1. Which of the following are, according to Berkeley, legitimate (i.e. possible) kinds of abstraction that the mind can perform?
a. Abstracting the idea of color, apart from particular conceived/perceived colors.
b. Abstracting the color of an apple from its taste.
c. Abstracting the idea of extension apart from any visible or tangible quality it might have.
d. None of the above.
a and c are the two bad kinds of abstraction. b is the ok kind.
2. Berkeley argues that EVEN IF there were such a thing as material substance, we could never know it. Why?
Through sense, we can only have knowledge of our ideas, not matter.
We could have the same reasons for believing there is matter whether or not there is any.
Since there is no good explanation of how matter is supposed to cause ideas, we cannot infer the existence of matter as part of an explanation of the production of our ideas.
All of the above.
Each of these is argued in turn in sections 46, 47 and 48.
3. To the objection "Look, my idea of a house and a real house are different" Berkeley replies:
a. There is a difference, but it is between ideas caused by myself, and ideas caused by God.
b. There is really no difference. You are abused by words.
c. The difference is between passive ideas (commonly called 'ideas') and active ideas (commonly called 'real things')
d. Both a and c.
For Berkely, all ideas are passive. This rules out c and hence d. He does recognize the difference, as part of his argument from 25 - 30, this rules out b. And the import of that argument is a.
4. To the objection "Hey, if you're right then things come into and go out of existence depending on whether or not they are being perceived" Berkeley replies:
a. That's right.
b. That's an objection to Lockians as much as to me, since even for Locke, the sensible object, as a combination of sensible ideas, goes out of existence when not perceived, and only some unknowable material substance remains.
c. Since God is always perceiving everything, then 'real things' don't really come into and go out of existence.
d. All of the above.
As in the previous quiz, Berkeley argues for each of a - c in order in PHK:46-48.
5. In PHK:16, Berkeley claims that in order for 'matter' to be meaningful, we must have
an idea of it, and we don't.
a relative idea of it, which we don't have.
either a positive Idea of it, or a 'relative' idea of it, and we have neither.
a new, special purpose sense.
See PHK:16 and study question #53.
6. How does Berkeley characterize the difference between Ideas of Sense and Ideas of the imagination?
a. Ideas of sense caused by God, ideas of imagination caused by human minds.
b. Ideas of sense stronger, more distinct, and more coherent.
c. Ideas of sense active, Ideas of imagination passive.
d. Both a and b.
Ideas are passive (see last question), which rules out c. For a and b see PHK:29, 30.
7. IN PHK:58 Berkeley says "the question whether the earth moves amounts to no more than whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like one of them". This is a statement of:
a. The Bundle Theory
b. Phenomenalism
c. The way in which Copernican astronomy can be derived from Berkeleyan epistemology.
d. Both a and b.
Obvious, especially if you read my notes on phenomenalism.
8. One could say that God plays a similar role for Berkeley that extended matter does for Locke: They both account for the order of our ideas of sense, and for the difference in force and coherence between ideas we create ourselves in imagination versus the ideas we get through perception. But Berkeley would undoubtedly claim that his theory is better because:
a. Berkeley's view, but not Locke's, is compatible with Phenomenalism.
b. Ideas of sense are active, and hence cannot be caused by passive matter.
c. It makes sense to say that Spirits can cause ideas, but not that inert matter can cause anything, especially ideas.
d. Both a and c.
For Berkeley, ideas are passive, and this rules out b. Phenomenalism wasn't recognized as such in Berkeley's time, nor is there reason to think he woul dhave preferred it to the bundle theory if he thought to distinguish them. a might be true, but Berkeley wouldn't have appealed to it. Hence a is out. He does explicitly say c, though.
9. Wilson claims that Berkeley addressed the so-called explanatory successes of corpuscularian science by:
a. showing that all this science is compatible with his Idealism.
b. arguing that these scientific 'explanations' can't explain the production of ideas in minds.
c. arguing that God does not cause Ideas in accord with the prescriptions of these theories.
d. Both a and b.
e. All of the above.
Berkeley claims that God does in fact cause Ideas as dscribed by these theories, and so c and hence e are out. Wilson does discuss and endorse both a and b.
10. McCracken claims that Berkeley abandoned the view that the Spirit consists of a wholly active Will combined with a wholly passive understanding because:
a. This view leads to the position that the will is 'blind'.
b. This view leads to a Cartesian Dualism.
c. This view leads to the position that the understanding is powerless.
d. Both a and b.
e. Both a and c.
See page 148, paragraph beginning "But this early...". Both are clearly spelled out. No mention of anything like b.