Answers to selected questiond from midterm one:

1. Foundationalist Epistemology.

A theory of the nature of knowledge according to which all knowledge claims are either i) part of an indubitable, self-verified 'foundation', or ii) derivable from this foundation, via logic or some other sure-fire rational principles. Contrasts with 'coherentism' according to which knowledge has no foundations, but rather forms a coherent (logically consistent) body of beliefs, in which each claim is justified by its part in the whole.

2. Dream Argument.

The second of Descartes' sceptical arguments, according to which it is claimed that any experience might in fact be part of a dream, and hence not 'true'. It puts into doubt even empirical knowledge which purports to be obtained in optimal viewing conditions (which is not put into doubt by the 'sensory unrelaibility' argument). It does not put extension (or other simple natures), or mathematics or logical truths into doubt.

9. The will.

One of the two functions of the mind whose misuse results in error (the other being the understanding). The will is that faculty by which choices are made, and in the context of knowledge, it is that by which we chose to affirm or dny a representation furnished by the understanding. It allows us to decide to judge the thought as 'true', or 'false', or to withhold judgement altogether. Our will is infinite, according to Descartes. We are using our will freely when we are not conscious of being compelled by any external force.

11. Objective and formal properties (of an idea)

All ideas have two aspects. The first is their formal properties -- they are modifications of the thinking substance which is your mind. The formal property of an idea makes no reference to what the idea is about, or what it represents. Rather, it is a characterization of the idea itself. The objective properties of an idea are characterizations of what the idea is about. For example, when you think of the moon, that idea (your thought of the moon) has as its formal property the fact that it is a modification of your mind. The objective property of this idea is the moon itself. By analogy, the objective properties of the word 'Moon' written on a chalkboard is the moon (what the word 'means' or 'represents'), while the formal properties are the features of the word itself, the configuation of chalk particles on the board.

Essay Question 5. The conclusion Descartes reaches to the effect that God is not a deceiver (and so Descartes can have confidence in the truth of his C&D Ideas) runs up against the following prima facie counter-argument: Descartes is (as he showed in Meditation I) deceived quite often about a range of things. How does Descartes reconcile the fact that a non-deceiving God exists with the fact that he (Descartes) often falls into error? Be sure to mention the nature of error, and the nature of the faculties of the will and the understanding.

Answer:

Descartes gets out of radical doubt by arguing that his clear and distinct ideas cannot be doubted, that they must be true. This is because God is not a deceiver, and because Descartes is compelled to believe his C&D ideas. But if God is not a deceiver, then how can He allow Descartes to fall into error at all? That is, if God must guarantee that C&D ideas are true, why must he not also guarantee that all Descartes' ideas are true? The answer is as follows. All judgement is a matter of i) the understanding producing some idea or thought, and i) the will deciding to affirm, deny, or withhold judgement, on the truth or falsity of that idea or thought. Our understanding is finite, however, and our will infinite, which means that we are able to use our will to affirm the truth of some idea or thought that the understanding has inadequately produced (some idea that is unclear, indistinct, or both). This is the source of error: we affirm something as true when it is false. Now, there are two cases to consider. First, cases in which, though I did affirm the truth of the idea, I was not compelled to do so, I might have withheld judgement, but I did not. God is not responsible for these errors, because God gave me a will which was free enough to withhold judgement, but I did not. Hence the error was mine. I misused the will. Second, cases in which I was compelled to affirm the truth of the idea. These are the cases where the idea is clear and distinct. In such cases, we are not able to withhold judgement. Our faculty of will, which was given by God, is not able to withhold judgement on C&D ideas, and is compelled to judge them as true. Hence, if such judgements can be in error, God would be to blame, since he provided us with a will that could not have done otherwise. Thus, since God is not a deceiver, the C&D Ideas, to which we are compelled to assent, must be true. Finally, this 'compulsion' to assent to C&D ideas does not mean that we do not have free will with respect to them. We do (our will is infinite, after all). Descartes defines a choice as free when we are not conscious of any external compulsion ont he decision. Since the compulsion in such cases (the compulsion to judge C&D ideas as true) is an internal compulsion, is is not contrary to our freedom.