Philosophy 1140 Empiricism. Quiz 5. 02.28.00 Name_____________________
In PHK:25-29 Berkeley offers a sort of demonstration that God must exist. The basic idea of this demonstration is:
Berkeley has an idea of God, but since all ideas are passive, and cannot cause anything or be their own cause, there must be a God that caused him to have that idea.
Since ideas are passive, they can only be caused by spirits. And Berkeley has ideas that he didn't cause himself, there must be some other, more powerful spirit (God) that causes them.
Since Berkeley knows that the world exists, the world must have had a cause, and this cause can only be God.
Since ideas are active, they must have been created by an active being, and God is the only completely active being.
Berkeley says that he has no idea of God, nor any other active spirit. This rules out the first. He also goes on and on about how ideas are passive. This rules out the last. The second is his explicit argument from PHK:25-30, and hence is right. I might give credit for the third, because it's not crazy.
According to Berkeley, the laws of nature, which are discovered by science, are:
Rules according to which ideas cause other ideas.
Mere illusion, since they concern non-existent material substance.
The laws which God has implanted into sensible objects so that He doesn't have to do everything Himself.
The regularities according to which God orders the pattern of ideas.
Ideas are passive and can't effect eachother, this rules out the first. The rules do not concern material substance, but the world of appearance, and this rules out the second. The third implies that sensible objects, which are collections of ideas, could act according to rules; but since the are passive they can't act at all. This rules out the third. He goes on and on about the fourth, though, so even if you didn't eliminate the others this one should have been obvious.
To the objection "Look, my idea of a house and a real house are different" Berkeley replies:
a. There is a difference, but it is between ideas caused by myself, and ideas caused by God.
b. There is really no difference. You are abused by words.
c. The difference is between passive ideas (commonly called 'ideas') and active ideas (commonly called 'real things')
d. Both a and c.
For Berkely, all ideas are passive. This rules out c and hence d. He does recognize the difference, as part of his argument from 25 - 30, this rules out b. And the import of that argument is a.
To the objection "Hey, if you're right then things come into and go out of existence depending on whether or not they are being perceived" Berkeley replies:
a. That's right.
b. That's an objection to Lockians as much as to me, since even for Locke, the sensible object, as a combination of sensible ideas, goes out of existence when not perceived, and only some unknowable material substance remains.
c. Since God is always perceiving everything, then 'real things' don't really come into and go out of existence.
d. All of the above.
As in the previous quiz, Berkeley argues for each of a - c in order in PHK:46-48.
Objection to Berkeley: If everything is just an idea, caused by God, then why is there so much apparent complexity in the internal organization of plants and animals? Surely God could make the sensible plant grow even if it was just a bunch of homogeneous goo inside! Berkeley replies:
Actually, most plants are kinda gooey inside.
Because God orders the ideas according to rules -- so that we may learn how the world works -- and these rules require that there are (or appear to be) complex parts in plants and animals.
Ideas, even ideas of the insides of plants, have to have the right kind of complexity in order to be able to cause other ideas, like the idea of a plant growing.
None of the above.
See PHK:60. Berkeley never uses the term 'gooey'. This rules out the first. Ideas are passive, and hence can't cause anything. this rules out the third. The second is right, and thus the fourth is wrong.
In 4:2:14 of the Essay, Locke addresses the question of how we can know whether or not there is anything corresponding to our ideas. His answer, in effect is:
a. We just know.
b. There is a manifest difference between ideas we create on our own, such as in dreams and by imagination, and ideas caused by real things outside us.
c. Neither a nor b, but something else.
d. Both a and b.
a and b mean pretty much the same thing, and if you read the section, it is clear that this is what he is saying.
In 4:4:1-5 of the Essay, Locke addresses criteria by which we can know that our ideas accurately reflect things outside of us. What does he say that we can know?
a. All simple ideas.
b. No simple ideas, but some complex ideas.
c. Complex ideas of Substance.
d. Both a and c.
He says that simple ideas can be known to be reflections of things outside us. This eliminates b. c is ruled out because he specifically says that we don't have any reason to think that complex ideas of substance are accurate reflections. This eliminates c and d.
According to Grush, Berkeley's idealism is
basically a principled working-out of Locke's epistemology, minus some of Locke's indefensible claims.
a radical departure from Locke's epistemology that denies many of Locke's central epistemological claims.
the result of failing to appreciate the subtlety, and most of all coherently and concisely expressed simplicity, of Locke's view.
an overly skeptical position that denies the obvious facts about reality.
That's what I said alright.
According to Grush, the difference between phenomenalism and the bundle theory is
Phenomenalism, but not the bundle theory, claims that the table can exist in the room when nobody is there to perceive it.
The bundle theory, but not phenomenalism, claims that the table can exist in the room when nobody is there to perceive it.
Phenomenalism entails that God exists in order to make the counterfactual perception statements true.
Phenomenalism accepts that matter exists, and it is this that makes the counterfactual perception statements true.
God plays no role in phenomenalism, so that rules the third answer out. Phenomenalism is a type of idealism, and hence denies matter, which rules out the last. The second gets things the exactly the wrong way around, since the first is right.
According to Grush, why can Berkeley get away with not distinguishing between the bundle theory and phenomenalism?
a. Because he thinks that God is always perceiving everything that exists, and so there ends up being no practical difference between phenomenalism and the bundle theory.
b. Because phenomenalism was not formulated or even hinted at by Berkeley or anyone else for over 100 years after Berkeley wrote.
c. Because doesn't really hold either the bundle theory or phenomenalism.
d. Both b and c.