Philosophy 1140 Empiricism. Quiz 9. 04.10.00 Name_____________________
1. Hume described the views of 'some philosophers' to the effect that "we are immediately conscious of what we call out SELF." Hume's reaction to this view is:
a. positive, since it will turn out to be his view as well.
b. This view is correct, but nobody has yet explained how we are immediately conscious of our self, and this is what Hume claims he will do.
c. This view is contrary to experience.
d. Both a and b.
He plainly says this at the beginning of the second paragraph. Also, the other answers are clearly false, since he is intent on arguing against the described view.
2. Hume's first argument against the claim that we have an idea of the self is that:
a. Ideas are passive, and the self is active, and hence we can have no idea of the self.
b. Since if there were an idea of the self, it would be an idea of Reflexion, and since Hume claims that we have no ideas of Reflexion, it follows that he thinks there can be no idea of the self.
c. Ideas are derived from impressions, and so if we had an idea of the self, the self would have to be an impression. But clearly it is not an impression. Therefore, we have no idea of it.
d. Trick question: Hume agrees that we do have an idea of the self.
Hume doesn't agree, and so this isn't a trick question, hence d is false. Hume also never says ideas are passive (that's Berkeley), and in fact talks about ideas entering into causal relations, implying that they are active. This rules out a. Hume also never says we have no ideas of Reflexion -- he never even uses that expression. But he does argue along the lines of c in the second paragraph.
3. Hume's second argument against the claim that we have an idea
of the self is that:
a. The self is supposed to be constant and enduring, but there is no single constant or enduring idea within the contents of our consciousness.
b. Since if there were an idea of the self, it would be an idea of Reflexion, and since Hume claims that we have no ideas of Reflexion, it follows that he thinks there can be no idea of the self.
c. We could only have an idea of the self as something that causes our impressions, and since we have no justification for the principle of causation, we can have no idea of the self.
d. Trick question: Hume agrees that we do have an idea of the self.
b and d can be eliminated as per the reasons given in question 2 above. c can be eliminated because Hume, unlike Berkeley, never discussed mind/self/sprit as a cause of ideas. a can be seen to be correct even apart from the process of elimination by looking at the second part of paragraph 2.
4. What does Hume say about the ideas we have of 'identity' and 'different but related objects in succession'?
a. Strictly speaking, the two are perfectly distinct.
b. The first applies only to impressions, the second only to ideas.
c. The imagination mistakenly slides from the first to the second.
d. Both a and c.
b can be eliminated, because Hume actually gives examples of identity and diversity each applying both to ideas and impressions. He does claim, however, that though they are perfectly distinct, the imagination can slide from diverse but connected ideas to the idea of identity, via something like blurring out the differences.
5. Hume gives a quick diagnoses of where we get our confused notion of substance (extended or mental), It is:
a. We have a single, constant idea or impression, and we assume that there is an enduring substance that accounts for it.
b. We have a number of changing ideas and impressions that are related, and we posit substance as the principle that unites them into a single thing.
c. We arrive at it through causal reasoning -- it is that which causes our impressions.
d. Both b and c.
Again, Hume is more or less silent on what causes impressions, and unlike Berkeley never makes any direct claim to the effect that they are caused by anything like mind or spirit or self. This eliminates c and hence d. b is correct, rather than a, exactly because in the case where the ideas are changing, something in addition to them needs to be posited in order to account for their identity. If they are not changing, then this additional thing, substance, would not be needed to account for their identity.
6. The first step from the 'bundle' view of the self as a collection of distinct and changing ideas to an account of how we get to an idea of a single, enduring self is:
a. The recognition that though the ideas are distinct and changing, they are related.
b. The recognition that there must be some substance that underlies the changing ideas.
c. The recognition that there is something constant, namely change itself.
d. The recognition that ideas cannot exist without a self to 'have' them.
d might have been argued by Berkeley, but not Hume. c is something I just completely made up, Hume never says anything like it, though it might make for a nice song lyric. b is wrong, for Hume never says that there must be a substance underlying things, in fact, he rails against the idea of substance. At best, such a line of reasoning would be what one gets, as an explanation of our confused reasoning, after something like a has occurred. As paragraph 16 makes clear, a is correct.
7. What is the primary way in which memory contributes to personal identity for Hume?
a. It guarantees that there will be a great deal of resemblance among the set of ideas in a given mind, since memory is in the business of making copies of things.
b. The imagination is able to produce a single, unchanging, idea, and this is the idea of the self.
c. The imagination allows us to conceive of what is really a single, unchanging enduring idea as being composed of many changing ideas, when strictly it is not.
d. Both a and c.
c is actually the opposite of one of Hume's points: he thinks that the imagination allows us to conceive of a set of changing things as a single identical thing. This eliminates c and d. b is out for a number of reasons, first, the imagination could not produce such an idea that would last your whole life, never fading out, and so could not supply the needed idea; second, this isn't what Hume says the imagination's role is anyway. But a is clearly correct, as can be seen by reading the material. Also, a is the only one that actually mentions memory. Another clue.
8. Biro distinguishes between two kinds of identity invoked by Hume, 'perfect' and 'imperfect'. What is the distinction?
a. Perfect identity is ascribable to minds, while imperfect ascribable to external bodies.
b. Perfect identity only is ascribable to simple unchanging things, while all other things have, at best, imperfect identity.
c. Perfect identity holds only of an object at one given time, while imperfect identity can, at best, hold of an object over an extended period of time.
d. Perfect identity is a fiction. Only imperfect identity is ever knowable.
We arrive at the idea of perfect identity by considering (or perceiving) an enduring, unchanging thing through time, and the thing at a later time is the same as the thing at an earlier time. It is not a fiction, at least not in all cases, and so this eliminates d. This characterization also shows why c is false, as the idea of perfect identity arises for a single unchanging thing over time, not at a given time. a can be eliminated, since Hume gives examples of both perfect and imperfect identoty in the case of perceiving external bodies. b is clearly correct anyway.
9, Biro points out that for Hume, both 'memory' and 'the natural relation of causation' (aka causation) are what chiefly unite the ideas in the mind. Of these he says:
a. Memory is the more important, since without it 'the natural relation would not arise.'
b. Causation is the more important, because without it 'nothing could cause memories to occur'.
c. Memory is not actually needed, since causation can do all the needed work.
d. Both b and c.
Hume nor Biro ever discuss what 'causes' memories. This eliminates b and hence d. c is out since Biro actually says that memory is the more important, and this is also the reason that a is right.
10. Why must we appeal to induction in order to legitimate our use of the principle of cause and effect (C&E) when we seek to extend our knowledge of the world beyond what we are presently aware of?
a. Because without inductive reasoning, we could never be sure that we (our own minds/selves) exist, and hence never be sure of any or our reasonings.
b. Because the only C&E relations we have direct evidence of are those we have observed, we must appeal to induction in order to claim that they hold of causes or effects that we are not observing.
c. Because without induction, we wouldn't know anything at all, and this includes C&E.
d. All of the above.
c is out, because as Hume says, and as we discussed in class, induction is not needed for knowledge of relations of ideas, nor for knowledge of what can immediately perceive. Hence d is also out. a is out because nobody ever talked about using induction to argue for the existence of our mind or self. b is clearly correct anyway, from our class discussion and also from the notes on induction I put up on the website.