Chapter 6: The English Ditransitive Construction

6.1 Introduction

The ditransitive construction has already been discussed with respect to its polysemy (chapter 2) and its partial productivity (chapter 5). In this chapter, I concentrate on particular semantic constraints and metaphorical extensions of the construction. Highly specific semantic constraints are associated directly with the ditransitive argument structure, revealing a more specific semantic structure than is generally acknowledged. In particular, the central sense is argued to involve transfer between a volitional agent and a willing recipient. Several systematic metaphors are identified and associated with the construction, showing that expressions such as Mary gave Joe a kiss and Mary's behavior gave John an idea, which are often assumed to be idiosyncratic, are instances of a large and productive class of expressions that are based on systematic metaphors.

Before getting to those constraints, however, evidence that a construction is indeed required in this case is reviewed.

6.2 The Existence of the Construction

Following the program laid out in previous chapters, we need to show that aspects of the syntax or semantics of ditransitive expressions are not predictable from other constructions existing in the grammar. [ By this, AG means that we need to show that the meaning of sentences that have the ditransitive form cannot be explained by appealing to the meanings or other features of other things in teh sentence, especially not the individual words. If this meaning cannot be predicted or generated on the basis of the meanings of these other expressions, then this is evidence that the semantic import of these sentences is in part provided by teh argument structure itself. ] First, to see that the construction contributes semantics not attributable to the lexical items involved, consider the verb bake when used ditransitively:

(1) Sally baked her sister a cake.

This expression can only mean that Sally baked a cake with the intention of giving it to her sister. It cannot mean that Sally baked the cake so that her sister wouldn't have to bake it; nor can it mean that Sally baked the cake as a demonstration of cake-baking, or that she baked a cake for herself because her sister wanted her to have one. Unless we associate the "intended transfer" aspect of meaning to the construction, we are forced to say that bake itself means something like 'X intends to cause Y to receive Z by baking.' This "transfer sense' of bake would be posited only to avoid attributing aspects of the semantics to the construction. The positing of such ad hoc verb senses which only occur in a particular construction was argued against extensively in previous chapters.

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In addition, as was noticed by Partee (1965:60) and Green (1974:103), the goal argument of ditransitives must be animate -- that is, it must be a recipient:

(2) a. She brought the boarder/*the border a package. (cited by Gropen et al. (1989), attributed to J. Bresnan)

[ That is, the sentence She brought the boarder a package is OK, because boarders are people and hence animate, whereas She brought the border a package is not OK (hence the asterisk), because borders are not animate. ]

As has been argued in chapters 1 and 4, this semantic constraint is most parsimoniously attributed to the construction.

Ditransitive expressions are syntactically unique in allowing two nonpredicative noun phrases to occur directly after the verb; the fact that English will allow such a configuration is not predictable from other constructions in the language. In addition, this is the only construction which links the recipient role with the OBJ grammatical function.

The construction was represented in figure 2.4, repeated here as figure 6.1.

Ditransitive Construction

Figure 6.1

[ Don't worry about this next paragraph. ]

The construction's agent and patient roles must be fused with independently existing participant roles of the verb (represented by the PRED variable), as is indicated by the solid lines between the agent and patient argument roles and the predicate's participant role array, which is unfilled in the above diagram. The recipient role may be contributed by the construction; this is indicated by the dashed line between the recipient argument role and the array of predicate participant roles.

6.3 The Semantics

The semantics of the ditransitive construction has not been understudied, and this work owes a large debt to previous analyses, in particular to Cattell (1984), Green (1974), and Oehrle (1976) for their detailed discussion of hundreds of ditransitive expressions.

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6.3.1 Volitionality of the Agent

There are certain semantic constraints on the ditransitive syntax which have not been incorporated into most theories of argument structure. The reason these constraints are often overlooked is that there appear to be exceptional cases. However, the exceptional cases form a delimitable class that can be seen to involve a general systematic metaphor (of the type described in Lakoff & Johnson 1980). It will be shown that the constraints do in fact hold in the source domain of the metaphor. [ Someone remind me to discuss metaphor theory, target and source domains, etc., in class. ]

To identify the first constraint, notice that each of the verbs described so far independently selects for a volitional subject argument. This generalization can be captured by assigning a constraint on the nature of the subject argument directly to the construction.

The volitionality must extend so that not only is the action described by the verb performed agentively, but also with the relevant transfer intended. For example, in (3) below, Joe must be understood to intend to give the picture to Sally. It cannot be the case that Joe painted the picture for someone else and later happened to give it to Sally.

(3) Joe painted Sally a picture.

Similarly, in (4) it cannot be the case that Bob told the story to someone else and Joe just happened to overhear. [1]

(4) Bob told Joe a story.

This constraint also accounts for the ill-formedness of the following examples:

(5) *Joe threw the right fielder the ball he had intended the first baseman to catch.

(6) *Hal brought his mother a cake since he didn't eat it on the way home.

(7) *Joe took Sam a package by leaving it in his trunk where Sam later found it.

This is not to say that the first or second object arguments of the ditransitive cannot be given a transparent interpretation. [ Someone remind me to explain what a 'transparent interpretation' is in class. ] The description used to pick out the argument referents may be understood to be the speaker's description, not the subject argument's. For example, consider (8):

(8) Oedipus gave his mother a kiss.

This sentence is felicitous despite the fact that Oedipus did not realize he was kissing his mother. Likewise for (9):

(9) Joe gave Mary a sweater with a hole in it.

[1] Subjects which metonymically stand for volitional beings are also acceptable:

(i) His company promised him a raise.

(ii) The orchestra played us the symphony.

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This statement is acceptable even if Joe did not intend to give Mary a defective sweater. Also, it is not necessarily contradictory to use "accidentally" in ditransitive expressions; for example:

(10) Joe accidentally loaned Bob a lot of money [by mistaking Bob for Bill, his twin; without realizing that Bob would skip bail with it; instead of giving the money as a gift as he had intended].

While I do not attempt to untangle the relevant issues here, I appeal to the fact that the same possibilities of interpretation occur with other expressions that are generally agreed to require volitional subject arguments. For example, murder is a verb which is universally recognized as selecting for a volitional subject argument. Still, it is possible to say the following without contradiction:

(11) Mary accidentally murdered Jane [although she had meant to murder Sue; although she had only meant to knock her unconscious].

What I am suggesting, then, is that whatever notion of volitionality is adopted to deal with verbs such as murder should also be used to capture the semantic requirement of the subject position of the ditransitive construction.

The existence of this constraint has been obscured by examples such as these:

(12) a. The medicine brought him relief.

b. The rain bought us some time.

c. She got me a ticket by distracting me while I was driving.

d. She gave me the flu.

e. The music lent the party a festive air.

f. The missed ball handed him the victory on a silver platter.

In these examples the subject argument is not volitional. Even when the subject argument is an animate being, as in (12c, d), no volitionality is required. However, these examples form a delimitable class of expressions, as they are all instances of a particular conventional systematic metaphor, namely, "causal events as transfers." [2]This metaphor involves understanding causing an effect in an entity as transferring the effect, construed as an object, to that entity. Evidence for the existence of this metaphor independent of the ditransitive construction comes from the following expressions:

(13) a. The Catch-22 situation presented him with a dilemma.

b. The unforeseen circumstances laid a new opportunity at our feet.

c. The document supplied us with some entertainment.

d. The report furnished them with the information they needed.

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Further evidence, both for the existence of the metaphor and for it motivating the ditransitive examples in (12), comes from the polysemy of each of the predicates involved in those examples. The predicates bring, buy, get, give, lend, and hand are used to imply causation, but on their basic sense they each involve transfer from an agent to a recipient. The link between these senses is provided by the metaphor. Bring, buy, get, give, lend, and hand here involve the metaphorical transfer of effect; each of the examples in (12) implies that the subject argument is the cause of the first object argument being affected in some way by "receiving" the second object argument.

This class can be represented as an extension of the central sense as follows:

Ditransitive Construction

Figure 6.2

Recognizing the metaphor allows us to divorce ourselves from the often-made but erroneous claim that examples such as those in (12) are idiosyncratic.

Returning to the statement of the constraint that the subject argument must intend the transfer, we can see the necessity of acknowledging the role of this metaphor. It is this metaphor which licenses the exceptional cases: we can recognize that the volitionality constraint is satisfied in the source domain of the metaphor. At the same time, this metaphor differs from other metaphors to be

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described below in not mapping volitionality to the target domain. This follows from the fact that the target domain is concerned with abstract causes. Abstract causes cannot be necessarily volitional because they are not necessarily human. Each of the metaphors described below, on the other hand, involves human actors in the target domain as well as in the source domain, and in each of the target domains the volitionality constraint is respected.

6.3.2 Semantic Constraints on the Recipient

As noted above, it has long been realized that the referent designated by the first object must be an animate being. However, this constraint, just like the constraint that the subject argument must intend the transfer, is somewhat obscured by expressions licensed by the causal-events-as-transfers metaphor. Consider (14-16):

(14) The paint job gave the car a higher sale price.

(15) The tabasco sauce gave the baked beans some flavor.

(16) The music lent the party a festive air.

In none of these examples is the first object an animate being; however, in the source domain of the metaphor the affected party is understood to be a recipient, and thus indeed an animate being. Again we find that a constraint can be satisfied in the source but not the target domain of the metaphor.

An additional semantic constraint is that the first object be understood to be a beneficiary, or a willing recipient. [3] This constraint is needed to account for the following example from Green (1974):

(17) * Sally burned Joe some rice.

Example (17) is unacceptable even if malicious intentions are attributed to Sally; however, it is acceptable in the context that Joe is thought to like burnt rice. Furthermore, one cannot felicitously say either of the following:

(18) * Bill told Mary a story, but she wasn't listening.

(19) *Bill threw the coma victim a blanket.

In these examples, the first object is not understood to be a willing recipient; accordingly, they are unacceptable.

This constraint may also be responsible for the slight difference in meaning between the following two examples provided by Robert Wilensky (personal communication):

(20) a. She fed lasagna to the guests.

b. She fed the guests lasagna.

[ The ditransitive construction -- SUBJ V OBJ1 OBJ2 -- is distinct from the dative construction -- SUB V OBJ2 'to' OBJ1 -- even though they have similar meaning (but not the same meaning. 20a is dative, 20b is ditransitive.]

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Most speakers find the first example to be somewhat less polite than the second. Since feed is normally used with reference to the food intake of babies or animals, the impoliteness of the first example is not surprising; what requires explanation is the fact that the second example is interpreted to be relatively more polite. The constraint that the first object must be construed as a willing recipient can account for this, since the ditransitive version has the effect of imposing the interpretation that the guests are willing agents, thereby according them more respect.

That the recipient is expected to be willing should not be confused with the idea that the recipient is expected to benefit from the transfer. Thus, while (21) below does not imply that Jane will benefit from imbibing the martini, it does presuppose that she is expected to willingly drink the martini.

(21) Jack poured Jane an arsenic-laced martini.

In some cases, however, the issue of the recipient's willingness or unwillingness is irrelevant to whether transfer is successful. These involve expressions in which actual successful transfer is implied: [4]

(22) Bill gave the driver a speeding ticket.

(23) Bill gave Chris a headache.

(24) Bill gave Chris a kick.

Nonetheless, all cases in which the first object is required to accept the transferred object in order for transfer to be successful imply that the first object is assumed to be a willing recipient.

6.3.3 On the Notion "Recipient"

I have been referring to the semantic role of the first object position as "recipient" instead of as "goal" or "possessor." In view of the above constraint -- that this argument be animate -- "recipient" is clearly more accurate than "goal." At the same time, "recipient" is preferable to "possessor" because many of the metaphors involving transfer (to be described below) do not map the implication that the recipient actually possesses the transferred entity after reception. Consider (25):

(25) Jo gave Mary an insult.

This sentence does not imply that Mary "possesses" an insult, only that Mary "received" an insult. Similarly with (26):

(26) Jan gave Chris a punch.

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This example does not imply that Chris "possesses" a punch but only that he "received" one. If we describe the role in question as that of "recipient" instead of "possessor," these facts pose no problem. The fact that a possessive relationship is usually implied follows automatically from the fact that what is received is normally subsequently possessed.

Noticing that a recipient is involved in ditransitive expressions may be a first step toward motivating the double object syntax of the construction. Beginning with Jakobson, those interested in the semantics of the direct object have noted that recipients of force and effect make for good direct objects (Jakobson 1938; for recent discussion see, e.g., Langacker 1987;6 Rice 1987a). (Of course this is not to say that all direct objects are recipients; clearly the objects of cognition verbs such as believe, see, and know would present difficulties for such a claim.)

Finally, the construction has been shown to be associated with a scene of transfer. Describing the first object as a "recipient" rather than "possessor" more adequately captures the dynamic character of this semantics.

6.3.4 Other Metaphors

The systematic metaphor of causal events as transfers is just one of several metaphors which license the use of the ditransitive construction. Other metaphors can be understood to license other extensions. The source domain of each of these metaphors is the central sense of actual successful transfer.

The "conduit metaphor," described and named by Michael Reddy (1979), involves communication traveling across from the stimulus to the listener. The listener understands the communication upon "reception." Evidence for the metaphor includes:

(27) a. He got the ideas across to Jo.

b. His thoughts came across from his speech.

c. Jo received the information from Sam.

d. Jo got the information from Bill.

This metaphor licenses the following examples:

(28) She told Jo a fairy tale.

(29) She wired Jo a message.

(30) She quoted Jo a passage.

(31) She gave Jo her thoughts on the subject.

A related metaphor involves understanding perceptions as entities which

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move toward the perceiver. The perception is understood to occur upon "reception." Evidence for the metaphor includes the following:

(32) a. The view knocked me over.

b. I caught a glimpse of him.

c. I missed that sight.

d. I had a view of the orchestra.

e. He let me have a look.

This metaphor licenses the following examples:

(33) He showed Bob the view.

(34) He gave Bob a glimpse.

Another metaphor involves understanding actions that are intentionally directed at another person as being entities which are transferred to that person. Evidence for the metaphor includes:

(35) a. He blocked the kick.

b. He caught the kiss she threw to him.

c. All he got from her was a goodbye wave.

d. Joe took a punch from Bill.

e. She couldn't get a smile out of him.

f. She threw a parting glance in his direction.

g. She targeted him with a big smile.

h. Bob received a slap/kick/kiss/smile from Jo.

This metaphor licenses the following expressions:

(36) She blew him a kiss.

(37) She shot him a keep-quiet look.

(38) She gave him a wink.

(39) She gave him a punch.

(40) She threw him a parting glance.

Another metaphor extends the use of the ditransitive to the speech act domain. This metaphor is used in reference to a situation where a person insists on certain facts and assumptions. The metaphor involves understanding these facts and assumptions as objects which are given to someone who is making an argument, to be used in the construction of the argument. (The idea of constructing an argument assumes yet another metaphor, that of arguments as constructed objects). We can title this metaphor "Facts and Assumptions as

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Objects which are Given." Evidence for the metaphor includes the following expressions:

(41) a. I'll let you have that much.

b. I don't want to give up that assumption.

c. Accept that as a given.

d. If you take that assumption away, you don't have a great argument.

e. If you don't have that assumption, you're not left with much.

f. Even granted that, your argument is still full of holes.

This metaphor licenses the following:

(42) I'll give you that assumption.

(43) I'll grant you that much of your argument.

The final metaphor to be discussed here licenses ditransitive expressions which are often assumed not to involve a possessor at all. The following examples come from Green 1974:

(44) Crush me a mountain.

(45) Cry me a river.

(46) Slay me a dragon.

(47) They're going to kill Reagan a commie.

These expressions can be seen to involve metaphorical transfer once the following metaphor is recognized: actions which are performed for the benefit of a person are understood as objects which are transferred to that person. The metaphor is exemplified in the following expressions:

(48) a. He owes you many favors.

b. By slaving away quietly for him, she has given more than he deserves.

c. The senator claimed never to have received any favors.

d. He always gets what he wants out of people.

e. She graciously offered a ride to the airport.

The mapping of this metaphor is different from that of the others in that the source domain of this metaphor is not 'X CAUSES Y to RECEIVE Z' as it was for each of the others. In particular, it is the action performed rather than the second object argument that is the received object in the mapping. This metaphor, then, represents an extended use of the ditransitive. And, as we might expect, there is wide dialectal variation in the degree of acceptability of these expressions. In fact, these cases are subject to their own special constraints. As noted by Oehrle (1976), they are more acceptable as commands:

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(49) a. Cry me a river.

b. ?Sally cried me a river.

They are also more acceptable with pronouns in first object position. Contrast (49a) with (50):

(50) ?Cry Joe a river.

To summarize, these cases can be seen to be a limited extension from the central sense of the construction. The source domain of this metaphor is not 'X CAUSES Y to RECEIVE Z' as it was in each of the other metaphors; rather, it is 'X CAUSES Y to RECEIVE an OBJECT (not necessarily designated Z).' The target domain is 'X Performs an Action for the Benefit of Y.' Z is mapped to the object acted on by X.

6.4 Conclusion

In this chapter the central sense of the ditransitive construction has been argued to be associated with a highly specific semantic structure, that of successful transfer between a volitional agent and a willing recipient. In addition, several systematic metaphors that license extensions from the basic sense have been identified.

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