a. Abstracting the idea of color, apart from particular conceived/perceived colors.

b. Abstracting the color of an apple from its taste.

c. Abstracting the idea of extension apart from any visible or tangible quality it might have.

d. None of the above.

a and c are the two bad kinds of abstraction. b is the ok kind.

a. The difference between human and animal minds is the ability of the former to frame certain kinds of abstract ideas.

b. Both humans and animals can form abstract ideas.

c. Neither humans nor animals can form abstract ideas.

d. None of the above.

Berkeley has a big diatribe about this specific topic in the Introduction to PHK. Note that the 'ok' form of abstraction mentioned in the first question does not result in an abstract idea. Nobody, man nor beast, can form an abstract idea.

a. by being associated with an abstract idea.

b. by being associated with a set of particular ideas.

c. by being associated with a general idea.

d. both b and c.

a. Ideas provided by sensation.

b. Ideas provided by 'perception' (or introspection) of the mind's own operations.

c. Ideas provided by the memory an imagination.

d. All of the above.

This is the import of the first section of PHK.

Since matter is active, and ideas completely passive, ideas cannot resemble matter.

Since ideas are active, and matter completely passive, ideas cannot resemble matter.

Relativity arguments of the sort Locke used to show that ideas of heat/cold are not in objects.

Nothing can be like an idea except another idea.

Berkeley goes on and on about how ideas and matter are both completely passive, and this rules a and b out, even if you didn't know that c and d are right.

Through sense, we can only have knowledge of our ideas, not matter.

We could have the same reasons for believing there is matter whether or not there is any.

Since there is no good explanation of how matter is supposed to cause ideas, we cannot infer the existence of matter as part of an explanation of the production of our ideas.

All of the above.

Each of these is argued in turn in sections 46, 47 and 48.

Mind-independent corporeal substance has primary qualities and these are not conceivable.

Our finite intellects cannot grasp the infinite complexity of matter.

Any attempt to form such a conception is itself a conception in a mind, and hence fails to be the conception it needs to be in order to work.

All of the above.

Berkeley did in fact understand Locke's arguments for the primary/secondary quality distinction, and had serious counter-arguments for them all.

Berkeley did in fact understand Locke's arguments for the primary/secondary quality distinction, but only had counter-arguments for those based on relativity of perception.

Berkeley misunderstood Locke's arguments for the primary/secondary quality distinction, thinking he rested them on relativity arguments when he did not.

Berkeley misunderstood Locke's arguments for the primary/secondary quality distinction, thinking he rested them on the explanatory success of Boylean atomism when he did not.

The identity of some historical figure who, before Locke, tried to use relativity arguments in connection with the primary/secondary distinction, and it is this figure that Berkeley, Locke, Bayle and others seem to have had in mind.

Why did Berkeley not understand that Locke didn't rely exclusively on relativity arguments, when in fact Locke was very clear about this?

Why did Locke make such an issue of Boylean atomism, given that Boyle wasn't born until after Locke had died?

Why did Berkeley make such an issue of Locke's putative use of Boylean atomism, when in fact Locke never mentions anything remotely connected with Boylean atomism?

a. Berkeley.

b. Locke.

c. Three commentators on Berkeley and Locke (Mackie, Mandelbaum, and Alexander).

d. a and c.