Philosophy 1: Introduction to Philosophy

Philosophy 1: Introduction to Philosophy
(Officially: The Nature of Philosophy)

Winter Quarter 2003. UCSD.
Time: Tu-Th 2:00-3:20
Room: CSB004
Instructor: Rick Grush (rick@mind.ucsd.edu -- http://mind.ucsd.edu)
Office Hours: Tu-Th 4-5
Office Phone: 822-4440 (note that email is a much more reliable way to contact me)
TA: Dave Smith (dave@reductio.com)

Session 01 (01.07): Introduction to course, proofs for existence of God, and the argument from Design.

1. Quizzes. There will be 10 in-class quizzes worth 10 points each, for a total of 100 points.

2. There will be three exams, each of which will have a multiple choice section worth 30 points, and two essay questions worth 35 points each, for a total of 100 points per exam.

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1. Be sure to read the assigned material before class. This will help to ensure that our class time is quality time, and not wasted with me and some of the students reiterating the material to those who haven't read it. Reading the material before class will also help you get some points on the quizzes, and that is a good thing.

2. Use the study questions to help you focus on the important topics in the readings, and also to help you determine if there is some topic you don't understand. Try to get to the point where you would feel comfortable answering all the study questions before class meets. But if there are a few that you are still finding difficult, don't panic.

3. Bring specific questions with you to lecture. Even if there are aspects of the readings or study questions you didn't fully grasp, the fact that you tried should help you to narrow down what it is that you don't get.

4. See me in office hours, or email me, if there are still questions you are unclear about. That's what office hours are for. Don't be shy.

5. After class, re-read the material for the session, paying special attention to the questions that you had before. Hopefully the material will make much more sense to you now.

6. Manage your time well. Many students are lazy, and wait until a few days before exams to start studying. That is bad time management. The same number of hours devoted to the material BEFORE lectures can lead to a much more efficient use of your time, better understanding, and higher grades.

Study Questions for Sessions 1-3: The Argument from Design

Aquinas: 'Five Ways', from Summa Theologica. Questions 1 and 2.

1. For now we are only concerned with the 5th way. When Aquinas says 'natural bodies act for an end' he means that physical objects, including the bodies of animals, act in such a way as to bring about some goal or result. Can you give an example of what he means by this?

2. Given that there are examples of physical objects that seem to behave as though they are acting towards a goal or fulfilling some purpose, what is Aqunias' argument to the effect that there must be some intelligent being that directs natural bodies?

Paley, William; Natural Theology (Chapters 1 and 2). Questions 3-9.

3. Paley is providing a much fuller and more detailed version of the argument Aquinas quickly stated. There are two parallel arguments that can be discerned here. The first is an argument from analogy: many aspects of the world, especially living plants and animals, are extremely complex, with mechanisms and parts interacting in extremely complex ways such as to allow for various things to occur correctly. The order and complexity in these natural systems is like the order and complexity found in human contrivances, but is far more sophisticated. Human contrivances all have intelligent human designers. Therefore, natural entities that show great complexity must also have an intelligent designer. The second sort of argument is a 'what other explanation is there?' argument. It is pointed out that in any case where we confront a very sophisticated entity, there must be some explanation for that complexity, and the only explanation available is intelligent design. Both arguments lead to the conclusion that the world, or at least many parts of it, have an intelligent designer. And this designer is God.

In [1] Paley discusses two cases in which an explanation for something is asked for. What are the two cases? And for each case, what does Paley say about the kinds of explanation that might be allowable? What is the difference between the two cases that makes some kinds of explanation permissible for the one sort of case but not for the other?

4. In [2]-[15] Paley further develops the analogy between the person who stumbles across a watch in a heath, and the fact that we are all continually coming across natural beings (especially plants and animals) that have a high degree of complexity. His goal is to slowly alter the watch example into one that closely approximates plants and animals, and the conclusion will be that at no point does the inference that intelligent design is involved become any weaker. Be sure you understand the points made in [2]-[4] in this regard.

5. In [5]-[9] Paley discusses other conclusions that one might possibly reach when confronted with the situation other than inferring an intelligent designer, and he argues that all of these other potential conclusions are unreasonable. The 'explanations' that Paley rejects in [5] and [6], and Paley's reasons for rejecting them, are pretty clear. Be sure you understand them. (Don't worry about [7].)

6. The 'explanation' Paley discusses in [8] is one that says that the order is just the result of 'metallic nature', and this would mean something like 'metal things are just governed by metallic laws that produce this kind of result'. This would be parallel to someone explaining that bodies fall in gravitational fields by appealing to 'physical laws' that explain how physical things act. What is Paley's objection to this? (Don't worry about [9].)

7. In [10] Paley alters the example from a complex watch to a case where the watch produces other watches. This is obviously to make the watch case more analogous to the case of plants and animals. But there is a very specific reason why Paley needs to make this particular change to the example. Can you figure out why? (Hint: There is another 'explanation' for the existence of the watch that he wants to refute. What is it, and what is the refutation?)

8. In [12] Paley distinguishes two senses in which the original watch is the 'cause' of the new watch. What is this distinction? Be able to explain this distinction clearly in your own words. Paley gives an example of a stream and a mill, and this is not the best example. Can you think of a better example for explaining the distinction he wants to make?

9. In [13]-[16] Paley, using the distinction he drew in [12], returns to potential 'explanations' of the new watch. What is the kind of 'explanation' Paley is rejecting in [13]? And what does Paley mean in [14] by 'running the difficulty farther back'? In [15] Paley distinguishes two kinds of question. What are they? What is the relation between these two kinds of question, and the two kinds of causal explanation Paley discusses in [12]?

Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Parts 1-8). Questions 10-24.

The Dialogues are presented as thought they are reported in a letter from Pamphillus, a student of Cleanthes (one of the three philosophers who will be involved in the dialogue), to his friend Hermippus. Pamphillus tells his friend that he was present during the discussion between these three philosophers, and is recording their conversation for Hermippus. After the introductory sections [1]-[6], the Dialogues reads like a report on a conversation. By 'natural religion' Hume means theological doctrines as supported by, or scrutinized by, reasoning (as opposed to faith, rehearsing the statements made in religious texts, etc.). This includes reasoning about the existence and nature of the divine. Hume will be discussing philosophical arguments for and against the existence of God, and arguments concerning the nature of God, if God exists. Paragraphs [1]-[26] are set-up. You should read them, but don't worry too much if there are things that don't initially make sense. The material we will be concerned with begins with [27], the first paragraph of Part II.

10. In [27]-[30] Demea and then Philo assert that nobody is questioning whether God exists. The question is: what is the nature of God? Demea and Philo claim that we can have no knowledge of this. This is a more radical claim than you might at first think, since most Western religions claim that God has a number of attributes, such as moral goodness, a capacity for knowledge, capacity for forgiveness, or whatever. The recurring idea is that God is conceived of anthropomorphically, as having human attributes, but to a much much higher, or infinite, degree. Humans have some knowledge, and are sometimes capable of being morally good; God is claimed to have infinite knowledge, and claimed to be infinitely good; and so forth for other attributes. Demea and Philo are claiming that strictly speaking, we can't say that God has knowledge, or has any moral attributes. Cleanthes objects to this, and provides, in [31], the argument from design, in order to prove that God has intelligence, like humans. In [33] and [34] Philo begins what will be a long (more than the next 100 paragraphs) and devastating critique of the argument from analogy. In these initial two paragraphs, Philo explains what he takes the form of the argument from design to be -- an argument from analogy -- and provides conditions under which such an argument can be used effectively, and conditions under which it cannot. What are these conditions? How does Philo think they apply in the case of Cleanthes' initial statement of the argument from design? In [35] Cleanthes tries to respond to Philo. What is his response?

11. From [38] to [40] Philo restates Cleanthes argument in more detail. He focuses on the principles by which we come to have knowledge of how the world is [38] and how it works, what kinds of things cause what other kinds of things [39]. What is the importance of this to the argument from design as Philo states it?

12. In [43] Philo provides a principle for determining when arguments from analogy are strong or weak. What is it?

13. In [44] Philo makes one objection based on the criterion in [43]. What is it? In [45]-[46] he makes a different objection. What is it? This is summed up in [48]-[49].

14. The last half of [50] contains a new objection to the argument from design. What is it? In [51] Cleanthes replies to this objection. How does he reply? In [52]-[54] Philo responds to Cleanthes' response. What is his reply? What does he mean by 'In this cautious proceeding of the astronomers, you may read your own condemnation, Cleanthes'? Be able to sum up Philo's point here,which is summarized in [54].

15. In [55]-[57] Cleanthes responds to Philo's point made in [54]. What is this response? In [58]-[59] Cleanthes comes up with another analogy. What is it, and what is its point? In [60]-[62] Cleanthes points out the naturalness of the argument. In [63] he makes a point that is similar to one made by Paley? What is it, and where does Paley make that same point? In [67] Demea again hammers Cleanthes for anthropomorphism, which remains the topic until [72].

16. Beginning with [73] Philo takes a different strategy from that he had in [33]-[54]. In those earlier sections he was attacking the applicability of the argument from analogy. His strategy for the rest of his attack on the argument from design will be to assume that the argument does apply, and show that it leads to conclusions very unlike those Cleanthes wants to establish. What is the point Philo is making in [73]-[75]? In [76] and [77] Phil presents Cleanthes with a dilemma. What is this dilemma, and why does it put Cleanthes in a bind? What is Cleanthes' response in [80]? And how does Phil reply in [81]?

17. In [82]-[85] Philo is setting Cleanthes up. He points out that the complexity found in nature is unlike that found in designed artifacts. Cleanthes agrees, saying that this is just proof that the Devine designer is that much smarter than humans. In [86] Philo closes the trap by saying pointing out that if the argument works, then it proves something analogous to what it proves in the human case. Cleanthes agrees. He will soon regret it. Philo makes two points in [87] and [88]. What are they?

18. In [89] to [94], Philo runs through a list of consequences that he thinks should be better conclusions for the argument from design to draw than that God as understood by most Western religions is the designer of the world. What is the hypothesis on [89]? [90]? The hypothesis in [90] is further defended and elaborated in [91]. What does Philo mean when he says 'To multiply causes without necessity, is indeed contrary to true philosophy: but this principle applies not to the present case'? In [92]-[94] Philo really indulges himself at the expense of the argument from design. But what exactly is the import of all these examples? That is, what objection do they pose to Cleanthes' argument?

19. In Part V Philo indulged the idea that the analogy to human design was worth pursuing, and he showed that it led to consequences that Cleanthes would not want to embrace. But Cleanthes had a response, in [95]. What was this response? Phil then produces different kinds of argument in Part VI not subject to this reply. As stated before, the argument from design rested on a principle of inferring causes from effects. Be sure you understand this (it is discussed in earlier sections of the Dialogues). Now (in [97]) Phil introduces a similar principle that we use in our reasoning. What is it? How does it differ from the causal principle?

20. How does Phil get to his hypothesis in [98] from this principle? In [99] and [100] Philo explains why this hypothesis has advantages to the conclusion of the argument from design. What are these advantages? How does this argument get around Cleanthes' point in [95]? What is the revised hypothesis Cleanthes puts forward in [103] and how does this further distance the issue from Cleanthes' point in [95]? We don't need to worry about the material about the duration of the world or its possibly cyclic nature in [104]-[107].

21. In [109] Philo combines the two principles used previously to come up with a new hypothesis. What is it, and how are these principles used? Philo continues on with this line for the next few paragraphs. In [117] Philo responds to an objection from Demea. What is the objection, and what is Philo's response?

22. In [118] Philo presents a new challenge to the argument from design. What is this new challenge?

23. In [119] Demea presents an objection to Philo. This objection is similar to a point made by Paley. What is the point, and how does Paley make it? In [120] Philo responds. What is this response? Is it as effective against Paley as it is against Demea? In [121] and [122] Philo presents another response to this challenge. This is fairly subtle. Philo's point is that Cleanthes cannot make this objection. Why not? What is the point of the odd planet that Philo brings up in [124]?

24. In [131] and [132] and [133] Philo presents a new explanation for the order we see in the world. What is this explanation? What is Philo's point when he says 'But wherever matter is so poised, arranged, and adjusted, as to continue in perpetual motion, and yet preserve a constancy in the forms, its situation must, of necessity, have all the same appearance of art and contrivance which we observe at present'? How does this explanation measure up to what a modern post-Darwinean person might think? In [135] Cleanthes raises an objection. What is it, and how does Phil reply in [136]?

Swinburne: The Argument from Design. Questions 25-30.

25. Be sure to understand Swinburne’s distinction between spatial and temporal order. Which of these does he claim (in [3]) was the exclusive concern of early writers on the argument from design?

26. In [4], Swinburne provides his summary of the argument from design, as offered by Paley and criticized by Hume. Do you think his summary is more or less accurate? In [5] Swinburne indicates why he thinks the argument from design now lacks much force. What is this reason?

27. In [6] Swinburne provides a slightly more sophisticated version of the argument from design. Be sure you understand it. He claims that it gets around the problem pointed out in [5]. How does it do this? Do you agree? But he claims (in [7]) that it has another problem. What is it?

28. In [8] and [9] Swinburne constructs yet another version of the argument from design. What is it? How does it differ from that in [6]?

29. In [10] Swinburne considers an objection. Be able to clearly state the objection. (Hint: Swinburne’s argument in [8] and [9] is that something requires an explanation, and the objection is that this thing does not really require an explanation. What is the thing, and why does the objector think that no explanation is needed?) What is Swinburne’s response to this objection? Do you find it convincing?

30. In [11]-[13] Swinburne further details and summarizes the order that he is using as a premise in his argument. What are the two main kinds of order? In [14] he provides what he thinks are the two ways to explain this order. What are the two possible explanations?

Aquinas, Thomas; Summa Theologica (The Five Ways, Ways One and Two). Questions 31-32.

31. Aquinas’ First Way is what was later labeled the ‘cosmological argument’ for the existence of God. The basic structure of such arguments is to start with some present entity or event, and then ask for its cause. We then ask for a cause of that cause, and so forth. Eventually we must reach some first cause, and this is God. It is often expressed in terms of causes for the existence of things: the universe exists, and so something must have cause it to exist. But Aquinas’ version is not in terms of existence, but something else. What? Given that a series of causes is being traced, it would seem that the series must either come to an end (at a first cause) or continue to infinity. What is Aquinas’ argument against the possibility of the series going to infinity?

32. Aquinas’ Second Way involves another kind of cause and effect. What is it? Aside from the change in the specific kinds of causes and effects made us of, the structure of the argument is identical. The argument against an infinite series is more clear here, however. What is it?

33. In [140] Demea provides a version of the cosmological argument. How does it differ from Aquinas’ version with respect to the kinds of causes and effects is makes reference to? Demea deals with the case of an infinite series differently than did Aquinas. How does Demea deal with it? (Hint: Demea claims that an infinite series is absurd, but his argument doesn’t show that it is absurd, rather, his argument tries to show something else about an infinite series, something that renders that possibility no objection to the cosmological argument. What is it?)

34. Cleanthes’ response, which begins at [141] is not initially directed exactly at the cosmological argument. Rather, it is directed at the idea that we can prove that there is any being that necessarily exists (and this is more directly connected to the ontological argument, which we will discuss next). Nevertheless, the notion of necessary existence is indirectly connected to the cosmological argument, because the cosmological argument must end at a being that is uncaused, and the only way an uncaused being could exists is if, for some reason, its existence is logically guaranteed. So Cleanthes is arguing that there can be no such being. In [144] we get Cleanthes’ first substantive objection. What is it, and how does it work?

35. In [146] we get another objection from Cleanthes. The objection concerns the use to which Demea put the idea of the entire infinite series. What is Cleanthes’ objection (we can call it the ‘whole series’ objection). Philo’s contribution at [147] is closely connected to one of Cleanthes’ objections above. Which one?

36. In [1]-[4] Taylor introduces an example meant to illustrate the principle of sufficient reason (PSR). What is the principle, and what example does Taylor use to illustrate its plausibility? And in [5] he introduces a distinction between two kinds of truths or facts. What are these two kinds, and how are they distinguished?

37. In [6] Taylor describes PSR as a presupposition of reason. By this he means that, while it is not provable, it seems to be a requirement on being rational that one accept and use it. Why is this? If someone were to claim that they just don’t believe PSR, how might you try to persuade them that they in fact do or should?

38. What is Taylor’s argument in [7] and [8]? Do any of Hume’s characters have a reply to this argument? In [9] Taylor constructs an interesting argument for why the need for an explanation for the existence of the ball is on the same footing as the need for an explanation of the physical universe (world). What is it? The point in [10] is meant to address a concern similar to that of the infinite causal series. Is this point more analogous to Demea’s treatment of the infinite causal series or Aquinas’ treatment? What is the point of [11] and [12]? That is, what objection is it attempting to respond to, and how does it respond?

39. In [14] Taylor fields a possible objection, one pushed by one of Hume’s character’s. What is the objection? Who do you think has the edge, Taylor or Hume’s character? In [17] the argument is pushed further. What move does Taylor make to go from the examples in [14]-[16] to [17]. How might someone object to this move (how might a physicist object)?

40. In [19] we get another version of the finite series/infinite series issue. How does Taylor treat it here? In [20] and [21] we turn from the world to God, and in particular to God’s status as a self-caused and necessary being. What is the point of this discussion? That is, what objection is the discussion of God as a ‘first cause’ meant to defuse? (Don’t worry about what a ‘necessary being’ is until we get to teh ontological argument.)

41. In [4] Edwards makes a crucial point: even if the cosmological argument is successful, all it shows is that there must be some uncaused first cause, not that this cause is anything like a personal god (it might be something analogous to some physical principle like gravity, and few theists would worship gravity).

42. In [5] and [6] Edwards addresses Aquinas’ version of the argument that thee must be a first cause (that the series cannot be infinite). In [7] Edwards explains what he thinks is wrong with the argument. Do you think Edwards is right? What are the two additional possibilities that Edwards thinks are allowed even if the cosmological argument is successful, and which a contemporary theist would want to reject?

43. In [10] Edwards makes a distinction between two kinds of cause. What is it? This distinction was also made by Taylor, but not given a name. What were Taylor’s examples? The distinction is used to construct a different version of the cosmological argument, one similar to that constructed by Taylor. In [11]-[14] the distinction is used to construct a new version of the argument. Be sure you understand it. Specifically, what is the import of the examples in [12] and [14]?

44. In [15] Edwards makes an objection to the new (in esse) version of the argument. What is this objection? In [16] Edwards makes another point. What is it? (Hint: it has to do with the relation between the ‘in fieri’ and ‘in esse’ versions of the argument.)

45. In [17]-[19] Edwards focuses on one of the key issues in the cosmological argument. What is the point? How would Edwards reply to the examples in [12] and [14]? What do you think?

46. Now that Edwards has argued that the is nothing incoherent about an infinite series such that each member is caused by the one before it, he turns to another issue, one raised by Demea and criticized by Cleanthes. What is it? What is the mistake that the example of the visitors to New York ([21] & [22]) is meant to expose? Who makes this mistake?

47. In [23]-[28] Edwards turns to the issue of the universe itself being the uncaused, necessary being (a possibility brought up by which of Hume’s characters?). Edwards objects to this possibility on what grounds? What does he mean by a ‘brute fact’? Edwards claims that only his position dispenses with ‘brute facts’. How does it dispense with them?

48. Anselm’s proof is rather simple, but not very easy to pick up from his description. The proof has the form of a reductio ad absurdum (sometimes also called indirect proof), which is an entirely legitimate form of proof. It works as follows: First, you know some statement you want to prove, call it P; next you assume or suppose that P is false; you then show that on the assumption that P is false, you can derive an absurdity or a contradiction; sine the supposition that P is false leads to a contradiction, that assumption cannot be true, that is P must be true. For example, I want to prove that there is no largest prime number. So I assume the opposite, that there is some prime number that is the largest prime. Next, from this assumption I derive a contradiction. Here’s how: take this largest prime number, call it Pn. Now take all of the primes between 0 and Pn, including Pn; These will be P1, P2, P3, ... Pn. Multiply these numbers together, and add 1. Call this number Z. Z will be prime, as can be seen by noting that it will not be divisible by any of the primes P1 - Pn. Therefore, since Z is larger than Pn, Z is a prime larger than Pn. So, if Pn is the largest prime, then Pn is not the largest prime. But this is a contradiction. So, our initial assumption, that there is a largest prime number, must be false. This form of proof is entirely legitimate. Now that you know how the form of proof works, see if you can follow Anselm’s argument. First, he provides a definition of what he means by ‘God’. What is it? Then he derives a contradiction from this assumption. What is this contradiction (it is near the end, it is the thing he describes as ‘obviously impossible’)? Now that you know how he defines God, and what the contradiction is, try to see how he derives this contradiction.

49. Guanilo doesn’t buy Anselm’s ‘proof’. In [1] he lays out some reasons why he thinks the argument doesn’t work. These are not entirely clear, but try to figure out what they are. Next, in [2], he constructs a counter-example. That is, he constructs an argument with the same form, but whose conclusion we clearly think does not follow. What is this counter-example? The point of the counter example is this: if the form of the argument is indeed parallel, and it leads to a result that is false, then there must be something wrong with the form of the argument. We cannot tell just from the existence of the counter-example what the problem is, but if the counter-example is legitimate, we know thee must be a problem somewhere.

50. In [1]-[6] Plantinga restates Anselm’s argument in a more perspicuous form. Note that the argument, reconstructed by statements numbered (1)-(7) is a reductio, and the first statement is that one that will be proven false. (Note also that I will refer to paragraphs in Plantinga’s text by numbers in square brackets, e.g. [6], and I will refer to numbered premises or conclusions in an argument by a number in parentheses, e.g. (7).) In [7] Plantinga says of some statements that they are necessarily true of they are true at all. In fact, the notions of necessity and possibility will play a large role in much of what follows. You should refer to your notes on my in-class primer on modal logic in order to understand what Plantinga means by ‘possibly’ and ‘necessarily’ and their cognates. How does Plantinga’s reformulation of Anselm’s argument compare to your understanding of the argument as questioned in Question 48?

51. In [8] Plantinga begins his discussion of Kant’s objection. What Kant means by an ‘identical proposition’ here is something like a definition. An example would be ‘A triangle is a three-sided closed plane figure’, or ‘A bachelor is an unmarried male’. They involve a subject (triangles or bachelors) and one or more predicates (being male, being three-sided). Given this, what does Kant mean when he says a contradiction results when the subject is retained and a predicate rejected? What does he mean by rejecting the subject and predicate together? Why is there no contradiction in such cases? In [9] Plantinga recasts Kant’s point. An ‘existential proposition’ is one that states that something exists. Examples are: there is a book in my office; God exists; Bigfoot exists; propositions such as ‘triangles have three sides’ are not existential, because it is not saying that anything exists – it would be true even if there happened to be no triangles in the universe. He then goes on, in [11], to discuss the kind of ‘contradiction’ Kant seems to be talking about. What is Plantinga’s point here?

52. In [12] Plantinga turns to the more serious objection: Kant’s claim that ‘existence’ or ‘being’ is not a real predicate. Recall, a predicate is what is used to define something: we use the predicates ‘is male’, ‘is unmarried’, ‘is three-sided’ and so on to define things like bachelors and triangles. Kant is saying that ‘is existing’ is not like ‘is three-sided’ in that it cannot be used to define something. Kant’s argument for this is a reductio, and it is states in the sentences that starts “For as the latter signify...”. Try to reconstruct this argument in the form of a reductio. The last paragraph of the Kant quote has another statement of this argument.

53. In [13]-[20] Plantinga goes into some detail examining Kant’s objection that since existence is not a predicate, it cannot be used to define something, and hence nothing can be ‘defined into existence’. He does this by constructing an example in which one tries to do this. What is the example? How does it work, specifically? That is, how does it try to use existence as a predicate? How does Plantinga show that the purported attempt to define something into existence in this example fails (this is done in the material surrounding statements (8), (9) and (10).

54. In [21] Plantinga claims that while thee is a mistake that Kant is pointing out, it is not a mistake made by Anselm’s argument. But where in Anselm’s argument might someone think that it is doing what Shopenhauer said it does?

55. Plantinga will, at [23], start to try to make the idea that existence is a ‘great-making-property’ seem plausible without having to suppose that existence is a property (sort of). The strategy for doing this is to talk in terms of comparisons between objects in different possible worlds. (Recall that one way to look at modal logic and possible worlds semantics is that it is a technique for dispensing with expressions such as ‘possible’, ‘necessary’, ‘impossible’, and ‘exists’ by, instead, describing situations in, and quantifying over, possible worlds. In this case, we are clarifying what we mean by ‘exists’ as a property by discussing an entity in various possible worlds.) How does Plantinga rephrase the notion that ‘to exist is greater than not to exist’ in terms of possible worlds? (This is done in [24].)

56. In [25] Plantinga begins to restate the argument in a way more clearly defined in terms of comparisons between an entity in various possible worlds. (19) states “Hence it's possible that there be a being greater than God is.” How does Plantinga arrive at this? Be able to explain this.

57. Beginning with [30], Plantinga discusses a problem with this formulation of the argument. In [30], what he is saying amounts more or less to the idea that 16 only follows from (14) is we are able to assess the greatness of God in the actual world – that is, it must be the case that God is a being in the actual world that has some degree of greatness. Even if this degree is 0, we need to suppose that God is a being in the world in order to make the comparison required by (14). In [31]-[33] Plantinga explains that we can restate the argument in terms of properties having instantiation in some worlds and not others. This is not crucial for our purposes. Note that (16)-(18) carefully speak of the greatness of God in this or that world, whereas beginning with (19) it loosely speaks of the greatness of God period. This is the problem. If we try to fill the argument out from (19) on, being specific about which worlds God has this or that degree of greatness, we find that we cannot construct a good argument. Be able to explain clearly what the two different interpretations of (21) are, and why the fact that there are these two interpretations renders the argument invalid.

58. Plantinga will be constructing a version of the ontological argument that he thinks works, but first he needs to introduce some more machinery. The crucial bit of machinery he introduces here in Section 5, as part of an argument (the ‘modal version’) that he will claim fails. But even though this ‘modal version’ fails, it will have an idea that Plantinga will use in his own version. But for now, the modal version. The basic idea is to introduce another ‘great-making property’. What is this property? What is the difference between this great-making property and the great-making property exploited by Anselm’s original version?

59. The version of the argument presented in [39] and [40] hinges on some specifics about a specific interpretation of modal logic and possible worlds semantics: that ‘possibly impossibly P’ is the same as ‘impossibly P’. Here, P is ‘God does not exist’, and the argument works by first showing that it is possible that it is impossible that God does not exist, and then concludes that it is impossible that God does not exist. So the crucial bit is the establishment of the claim that it is possible that it is impossible that God does not exist. How does the argument try to establish this by using this new great-making property? In [41] Plantinga points out what he takes to be a problem with the modal version. What is the problem, specifically?

60. In [42], [43] and [44] Plantinga discusses the notion of ‘greatness’ in more detail. What is it he says about greatness? How does what he says here relate to the ‘new’ great-making property that was used by the ‘modal’ version of the ontological argument discussed in [39]? What exactly is the distinction he marks by the terms greatness and excellence? Given this, what does ‘maximal greatness’ now mean?

61. In [45] and [46] we get a new version of the argument that uses the just-defined notion of maximal greatness. Be sure you can clearly explain how we can get from the premise that a maximally great being is possible to the conclusion that this being exists in the actual world. In [47]-[50] Plantinga again brings up the objection about our reference to possible beings as used in this argument. He will suggest that the argument can be restated without mention of possible beings. This will be done beginning with [51].

62. Just as with the modal version discussed earlier, this version if the argument, constructed in Section 8, exploits the principle embraced by certain versions of modal logic and possible worlds semantics to the effect that if possibly impossibly P, then impossibly P. In this case the key premise will be it is possible that it is impossible that maximal greatness is not instantiated to the conclusion that it is impossible that maximal greatness is not instantiated. B sure to understand how we move from a) there is a possible world where maximal greatness is instantiated, and b) the definition of maximal greatness, to the key proposition that it is possible that it is impossible that maximal greatness is not instantiated.

63. Plantinga points to the perhaps questionable premise in this argument. What is it? What does he say about it? Is there anything else about this argument that you think might be objectionable?

Hume: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (Parts 10 and 11). Questions 64-67.

64. In [149]-[174] Philo and Demea run through a list of things that are wrong with the world, focusing on how much unhappiness there is in the world, countering Cleanthes’ objections to the effect that things aren’t as bad as they are suggesting. Nevertheless, Philo and Demea build up a good case to the effect that there is a good deal of misery in the world. Then, in [175]-[178] Phil gives statement to a version of the argument from Evil. What is this argument? That is, the existence of a great deal of pain and misery (which we can label as ‘evils’) are taken to be incompatible with what? Philo, using the quote from Epicurus, mentions two features that are taken to be incompatible with the existence of evil. But strictly speaking a third is needed to generate an inconsistency. Can you figure out what this third feature is? The argument from evil is often taken to be an argument against the existence of God, but strictly speaking it is not necessarily an argument against the existence of God, for Philo is using the argument, but he does not think that God doesn’t exist. What does Phil think that the argument does show? (This is most clearly stated in [178].)

65. In [180] Demea presents an answer to the problem of evil. What is it? Demea’s statement is rather general. Can you explain what he means by providing an example?

66. In [190] Philo makes an analogy with an inconveniently designed house. This is aimed at a certain defense of Thesim from the problem of evil. The defense is: yes, there are evils, for example the fact that Betty broke her foot when she slipped on the ice. But if we knew more about how the universe is structured, we would realize that these evils are necessary for a greater good.. Perhaps had Betty not slipped on the ice, she would have gone skiing with her friends and died in a freakish snow-weasel incident. So those things that seem to us to be evils are really for the greater good. What is the point of Philo’s analogy, and how does it work?

67. Beginning with [192] and going to about [200], Philo goes through what he takes to be four sources of evil/misery, and claims that none of them appear to be necessary. What are the four, and for each, what is his argument that they evils are do not seem to be necessary?

68. In [1]-[3] Hick, in a way rather thick with specifically Christian textual support, makes a distinction between two views of the nature of God’s creation of Man. What are these two views and how, specifically, do they differ? In [4] Hick discusses one of these options in more detail. It includes 2 stages. What are they, and how do they differ? Why are 2 stages needed? What is Hick’s point in [6]?

69. In [7], [8] and [9] Hick identifies an assumption made by proponents of the Argument from Evil. What is this assumption? Why is this assumption needed by the proponent of the Argument from Evil? What is Hick’s reason for thinking this assumption is false? What is the switch of metaphor for understanding God’s relationship to Man that Hick advocates?

Edward Madden and John Hare: A Critique of Hick’s Theodicy. Questions 70-71.

70. In [1]-[7] Madden and Hare (henceforth M&H) recap Hick’s position and identify 3 informal fallacies that they think are used by Hick in his arguments. In [8]-[10] M&H point to one place where what they call the ‘all or nothing’ fallacy (a special case of what is sometimes called a ‘false dichotomy’ fallacy) is committed by Hick. What is the theistic argument being credited to Hick here (sometimes called the ‘free-will defense)? How is this supposed to defuse the Argument from Evil? How, according to M&H is the all-or-nothing fallacy involved in this? What is the other option that M&H claim would be possible, and what problem does this pose for Hick’s free-will defense?

71. In [11] M&H turn to what they claim is an instance of th e’it could be worse’ fallacy. What is this fallacy? Where specifically do they think Hick commits this fallacy? They say, in [11], what Hick would need to do to show that his argument is not just an ‘it could be worse’ argument, and claim he does not do it. What is it they M&H say would be needed? In [12] and [13] E&H criticize and argument by Hick that we did not read. Briefly, the argument is “The reason that there is not less evil in the world than there is, is that if the amount of evil were lessened, there would be no reason why it should be lessened to just a certain amount, rather than a greater amount. And thus eventually one might wonder why not just get rid of all evil. But we cannot get rid of all evil. So the amount we currently have is justified.” What is M&H’s criticism of this argument?

72. In [1] Swinburne gives a brief synopsis of the Argument from Evil. His version is slightly different from that produced by Philo in [175]-[176], because it adds a third feature to God. What is this third feature, and why is it needed? In [2] Swinburne says that the argument as stated is too strong, and he provides an analogy to explain what he means? What is Swinburne’s argument here? How might a proponent of the Argument from Evil respond to Swinburne here? In [4] and [5] he provides a list of 4 kinds of evils. How does this list compare to the one created by Philo from [192] to [200] of Hume’s Dialogues?

73. In [7] Swinburne isolates what he calls P1. This can be thought of as one part of an Argument from Evil. That is, Swinburne is dividing the evils into different types, and treating each type of evil as part of its own little Argument from Evil. He will then try to show that each of these sub-Arguments from Evil does not work. What is the specific evil used in the P1 sub-Argument from Evil? How does Swinburne answer the P1 sub-argument from Evil in [7]? What did M&H say about this? In [8] and [9] Swinburne goes into a little more detail. Does what he says here answer the sort of objection M&H had about this defense? What might M&H says in response to what Swinburne here says in [8] and [9]?

74. Starting with [10], Swinburne discusses the next sub-Argument from Evil, one based on P2. The situation is roughly this: the anti-thesist says “OK, fine, P1 is not true, and so God cannot get rid of evildoers without removing a greater good. Nevertheless, there is something that God could do that would reduce the amount of evil.” What is this something else God could eliminate, according to the anti-theist?

74. How, in [11]-[13] does Swinburne answer the P2 argument? What does he mean by ‘responsibility’ Be sure you understand his response: he needs to argue both that it is a good thing (better than the evils it is associated with), and that it cannot be obtained without passive evils. What are his arguments for both of these claims? Are you convinced? How might M&H respond (which of their informal fallacies might they accuse Swinburne of committing here)?

75. In [14] and [15] Swinburne articulates a further sub-Argument, based on P3. What is this argument? What is Swinburne’s response? (Note: Belsen is a town in Germany where a Nazi concentration camp was located.)

76. In [16] Swinburne provides a possible justification for various evils, to the effect that they are necessary for certain goods. What are these evils and goods? He articulates a possible objection to the effect that the goods might be made available without the evils. What is this objection, and how does Swinburne answer it?

77. In [17]-[19] Swinburne articulates and answers a natural antitheodicist objection. The objection itself is stated in [17]. What is it? His response is developed in [18] and [19]. In [18] he describes certain conditions under which we have certain duties. What are these conditions, and what are the duties? Can you give an example of what he means by the following: “Hence it follows that one who knows much more about the probable consequences of a quarrel may have no duty to interfere where another with less knowledge does have such a duty — and conversely.” In [19] Swinburne provides another answer to the antitheodicist. What is it?

78. In [20] and [21] Swinburne articulates the P4 Argument from Evil. What is it? He provides two possible responses that he does not himself seem to put a lot of weight on. What are they? He provides another response in [22]. What is it? In [23] Swinburne makes a distinction between three possible kinds of universe. What are they?

79. In [24]-[26] Swinburne discusses the nature of human beings in his preferred kind of world. Eventually, this will be an argument for why certain kinds of passive evils not caused by humanly free agents is justified. So we should expect and argument as to what purpose or good these evils serve, and an argument to the effect that these goods could not be acquired in an easier, evil-free way. What are these two arguments? Swinburne answers a possible objection, one that Philo made in [193] of Hume’s Dialogues. What is this objection, and how does Swinburne reply? Who do you find more convincing?

80. In [28]-[31] Swinburne goes into some detail concerning how the evils under discussion lead to a greater goods. Go through these in detail? Are you convinced that there is not an obvious better way to get these goods? Are you convinced that the goods justify the evils at issue? How might an anti-theodicist reply?

81. In [3], Phillips takes on Swinburne’s argument to the effect that ‘responsibility’ is a great good that we humans can only have if we are able to cause evils. What is Phillips’ response to this? Phillips provides another response in [4]. What is this response? How does it compare with what you took to be Swinburne’s argument as you articulated it in Question 74?

82. In [5] Phillips takes on another of Swinburne’s arguments. Which one? In [6] he gives a response that he says makes a mistake in transitioning from conceivable limits to actual limits. What is this argument? Is there a similar argument made by Madden and Hare? What is their term for it?

83. In [7] Phillips mentions one of Swinburne’s defenses of his theodicist. In [8] and [9] he provides one argument against it. What is this objection? In [10] He provides another objection. What is it? (Note: Billy Budd and John Claggart are characters from Herman Melville’s novel Billy Budd, Sailor; and Iago is the main bad guy in Shakespeare’s Othello.)

84. In [11] and [12] Phillips states and attacks one of Swinburne’s arguments. Which one? What is the nature of his reply? What exactly does he mean when he says “if there is a "higher" form of reasoning among God and his angels, where such matters are open for compromise and calculation, then so much the worse for God and his angels.”? (Note: Ivan Karamazov is a character from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov. This novel has the problem of evil as one of its foci.)

85. What is the main point of [13]-[15]? What is the point of [16] and [17]? (Note: Prometheus was a Titan in Greek mythology who stole fire from the gods and gave it to humans, and was subsequently punished by Zeus.)