Notes on Phenomenalism: Phenomenalism vs. the Bundle Theory.

Berkeley wavers between, or does not even distinguish clearly between, two positions that later philosophers have separated. The topic is the nature of real objects, and especially what it means for real objects to exist.

One position, the bundle theory, is that objects are sets, or bundles, of ideas or perceptions. So the apple just is the idea of redness, the shape, the taste, etc. To say that the apple exists is to say that it is being perceived (and conceived as one thing even though it is a collection of ideas). If it is not being perceived, then the apple simply does not exist on this view.

The second position, phenomenalism, has it that objects are 'logical constructions' from sense-data or ideas. What does this mean? First an example. For a phenomenalist, to say that there is a table in the other room when there is nobody in that room to perceive it means that IF someone were to go into that room, THEN she would perceive the table.

The two positions have in common the conviction that there is no material, corporeal, mind-independent thing that is the table. On both positions, what one has are, ultimately, sense impressions (aka ideas, aka pereptions).

Where they differ is that phenomenalism, but not the bundle theory, treats objects as logical constructions, involving a lot of conditionals and counter-factuals. For instance: "The table in the next room exists" means that (is true if) some conditional, call it C1, holds.

C1: If I or anyone were to go into the next room, then they would have ideas we might describe as brown and rectangular; if they were to move in such and such a way, then the idea will change from a rectangle to a sqaure, etc.

What is crucial is that on this view, the table exists even when nobody is actually perceiving it, because it is not actual perception, but the conditional possibility of perception that counts. The table exists if the following conditional is true: IF someone were to go into the room, THEN they would perceive the table. This conditional can be true (and hence the table really exists), even if nobody is in fact in the room.

On the bundle theory, however, the table is not some logical construction out of sense data (= ideas = perceptions), but rather just is a bundle of actual sense data. So on the bundle theory, the table doesn't exist if nobody is there to perceive it.

Now phenomenalism can seem odd. Here's one reason. Normally we think that conditionals like C1 are true because there is some mind-independent material object in the other room. We think that it is because there is some such mind-independent matter in the other room that explains why C1 is true, and if there is not such a thing in that room, then C1 would be false.

What phenomenalism does is to keep the conditional, and make it constitutive of the object. But they jettison the assumption that what makes the conditional true is some mind-independent material stuff. In fact, phenomenalists don't provide any analysis of what it is that makes such conditionals true. They don't really care.

So phenomanlism, like the bundle theory, denies that there is any mind-independent material substance. But unlike the bundle theorist, the phenomenalist claims that things do exist unperceived, because the phenomenalist stipulates that 'X exists unperceived' just means something like C1.

Berkeley shifts back and forth. For bundle-ish quotes, see PHK1, 4, 46.

For phenomenalism-ish quotes, see PHK:3, 58.

Why doesn't Berkeley clearly distinguish these? Well, given his particular metaphysics, he doesn't have to. This is because he thinks that God is continually perceiving everything in the universe. Thus, everything really is a bundle of ideas/perceptions, maybe not a bundle of my ideas, but an actual bundle of ideas nonetheless. Furthermore, it is because God is perceiving everything all the time that conditionals like C1 are true. [That's an important point to keep in mind: God is playing the same role that matter plays in the common sense scheme, it is the thing that guarantees the truth of conditionals like C1.]

In any case, because for Berkeley God is always perceiving reality, and this will always make conditionals like C1 true, the difference between the bundle theory and phenomenalism vanishes for Berkeley.