider the two sentences, the first of which is Evans' (22) on p. 60:

2. If you had invented the zip, you would have been the person who invented the zip
3. If you had invented the zip, you would have been Julius

(2) is perfectly fine, if a bit awkwardly tautologous. However (3) is "unallowed", as Evans puts it. He seems to be suggesting that (3) is infelicitous, and that the explanation for this is that 'Julius' is functioning as a proper name, and not a description. (Again, the idea is that its reference is fixed by description, but once that ladder has been used it is thrown away and what we have is a proper name that refers to an individual.)

Evans points out that Kripke used the expression 'rigid designation' to mark the sort of relation that contrasts with description. But as should be expected given the previous section, Evans claims that the expression is redundant, since the reference relation just is rigid — there is no such thing as non-rigid designation. Even so, Evans will continue to use the expression since everyone else is doing it.

Thus, Evans describes the result of 2.4 as showing the consistency of a singular term's being associated with a clear descriptive criterion for something's being its referent, and its functioning as a rigid designator. And since the descriptive content can serve the role of a Fregean sense — it specifies the way that one must think of the referent if one is to understand the name correctly — it shows that rigid designation is consistent with possession of a Fregean sense. Evans then states that if rigid designation is consistent with expressions that have a Sense that is essentially descriptive, then rigid designators of other types should even more clearly be consistent with Fregean Sense. The thought here would appear to be that if anything is a poster child for not being a rigid designator, it is a description. And so if descriptive senses are consistent with rigid designation, any other kind of Sense should be an even easier case to make.

Evans closes this section, and thus, this chapter, by remarking on his disagreement with David Kaplan who asserts that a singular term cannot possess a Fregean sense if it behaves as a rigid designator. Kaplan draws a distinction between direct and indirect reference, and then assumes that any expression with a Fregean Sense could not refer directly. And anything that did refer directly could

not have any 'intermediary' such as a Sense. The idea here seems to be that if there is a sense associated with a term, then this sense would be an intermediary between the thinker/language user and the object picked out by the intermediary. On this conception, it would seem that this intermediary might latch onto different objects in different circumstances or possible worlds, in much the way that a description might be true of different objects in different possible worlds.

Evans claims that this is misguided for two reasons. First, Fregean senses need not be thought of as *mediating* between expressions and their referents. Recall that on Evans' reading, sense is just a way of thinking about a referent. 'Way' need not be cashed out as a description nor as anything else that would serve to mediate between an expression and a referent. Evans points out that the mere fact that an object is thought about *in a particular way* does not render relation to the object indirect — and he compares this with the suggestion that if I gave you something in a particular way (with my left hand instead of the right) the giving would be rendered indirect.

Second, Evans diagnoses Kaplan's position as perhaps implicitly assuming that Fregean senses are basically Carnapian intensions — functions from possible worlds to extensions. Of course, if this is so, then such terms cannot be REs, because they will, by definition, have different extensions in different worlds. But as the case of descriptive names shows, even when a name has a clear descriptive reference-fixing component, it need not behave in this way. It can still be a rigid designator. Consider: *Julius might not have invented the zip* (had he died in his youth, for example).