Philosophy 1140 Empiricism. Quiz 6. 03.13.00 Name________________________
According to Berkeley, how many kinds of substance are there, and what is/are its/their nature(s)?
a. Only one kind: Spirit.
b. Two kinds: Spirit and Ideas.
c. Three kinds: Spirit, Ideas and God.
d. Only one kind: God.
Ideas aren't substances, but modes of Spirit, and this rules out b and c. He thinks that God is an infinite Spirit, and we are finite Spirits, but we are all substantial, hence God is not the only substance.
According to Berkeley (in PHK):
Ideas and Spirit are both active.
Ideas and Spirit are both passive.
Ideas are active and Spirit is passive.
Ideas are passive and Spirit is active.
He says this over and over all over the place in PHK. See e.g. PHK:25, 27.
How does Berkeley characterize the difference between Ideas of Sense and Ideas of the imagination?
a. Ideas of sense caused by God, ideas of imagination caused by human minds.
b. Ideas of sense stronger, more distinct, and more coherent.
c. Ideas of sense active, Ideas of imagination passive.
d. Both a and b.
Ideas are passive (see last question), which rules out c. For a and b see PHK:29, 30.
Berkeley says that though we have no Idea of Spirit, we have a notion of it. What does he mean by a 'notion'?
a. A notion is a faint and indistinct Idea.
b. A notion seems to be something like knowledge of a relation: in the case of Spirit, the relation of being the active principle behind the change in passive ideas.
c. A notion is an innate Idea implanted in the mind by God.
d. Both a and c.
A notion is not an Idea at all, and hence a is wrong (if it were an Idea, since Berkeley says we have a notion of Spirit, he would be saying that we have an Idea of Spirit, which he explicitly denies.) Hence d is wrong too. Berkeley never talks about innate ideas or God implanting Ideas, and so c is out. See PHK:89 and study question 59 for why b is right.
In PHK:16, Berkeley claims that in order for 'matter' to be meaningful, we must have
an idea of it, and we don't.
a relative idea of it, which we don't have.
either a positive Idea of it, or a 'relative' idea of it, and we have neither.
a new, special purpose sense.
See PHK:16 and study question #53.
According to McCracken, why didn't Berkeley write more about our knowledge of the mind?
Berkeley lost a draft in which we was in fact worked out a theory of such things.
Berkeley realized that the topic was full of difficulties and he realized that the prudent thing to do might be to not say anything about more it.
He did. Part Two of the Principles of Human Knowledge was all about our knowledge of Mind.
All of the above.
All are true. He did write on this topic, but lost the manuscript. McCracken suggests that the reason he didn't write on the topic again was the second answer above.
According to McCracken, the Cartesian notion of Mind that Berkeley started with held that
the Mind is a single thing, with a passive faculty (understanding) and an active faculty (will).
the Mind is two things: and active understanding, and a set of passive Ideas.
the Mind is three things: an understanding, a will, and a set of Ideas.
the Mind is two things: an active will, and a set of passive Ideas.
Explained in the 2nd paragraph of McCracken's article. See also study question #54.
According to McCracken, Berkeley at times used the term 'Mind' to mean not Spirit per se, but
a. the understanding, or passive part of Spirit.
b. the will, or active part of Spirit.
c. the set of the Spirit's Ideas.
d. Both a and c.
Explained on page 146. The Understanding was identified by Berkeley at this stage simply as the set of Ideas, hence a and c are both right. See also study question #55.
According to McCracken, Berkley was at one point in a dualist phase, in which the Spirit was equated with the active Will, and the Understanding was equated with the set of Ideas 'in' the Spirit. Berkeley eventually gave this dualism up because:
a. it would follow that the Will perceives nothing, and is blind, which is contrary to Berkeley's entire metaphysics of Spirits perceiving Ideas.
b. it would follow that the Will could only perceive, and hence not really be active after all.
c. it would follow that the Understanding was wholly passive, and hence unable to direct its attention at different ideas.
d. Both a and c.
See first full paragraph of p. 148, sentences 2 and especially 7. See also study question #57.
The 'final view of Spirit' that Berkeley reaches, according to McCracken, is one in which:
Spirit is wholly active.
Spirit is wholly passive.
Spirit is both active and passive.
Spirit is neither active nor passive.
Explicitly stated in the last two sentences of the first full paragraph on p. 150. See also study question #59.