Essay Questions for Exam 3. March, 13, 2003.

Below are the essay questions for Exam 3, The exam itself will be in class on March 13, normal room, normal time. You will need a blue book; maybe two. It will consists of 10 multiple choice questions like the quizzes, and two essay questions. I will choose at random three of the questions below, and these three will appear on the exam. You will choose any two of those three to write on. Your two essays should be organized and complete, but concise, meaning that everything that is relevant to answering the question should be mentioned, but there shouldn’t be anything that is not relevant.

1. Explain the Cartesian view of personal identity. Your explanation should include discussion of Descartes’ wax example, the distinction between substances and properties, and Descartes’ take on how each of us knows that we are, essentially a thinking thing. What would Descartes say about the identity (or lack thereof) of Leonard Shelby (main character of Memento) over time after his accident?

2. In the year 1683, March 13, at 3pm Pacific time, a certain collection of atoms (supposing all the atoms in the universe are numbered, this collection might contain atom number 1, atom number 2,134, atom number 234,563, etc.) makes up John Locke's body. At this time, John Locke also has a certain collection of memories: he remembers entering Westminster School in 1646, going to Oxford in 1652, etc. As a matter of striking coincidence, exactly 320 years later, all the same atoms make up the body of your philosophy professor Rick Grush (the same set of atoms). Also, it turns out that meddling neurosurgeons have messed with Rick's hippocampus in such a way as to erase all his memories and install memories of entering Westminster School in 1646, going to Oxford in 1652, etc. Now , how would Locke's theory handle the following questions: Are Locke's body on 03.13.1683, and Grush's body on 03.013.2003 the same mass? Are Locke on 03.13.1683 and Grush on 03.013.2003 the same man (homo sapiens)? Are Locke on 03.13.1683 and Grush on 03.013.2003 the same person? Be sure you explain WHY Locke's theory provides the answers you say it does.

3. One plausible interpretation of Dennett’s article is that none of the things that people usually think are important for personal identity really are important. The two things people usually fixate on are the body and the brain. Dennett tries to argues that neither of these things is needed for personal identity. What is Dennett’s argument for the claim that the body is not needed for personal identity through time? The case of the brain is more difficult. How does Dennett try to show that even the brain can be irrelevant for personal identity?

4. Williams’ article contains two different cases: the first which can be described as a machine that allows people to change bodies; and a second involving an evil tyrant in whose power you are, and who is telling you about bad things he will do to you soon. Describe both of these examples, and the intuitions that Williams thinks each of them supports. Williams points out that there is a difference between these cases, but that it doesn’t seem to be a significant difference. Briefly state what this difference is and why Williams thinks it doesn’t matter. After answering all of this, in a brief final paragraph explain what you would choose if presented with the options given in the ‘body switching’ example. That is, you and the person you hate most (call this person X) will be put into the machine Williams describes in [1]-[12]. Afterwards, one of the resulting people will be tortured and killed, and the other one will receive millions of dollars and a year’s supply of Turtle Wax. And which person gets which is completely up to you right now. Do you choose i) the person in what is currently your body (the my-body-person) gets the goods, and the person in what is currently X’s body (the X-body-person) gets treated badly; or ii) vice versa.

5. Parfit claims that the ‘problem’ of personal identity is not that there is such a thing as personal identity and we haven’t figured out yet what it is, but is rather that we think in terms of personal identity at all. This involves trying to show that i) identity cannot work in some cases; and ii) everything we really care about can be captured in terms other then identity. His argument for (i) hinges on the example of a person who undergoes fission and becomes two people. Why does Parfit think that the notion of identity cannot handle this case? His argument for (ii) hinges on the provision of notions that he thinks do a better job of capturing what is important to us. What are these two notions, what do they mean? What is Parfit’s analysis of why we have been fooled into thinking of these issues in terms of identity?

6. Leonard Shelby (the main character of Memento) clearly felt as though he continued to be one person after his accident, even though each of the Leonard-segments had no memory of any of the others. Initially this seems contrary to Locke’s theory. But what could a Lockean say in support of the idea that he really is the same person through time after his accident? (I can think of three things prominent in Leonard’s situation that Locke might appeal to in order to explain the attribution of identity in such a case.) Given these considerations, is the cloned Adam Gibson (main character in The 6th Day) the same person as Adam Gibson before the cloning event? What is the one thing Shelby has going for him that Adam Gibson’s clone doesn’t? (Clue: this is something that Locke’s theory can’t really appeal to.)