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A Brief History of Time-Consciousness: Historical Precursors to James and Husserl

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1. INTRODUCTION

THE DECADES BRACKETING the end of the nineteenth century saw two colossal developments in the philosophy and psychology of the experience of time. The first was William James' highly influential *Principles of Psychology*,[1] published in 1890; the second was Edmund Husserl's *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins*,[2] based on notes written largely during the first decade of the twentieth century, but first published in 1928. Associated with each of these developments is a standard, largely unchallenged understanding of its historical precursors:[3] James was chiefly synthesizing a good deal of work that had been done over the previous three decades or so in experimental psychology in Germany, primarily under the influence of Wundt, and framed this synthesis in terms of a philosophical idea he credited to "E. R. Clay," namely, the *specious present doctrine* (henceforth, SP doctrine) Husserl

[1]William James, *Principles of Psychology* [*Principles*] (New York: Henry Holt, 1890).

[2]Edmund Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893–1917)* [*PZB*], *Husserliana* 10 (The Hague: Herausgegeben von Rudolf Boehm, 1966). Page numbers are from this edition; English translations are from Husserl, *On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917)*, trans. John Brough, *Collected Works* 4 (Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991).

[3]Shaun Gallagher, *The Inordinance of Time* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press , 1998), has one of the better and more complete historical discussions, and is an excellent source for the standard understanding of the precursors of James and Husserl. See also Toine Kortooms, *Phenomenology of Time: Edmund Husserl's Analysis of Time-Consciousness* [*Phenomenology of Time*] (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002). Our position in this paper is not that anything in this standard picture is wrong, just that it is importantly incomplete. We will not discuss the standard picture beyond the brief synopsis offered here.

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was reacting to, and building on, attempts by Brentano and Meinong to provide analyses of time consciousness, and was also familiar with work in experimental psychology, including James' work, and with the expression 'specious present' that James had used for the doctrine.

But as we shall demonstrate in this paper, the standard picture is crucially incomplete. There is a clearly discernible line of philosophical debate about the temporality of experience which began with Thomas Reid, ran through a number of nineteenth-century Anglophone philosophers, and culminated in two independent termini: "E.R. Clay," identified by James as the author of the anonymously published *The Alternative: a Study in Psychology*; and the work of the now nearly-completely forgotten Shadworth Hollway Hodgson. The first goal of this paper is discerning and describing this line of development and its two termini. Both of these termini were significant influences on James. The second goal of this paper is to argue that the second terminus, Hodgson, was also a significant and unappreciated influence on Husserl. Sections 2 through 5 discuss, in turn, the relevant doctrines of Thomas Reid, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, and William Hamilton. Exposition of these authors establishes that discussion of the temporal character of perceptual experience was already underway prior to James, while tracing how distinct stances on relevant premises concerning consciousness and experience eventually led to the formulation of the SP doctrine. Section 6 discusses Robert Kelly (alias 'E.R. Clay') who named and (co-)developed the SP doctrine James made famous. Section 7 discusses Hodgson's early work and his own independently-developed version of the specious present doctrine. Section 8 turns to Hodgson's later work and the specific issue of his influence on Husserl. Section 9 concludes, and considers the reception of Hodgson and Kelly's work. The rest of this introductory section will very briefly outline the relevant doctrines of James and Husserl, in order.

In Chapter 15 of his highly influential *Principles*, James focuses on the experience of time, and motivates the discussion with the problem of the origin of our idea of time, and in particular, of our idea and experience of pastness. Like the classical empiricists before him, James takes it that the mind's ideas are derived from experience and so, since we have ideas of time, duration, pastness, and so forth, there must be some suitable experience from which these ideas are derived. James suggests that the solution to this problem lies in the *specious present*, a doctrine he credits to 'E.R. Clay'. In James' hands, SP is the doctrine that that the "now" we experience as *present* at any time is not punctate, but rather includes a small but extended interval of time. James adopted the expression '*specious present*',[4] which he introduces by quoting the following passage from *The Alternative*:

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[4]A few words about the import of the doctrine's name are in order, since the expression 'specious present' has itself been a source of confusion. The word 'specious' is polysemous, its various meanings clustering around the notion of *appearance*. The two most relevant meanings are a non-pejorative "apparent" and a pejorative "*merely* apparent." If one is concerned with epistemological issues, and in particular with the relation between the various mental faculties and their capacity for providing accurate information, then the fact, if it is one, that experience exhibits *as present* what is in fact an interval of time, only one point of which is objectively present, is a shortcoming of experience. The temporal content of our experience would then be *merely* apparent, failing to accurately reflect the temporality of the world. The experienced present can thus be derided as "specious" because it misrepresents what

> The relation of experience to time has not been profoundly studied. Its objects are given as being of the present, but the part of time referred to by the datum is a very different thing from the conterminous of the past and future which philosophy denotes by the name Present. The present to which the datum refers is really a part of the past—a recent past—delusively given as being a time that intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named the specious present, and let the past, that is given as being the past, be known as the obvious past. All the notes of a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in the present. All the changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be contained in the present. At the instant of the termination of such series, no part of the time measured by them seems to be a past. Time, then, considered relatively to human apprehension, consists of four parts, viz. the obvious past, the specious present, the real present, and the future. Omitting the specious present, it consists of three . . . nonentities—the past, which does not exist, the future, which does not exist, and their conterminous, the present; the faculty from which it proceeds lies to us in the fiction of the specious present. (*Principles* 609; quoted from *The Alternative*, 167–68)

This is meant to address the problem of the origin of our ideas of time, duration, and succession by treating them as abstractions from our direct experience of temporal intervals as given in the SP. An example that is commonly provided as both an illustration of the meaning of SP, and as motivation for it, is our ability to perceive motion. A typical way that one becomes aware of the fact that the hour hand of a clock is moving is by comparing its orientation as one is currently perceiving it to its orientation as one remembers it being some time ago. In contrast, the typical way in which one becomes aware of the fact that the second hand is moving seems to be quite different. Rather than comparing what one is currently perceiving to something one is remembering, it seems as though perception can get the job done without memory's assistance—that the content of one's perceptual experience spans a temporal interval of sufficient magnitude to include an easily noticeable chunk of the second hand's motion.

James then goes on to discuss a good deal of work in the then-emerging field of empirical psychology that he takes to be experimental verification of the correctness of the SP doctrine. This work took as its object of investigation the time-sense, and focused on the capacity to discern differences in temporal intervals, the limits of capacity to discern simultaneity from succession, the capacity to recall temporal patterns, among other things. The details of this experimental work are beyond the scope of this paper.

Now to Husserl, who began writing on time consciousness in the early 1890s, but whose significant sustained work on the topic began around 1904 with copious notes and lectures that would eventually be published in 1928, under the nominal editorship of Martin Heidegger with the substantial editorial influence of Husserl's secretary, Edith Stein. In the published text, Husserl begins the discus-

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is in fact a temporal interval, most of which is past, as *present*. But if one has what might be called an intentional/phenomenological (as opposed to epistemological) project, then one will be interested in the nature of consciousness and its contents, not the objective accuracy of those contents. Given this focus, the "present" that is the object of investigation is the *appearing* present, the present that is phenomenally/intentionally and non-pejoratively *apparent*. We will use the expression 'specious present' merely as the established name for a doctrine, not as a shortcut way of deriding it or anything it is a doctrine of, or saying anything about what its meaning or proper use is.

sion with the phenomenological reduction. Ignoring a number of subtleties, this technique involves "bracketing" any knowledge of the external world, including causal relations between the world and consciousness, in order to avoid importing considerations from outside consciousness into the investigation of consciousness as such. The focus in the case of *PZB* is our consciousness of temporality, including temporal objects, namely, objects experienced as persisting through time, such as melodies and trees.

The central pivot of Husserl's analysis is his tripartite structure of temporal consciousness, according to which our experience of temporal objects consists of three aspects: *protention*, *retention*, and *primal impression*. When listening to a melody, for instance, at any given moment a specific note will be playing. This currently-given-as-new note is the *primal impression*. But this note is not heard as an isolated note, but as part of a temporally extended whole. The notes that have just been heard remain in consciousness, not as auditory images or echoes, but in what Husserl calls 'retention'. Retention is a process by which contents are held in consciousness and experienced-as-just-past, after having been given in primal impression when they were experienced-as-present. Part of the explanation for why the third note of the main theme of the final movement of Beethoven's *Ninth Symphony* sounds the way it does is the context that is perceptually available in consciousness, a context provided by retention of the notes that immediately preceded it. Without retention of the preceding notes, the third note would, in some sense, be the same note in primal impression, but would nevertheless not sound the same. And as time passes, the third note will in turn sink into retention and provide part of the temporal context for the experience of the fourth note.

Husserl is at pains to distinguish retention from recollection (he sometimes calls the former *primary memory* and the latter *secondary memory*). Retention is a process by which something that is experienced-as-present remains in consciousness: it "sinks back" so that, while it is retained in consciousness, it is no longer experienced as present, but rather as just-past. In recollection, by contrast, a past experience is brought back to be re-experienced. But this re-experiencing will involve its own new now-point and have its own temporal structure. As I re-create in memory the experience of hearing a melody, there will be a point in time at which I am recalling the third note, and at that point, the recollection of the first and second notes are held, in retention, to provide the context for my experience of the third note. Recollection, understood as a process by which experiences from the past are re-created, relies upon retention, but not *vice versa*.

The third element in the tripartite structure of temporality is *protention*, a process by which anticipations are formed concerning what will shortly be experienced (in primal impression). When I hear the third note, its phenomenal content is conditioned by the expectations I have concerning imminent notes. This is part of the reason that a composition can actually sound different after one hears it several times: protentions get more detailed and hence are able to make more substantial contributions to the phenomenal content of each phase. Even without specific expectations of upcoming notes, however, protention accompanies the primal impression as a general openness towards imminent experience. Protention is given relatively little attention in Husserl's work, and it does not figure significantly in what follows.

There are obvious similarities between the SP doctrine and Husserl's analysis of time consciousness. Both are built around the idea that the contents grasped by consciousness are temporally thick, that the temporal unit of grasped content is a duration, not a punctate instant. But there are many ways that the SP doctrine can be understood, and many ways that Husserl has been interpreted, and so it is not possible to simply equate the two doctrines without argument. These subtleties are beyond the scope of this paper. The gross characterizations above will be sufficient for the purposes that follow.

2. THOMAS REID

The catalyst of the philosophical movement whose eventual product was the SP doctrine and *PZB* was Thomas Reid's essay "Memory" from his *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.*[5] This is not because he endorsed anything like the SP doctrine. Quite the opposite—as we shall see his position entails the denial of the SP doctrine. But Reid was the first to explicitly isolate and problematize the topic of the temporal content of single perceptual acts and thus to introduce a topic that would be developed by his successors in the Scottish Common Sense tradition.

Reid sketches his position in "Memory" against a criticism of Locke's account of the genesis of our ideas of succession and duration as stated in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding.*[6] An assumption of Locke's brand of empiricism was that any idea the mind could make use of must first have been introduced to the mind either through perception or reflection. Clearly the normal adult mind has ideas of succession and duration—ideas employed in thought of events in the distant past or future, for instance. It is therefore incumbent upon Locke to provide some account of how the mind comes to have these ideas. Locke held that our *idea of succession* was the product of reflection upon the *succession of ideas*, and that the *idea of duration* comes from reflection upon the "distance" between these successive ideas:

> It is evident to any one who will but observe what passes in his own mind, that there is a train of ideas which constantly succeed one another in his understanding, as long as he is awake. Reflection on these appearances of several ideas one after another in our minds, is that which furnishes us with the idea of succession: and the distance between any parts of that succession, or between the appearance of any two ideas in our minds, is that we call duration. (*Essay* bk. 2, ch. 14, §3)

In motto form, the idea of succession is derived from the succession of ideas, and the idea of duration is derived from the duration between successive ideas. Reid attacks this doctrine in two ways. First, he argues that if Locke's account can say anything at all about our idea of succession, it is only by presupposing *memory*:

> Reflecting upon the train of ideas can be nothing but remembering it, and giving attention to what our memory testifies concerning it; for if we did not remember it,

[5]Volume 1 of Thomas Reid, *Philosophical Works: with notes and supplementary dissertations by Sir William Hamilton* [*Intellectual Powers*], 2 vols. (Hildesheim: G. Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967); page numbers from this edition.

[6]John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* [*Essay*], ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); book, chapter, and section numbers, and, where appropriate, page numbers from the Nidditch edition.

> we could not have a thought about it. So that it is evident that this reflection includes remembrance, without which there could be no reflection on what is past, and consequently no idea of succession. (*Intellectual Powers*, 348)

Thus, Reid's first conclusion is that the process of reflection, which, according to Locke, derives the idea of succession from the succession of ideas, requires the operation of memory. This, by itself, would not be too hard a pill for Locke to swallow, since it is not clear that he has any stake in purging memory from the process of reflection—he might have willingly conceded that memory is a significant aspect of the operation of "reflection" in this context.

But Reid's second and more damaging criticism concerns the details of Locke's attempted derivation of duration from reflection on succession. Reid begins by observing that if a succession of ideas is to compose a duration, then it must be the case that either the ideas themselves or the intervals between them, or both, have duration:

> For, suppose a succession of as many ideas as you please, if none of these ideas have duration, nor any interval of duration be between one and another, then it is perfectly evident that there can be no interval of duration between the first and the last. . . . (*Intellectual Powers*, 348)

But Reid then points out that

> in these elements of duration, or single intervals of successive ideas, there is no succession of ideas, yet we must conceive them to have duration; whence we may conclude with certainty, that there is a conception of duration, where there is no succession of ideas in the mind. (*Intellectual Powers*, 348–49)

The argument's conclusion is that our conception of duration cannot be derived from succession.[7] One way to construe the argument is as an attempt to confront Locke with the horns of this dilemma: either none of the successive ideas and the putative "spaces" between them from which we supposedly generate the idea of duration have any perceivable/conceivable duration themselves, or they (some of them at least) do have some perceivable/conceivable duration. If none of the successive ideas, or the spaces between them, have any perceivable/conceivable duration themselves, then they cannot constitute a succession, since failing to be separated by any temporal duration just is what it is for two temporal entities to be simultaneous. If they do not constitute a succession, then Locke's account trips on its first step. This is the first horn of the dilemma. On the second horn, if any of the ideas in the succession or any of the spaces between these ideas do have perceivable/conceivable duration, then the idea of duration (understood here

[7]Reid cites Richard Price's *Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*, ed. D. D. Raphael (Oxford: Clarendon, 1974), as the source of this argument. The entirety of Price's argument is this:

> What the observation of the train of thoughts following one another in our minds, or the constant flux of external objects, suggests, is *succession*; an idea which, in common with all others, presupposes that of *duration*; but is as different from it as the idea of motion, or figure. It would, I think, have been much properer to have said, that the reflection on the succession of ideas in our minds is that by which we estimate the *quantity* of duration intervening between two events; than, that we owe to it the idea of duration. (Ibid., 24)

While Locke is not mentioned by Price explicitly in this passage, it is clear from earlier context that Locke's account is the target.

as a capacity to experience duration) must precede that of succession, since any single idea, or any space between ideas, would *ex hypothesi* "have" duration, even though it is not composed of a succession of ideas.

Exploring the adequacy and nuances of Locke's position and Reid's criticism is beyond the scope of this paper. The relevant consequence of Reid's discussion is that he has explicitly identified a need to credit to the mind a capacity to experience, or become aware of, duration—a capacity that must already be in place in order for Locke's stated program concerning the origin of our temporal ideas to get off the ground.

Having identified the need for a capacity to experience duration, Reid goes on to credit that capacity exclusively to the faculty of *memory*, which not only gives us "an immediate knowledge of things past" (*Intellectual Powers*, 339), but which also "implies a conception and belief of past duration" (ibid., 340). Temporal duration is simply given through memory in a manner analogous to the way (as was commonly assumed at the time) that two-dimensional space is simply given through vision:

> I know of no ideas or notions that have a better claim to be accounted simple and original than those of Space and Time. . . . The sense of seeing, by itself, gives us the conception and belief of only two dimensions of extension, but the sense of touch discovers three. . . . In like manner, memory gives us the conception and belief of finite intervals of duration. (*Intellectual Powers*, 349)

By arguing that the faculty of memory is the source of the mind's capacity to experience temporal duration, Reid denies that the faculty of "sensation" can fulfill this function:

> It may be here observed, that, if we speak strictly and philosophically, no kind of succession can be an object either of the senses, or of consciousness; because the operations of both are confined to the present point of time, and there can be no succession in a point of time; and on that account the motion of a body, which is a successive change of place, could not be observed by the senses alone without the aid of memory. (*Intellectual Powers*, 348)

Thus Reid's position entails that there is, strictly and philosophically, no difference between our experience of the second hand's motion and our experience of the hour hand's motion. In neither case do we perceive motion—more strictly, in neither case can we *sense*, or *be conscious of*, the motion (we will henceforth, when discussing Reid, use 'perceive' and cognates to mean "sense or be conscious of"). We come to *believe* that there is motion in both cases only by comparing the content of a current perception to the content of a memory, and noting a difference in spatial location.

In defending this conclusion, Reid contrasts two related distinctions—each a set of *strict* versus *vulgar* conceptions (this distinction will reverberate throughout the writings of those who followed Reid, and will also find its way into the passage that James cited from *The Alternative*, quoted in section 1). The first distinction is between the strict and vulgar conceptions of the difference between perception and memory; the second is between the strict and vulgar conceptions of the expression 'present'. As to the first, the vulgar often claim that we can see (without the aid of memory) temporally extended events *as* temporally extended, e.g.,

the motion of the second hand. But strictly speaking, the temporal content of perception comprehends only a durationless instant. Relatedly, the vulgar often use the expression 'present' to denote a span of time of non-zero, perhaps extensive, duration. Nevertheless, strictly speaking, the present comprehends only a durationless instant:

> Philosophers and the vulgar differ in the meaning they put on upon what is called the *present* time, and are thereby led to make a different limit between sense and memory.
>
> Philosophers give the name of the *present* to that indivisible point of time, which divides the future from the past: but the vulgar find it more convenient in the affairs of life, to give the name of present to a portion of time, which extends more or less, according to circumstances, into the past or the future. (*Intellectual Powers*, 348)

Both the vulgar and the strict philosopher will assent to the *sentence* "we can only see what is present, not what is past, and we can only remember what is past, not what is present," but because of the different significance attached to the key words by each, the vulgar and the philosopher will be assenting to different, and inconsistent, *propositions*.

Reid compares the way that memory supplies us with temporal contents to the way that vision and touch supply us with spatial content, and he pushes the analogy by noting that, while both time and space, *as they really are*, are continuous and can be divided indefinitely without ever reaching a least part, it is nevertheless true that our faculties are capable of merely finite degrees of discrimination. Just as the eye is only capable of discriminating a region no smaller than some minimal extent (the *minimum visibile*), memory's capacity for temporal discrimination has limited resolving power. We only notice finitely small divisions in time, beyond which further subdivision cannot be distinguished: "there are limits beyond which our faculties can divide neither the one nor the other" (*Intellectual Powers*, 349).

Interestingly, Reid seems to have performed some experiments to ascertain the magnitude of this *minimum discernible duration* (henceforth MDD; this is our expression, not Reid's). Reid's report of the experiment and its results is made at the very end of chapter 5 of the essay "Memory." Subjects listened to a pendulum beating second intervals, and then were supposed to continue beating seconds after the pendulum was silenced. Reid observed that "a man may beat seconds for one minute, without erring above one second in the whole sixty" (ibid., 350). For longer time periods, the error rapidly escalates such that the subject is entirely unable to replicate the correct beat. From this Reid concludes that the MDD is 1/60 of a second. There are a host of criticisms and questions that could be raised about the experimental methodology, but that is beyond the scope of this paper. This crude experiment is of historical interest because, when experimental psychology developed in the middle of the nineteenth century, investigations of the "time sense" were among the most significant experimental paradigms developed. The way the problem was formulated by these researchers was essentially the same as Reid's, namely, an assumption that the mind has a capacity to experience durations in a way analogous to the way it experiences spatial expanses. Hence, the two major lines of investigation in empirical psychology concerned i) the extent of the mind's temporal field of view (analogous to the spatial extent of the field

of vision), the amount of time that is grasped *all at once*; and ii) the mind's discriminating power within this temporal duration.

Among the experimental paradigms used by these nineteenth-century researchers was Reid's. Reid, however, is never, to our knowledge, credited with contributing to the intellectual inspiration for these later experimental psychologists, but it seems unlikely that none had ever read Reid's *Intellectual Powers*. Many, including the towering figure Wundt, were aware of Reid's predecessors in the tradition of British empiricist philosophy, notably Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and indeed many of the working assumptions about how the mind functioned—assumptions that guided early experimental design—were taken from the empiricists. But exploring the issue of Reid's possible influence on these figures in experimental psychology is beyond the scope of this paper.

To summarize this section, Reid did the following in his essay on "Memory." First, he raised the issue of the origin of our temporal ideas—exactly the issue that James would use to motivate his discussion of time consciousness in chapter 15 of the *Principles*. More interestingly, he addressed the issue by positing a time sense—one he labels *memory*, but which he defines in a particular way—that presents temporal intervals directly to the mind. Second, he analogized this time sense to a spatial sense, suggesting that its scope and discriminating powers could be investigated in a manner analogous to the investigation of the scope and discriminating power of spatial senses. This was the explicit assumption of the nineteenth-century experimentalists with which James and Husserl were familiar. Third, he defined a position on the consciousness of time that was clear, initially plausible, but ultimately untenable. This was the position that drew a hard distinction between memory and perception, and divided the labor between those faculties in such a way that memory had a monopoly on temporal content, and perception was restricted to series of temporally punctate snapshots.

3. DUGALD STEWART

A student and friend of, and eventually successor to, Reid at Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart's[8] contribution to the development of the SP doctrine was made by way of expanding upon Reid's faculty psychology to improve, by Stewart's lights anyway, its capacity to do justice to the facts of our temporal experience. In fact, what Stewart did was to create something of an unwieldy mess, though arguably exactly the unwieldy mess that would have to result from any attempt to work out the details of Reid's unstable position and make them consistent with obvious phenomenological facts. Stewart's contribution to the line of development we are tracing was the production of an account of the contents of perceptual consciousness that attempted both to stay true to Reid's distinction between memory and perception, and yet also to account for why we seem to have perceptual contents that span a temporal interval.

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[8]Dugald Stewart, *Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind* [*Elements*], in vol. 2 of Stewart, *The Collected works of Dugald Stewart*, ed. William Hamilton, 9 vols. (Westmead: Gregg International Publishers, 1971); page numbers from this edition and volume.

Stewart did not question Reid's division of labor between perception and memory, nor memory's role as the "time sense." But he felt that a third mental faculty—*attention*—was required as something of a mediator, since only those perceptions to which some degree of attention is allocated will be remembered, while those to which no, or insufficient, attention is allocated will be perceived but will leave no trace in memory. He illustrates this point at the beginning of the chapter on "Attention" with an amusing example of a person who dozes off in church during the sermon. If such a person is suddenly awakened, he will not remember anything that was said, and this can be taken to be evidence that *either* the preacher's voice was not perceived, or that it was perceived but not remembered. Stewart argues for the second option on the basis of the observation that "if the preacher were to make a sudden pause in his discourse, every person in the congregation who was asleep would instantly awake" (*Elements* 120). Evidently the dozing parishioners perceived the voice, even though they did not attend to it. This, of course, raises the question of what distinguishes those perceptions we can recall from those we cannot. Stewart's position, which he articulates by way of enlisting the presumed agreement of common sense, is that "[t]here seems, therefore, to be a certain effort of the mind upon which, even in the judgment of the vulgar, memory in some measure depends; and which they distinguish by the name attention" (ibid., 122).

It will be worth looking at one of Stewart's examples, the visual perception of a geometric figure, in more detail:

> Does the mind perceive the complete figure of the object at once, or is this perception the result of the various perceptions we have of the different points in the outline? . . . [*T*]*he mind does at one and the same time perceive every point in the outline of the object,* (provided the whole of it be painted on the retina at the same instant,) for perception, like consciousness, is an involuntary operation. As no two points, however, of the outline are in the same direction, every point by itself constitutes just as distinct an object of attention to the mind, as if it were separated by an interval of empty space from all the rest. . . . [But] it is impossible for the mind to attend to more than one of these points at once; and as the perception of the figure of the object implies a knowledge of the relative situation of the different points with respect to each other, we must conclude, that the perception of figure by the eye, is the result of a number of different acts of attention. These acts of attention, however, are performed with such rapidity, that the effect, with respect to us, is the same *as if the perception were simultaneous.* (*Elements* 142; emphasis added)

Note that, paradoxically, the "problem" presented here is how we go from a large set of *simultaneous* perceptions (the first italicized phrase), each of which corresponds to some point of the spatial figure, to the "effect, with respect to us" that it is *as if* the perceptions were simultaneous (in the second italicized phrase). The "problem" arises for two reasons: first, Stewart is thinking of consciousness as a faculty that acts on (for instance by *paying attention to*) independently existing, and persisting, mental objects called *perceptions*; and second, attention is limited to one such object at a time, yet operates with such rapidity that we fail to notice this fact. The upshot is that while many "perceptions" can be simultaneously in the mind, the mind can only pay attention to one of these perceptions at a time. The simultaneous perceptions are successively attended to, but to the mind, it

seems as though the attendings-to of each perception occur simultaneously. Thus, there must be some account of how it is that what is in fact a succession seems to the mind like a simultaneity, and an awkward distinction is necessary between the simultaneously given perceptions and our subsequent consciousness of those perceptions as simultaneous.

Briefly, Stewart's account of this phenomenon is as follows. All the point-perceptions are present in the mind simultaneously. The mind quickly and willfully moves attention from one of these perceptions to the next. Each of the acts of will corresponding to a shift of attention is so brief that it falls beneath the minimally discernible duration (Reid's MDD) and is therefore not remembered by the mind as an individual act of will, or as a distinct act of attention. However, once the spotlight of attention shines on a perception, that perception (and the point that it is a perception of) gets remembered by the mind. Though each of the perceptions is noted by attention at a different time—there is, in fact, a succession of perception-attendings—these attendings are not noted as distinct because the interval between them is too brief, beneath the MDD, even though they are sufficiently long as to be subsequently remembered. In this way the mind takes itself to have noticed all the perceptions simultaneously.[9]

In summary, Stewart's aim was to improve upon Reid's doctrines by describing the contribution made by the faculty of attention to the workings of perception and memory. While it was not the main goal of his account, it provided an answer—even if a flawed one—to the counter-intuitive consequence of Reid's position that only the things present at the current time point are perceived. Although Stewart agrees that, strictly speaking, the mind cannot attend to more than the single "perception" that is the current focus of attention at the current instant, his account is able to explain operations such that "the effect, with respect to us" is as though we are able to currently perceive as simultaneous a set of things, one of which may in fact be the current object of attention, but the rest of which were actually attended to a very brief time ago.

4. THOMAS BROWN

The convolutions of Stewart's doctrines were not lost on his assistant, Thomas Brown.[10] In *The Philosophy of the Human Mind*,[11] Brown went to pains to diagnose

[9]Understanding Stewart's doctrine on this matter is no easy task, and has even proven to be a recurring source of exegetical disagreement between the co-authors of this paper. (Andersen in general interprets Stewart to be much less confused than does Grush.) Fortunately this specific aspect of Stewart's doctrines can be ignored for present purposes.

[10]Brown, at one time a student of Stewart's, was tasked as Stewart's substitute when Stewart fell ill and became partially paralyzed, in 1808, after which Brown remained Stewart's assistant. It was upon Brown's death in 1820 that Stewart was forced to vacate the Chair of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh because he was unable to fulfill the duties without Brown's assistance (see, e.g., the memoir by David Welsh in Thomas Brown, *Philosophy of the Human Mind* [Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1857], vol. 1, 1–84). While there can be little doubt that Brown's critique of an unworkable notion of "consciousness" was directed largely at Stewart's doctrines, Brown makes no mention of Stewart in this section of his book. Rather, Brown uses passages from Reid as illustrations of the confusions he is diagnosing. The explanation here is most likely personal and professional tact.

[11]Thomas Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Mind* [*Human Mind*], in *Philosophy of the Human Mind*, vol. 1; page numbers from this edition and volume.

conceptual confusions, in some cases suggested by linguistic confusions, that beleaguered attempts to provide analyses of, e.g., consciousness, sensation, and associated phenomena. After pointing out that "consciousness" is often taken to be a faculty that *has as objects* pains, fears, and "thoughts of every kind" (*Human Mind*, 294), Brown says that

> this attempt to double, as it were, our various feelings by making them not to constitute our consciousness, but to be the objects of it, as of a distinct intellectual power . . . is founded, partly on a confusion of thought, and still more on a confusion of language. Sensation is not the object of consciousness different from itself, but a particular sensation is the consciousness of the moment. . . . (*Human Mind*, 294–95)

This is directed at Stewart's faculty psychology if it is directed at anything. Stewart's doubling took the form of the mind directing the spotlight of attention at some of its perceptions so that those perceptions would be noticed by the mind. But Brown's case against Stewart is not our focus. We will instead focus on Brown's positive accounts of *consciousness* and *self-consciousness*, and relatedly, on Brown's views about memory and its relation to the current contents of consciousness. His positive account of consciousness is summarized in the last sentence of the quoted passage: consciousness is not a faculty that is aware of, or perceives, sensations, but rather is constituted by the having of sensations. But he distinguishes between consciousness and self-consciousness:

> [L]et us imagine a human being born with his faculties perfect as in mature life, and let us suppose a sensation to arise for the first time in his mind. . . . [L]et us suppose the sensation to be . . . that which the fragrance of a rose excites. . . . [T]here will be, in this first momentary state, no separation of self and the sensation,—no little proposition formed in the mind, *I feel* or *I am conscious of a feeling*,—but the feeling and the sentient I, will, for the moment, be the same. (*Human Mind*, 297)

Here is a very early statement of what Peter Strawson would later famously analyze as a *solipsistic consciousness*—a mind that does not draw a distinction between itself and anything other than itself.[12] Brown continues with what is missing in such a case:

> [B]ecause the knowledge of self, as distinct from the particular feelings, implies the remembrance of former feelings,—of feelings which, together with the present, we ascribe to one thinking principle. . . . Let us . . . suppose another sensation to be excited, as, for instance, that which is produced by the sound of a flute. The mind either will be completely absorbed in this new sensation, without any subsequent remembrance . . . or the remembrance of the former feeling will arise. If the remembrance of the former feeling arise, and the two different feelings be considered by the mind at once, it will now . . . conceive the two sensations, which it recognizes as different in themselves, to have yet belonged to the same being. . . . The notion of self, as the lasting subject of successive transient feelings, being now, and not till now, acquired, through the remembrance of former sensations. . . . In these circumstances, the memory of the past will often mingle with and modify the present. . . . (*Human Mind*, 297–98)

[12]Peter F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (London: Methuen, 1959), esp. chs. 1, 2, and 3. It is interesting to compare Brown's solution to the solipsistic consciousness problem to that of Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London: Methuen, 1966), esp. 97–112.

The following would appear to be behind Brown's thought here. There is a persisting mind capable of being the subject of multiple sensations synchronically and diachronically (where 'is the subject of' is not to be understood as "perceiving" or otherwise "acting on"). But the mind does not necessarily conceive of itself as such, as a self, mind, or subject. What allows the mind to conceive of itself as a self is its having of a present sensation along with a remembrance of a prior sensation. In these conditions the mind is forced to recognize itself as the persisting unity underlying the diversity of sensations.

There are two questions one could raise here. First, why focus on the notion of the self as a *persisting* thing? Would not the having of simultaneous sensations lead the mind to conceive of itself as a unity that underlies diversity just as effectively as the having of successive sensations? This would not result in the same kind of underlying unity characteristic of our own self-notion as a unity underlying both synchronic and diachronic diversity, but it might be a perfectly respectable, if limited, kind of self-consciousness nevertheless. Second, is it necessary that the sensations be qualitatively different, like the rose scent and the flute note? It would seem that nothing in the account would rule out a current flute sound along with a remembrance of a qualitatively identical, but numerically distinct flute sound being just as capable of inducing diachronic self-consciousness as qualitatively distinct sensations. We raise these two questions not to pursue them further here, but because Brown's unargued focus on a diachronic distribution of qualitatively distinct sensations would be taken up by, and have an influence on the doctrines of, William Hamilton.

Now we turn to Brown's diagnosis of how we mistake the conscious mind to be a faculty that acts on objects such as sensations. The first stage in the account is to identify a sense in which the mind is aware of a sensation:

> There is, indeed, one other sense in which we often talk of our consciousness of a feeling, and a sense in which it must be allowed that the consciousness is not precisely the same as the feeling itself. This is, when we speak of a feeling, not actually existing at present, but past—as when we say, that we are conscious of having seen, or heard, or done something. Such a use of the term, however, is pardonable only in the privileged looseness and inaccuracy of familiar conversation; the consciousness, in this case, being precisely synonymous with remembrance or memory, and not a power different from remembrance. . . . (*Human Mind*, 302–03)

But this pardonable sense of 'being conscious of a sensation' through remembrance can shade into a full-blown confusion:

> When we think of feelings long past, it is impossible for us not to be aware that our mind is then truly retrospective. . . . But when the retrospect is of very recent feelings—of feelings, perhaps, that existed as distinct states of the mind, the very moment before our retrospect began, the short interval is forgotten, and we think that that primary feeling, and our consideration of the feeling, are strictly simultaneous. . . . When it is any thing more than the sensation, thought, or emotion, of which we are said to be conscious, it is a brief and rapid retrospect. (*Human Mind*, 303)

Memory, for Brown, is a matter of the presence of a feeling whose intentional object is another, previously experienced, feeling. But, crucially, his account draws a distinction between two mnemonic phenomena: those for which the temporal interval between the memory-feeling and the remembered feeling is noticed

because it is great enough, and those for which the temporal interval is so brief that the temporal interval is not noticed. The latter sort of case, which Brown describes as a *rapid retrospect*, results in a situation where the mind takes itself to simultaneously have a feeling and another mental state that has this feeling as its intentional object. This invites the confused suggestion that the mind, in its usual mode of operation, consists of the perception of perceptions.

Brown's position, like Stewart's, provides a response to the counter-intuitive consequence of Reid's doctrine to the effect that only that which is available at the present instant can be perceived. Brown, like Stewart, does not argue against the strict truth of this, but addresses the purported illusion that the present perceptual contents of the mind encompass a temporal interval that includes a brief bit of the past. The illusion is the result, according to Brown, of the peculiarities of *rapid retrospect*; a phenomenon that, although it is strictly speaking a mnemonic phenomenon and not a perceptual one, shares features both with memory and perception. Because of this, it has some claim to being the first identifiable precursor of the SP doctrine and the Hodgsonian and Husserlian notion of retention.

5. WILLIAM HAMILTON

In his *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic*,[13] William Hamilton develops a theory of consciousness that is, in many respects, a more meticulously worked-out version of Brown's. There are two aspects of his theory we will focus on. The first is Hamilton's treatment of memory; the second is his development of the preconditions for consciousness.

Hamilton treats the topic of "memory" at length in chapter 30 of the *Lectures*. The account essentially involves distinguishing two different senses of 'memory'. The first is a more or less passive capacity of the mind, which Hamilton sometimes refers to as 'memory proper' and at other times as *retention*. This is the capacity to retain ideas, feelings, and so forth, that the mind acquires through, e.g., perception: "the term *Memory* exclusively denote[s] the faculty possessed by the mind of preserving what has once been present to consciousness . . . " (*Lectures* 2, 208–09). This is contrasted with an active capacity, *reproduction*, that can access retained information and reproduce an experience that is similar to the one that was retained. One of the purposes, though not the only one, of retaining what has been presented to consciousness is "that it may again be recalled and represented in consciousness" (*Lectures* 2, 209).

Hamilton's distinction between retention and reproduction is not the same as Brown's distinction between rapid retrospect and retrospect recognized as such. Brown's distinction is between products of a single mnemonic capacity, the difference being whether or not the pastness is noticed. Hamilton's distinction is between two different but overlapping capacities: a passive capacity for storage (retention),

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[13]During his first term as Chair of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh in 1836, Sir William Hamilton gave a series of undergraduate lectures on metaphysics, a lecture series he would continue to deliver on alternate years until his death, even after he suffered a stroke in 1844 that left him paralyzed on his right side. Though these lectures were never intended by Hamilton for publication, they were posthumously published, along with lecture notes for his course on logic that he gave in alternate years, as Sir William Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* [*Lectures*], 2 vols. (Edinburgh-London: Blackwood and Sons, 1861; reprint 1969); volume and page numbers from this edition.

and an active capacity for producing representations that, when it acts on retained items in order to produce fresh copies of them, results in re-production. It is also worth noting that, although he is the first to introduce the expression 'retention' as a technical term, Hamilton's notion is quite different from the successor notion that Hodgson and Husserl would name with that expression. Hamiltonian retentions are not, *per se*, intentional *states* or *aspects* of consciousness (though they can *contribute* content to states of consciousness that are intentional by being taken up by recollection). Instead, they are passive objects on which consciousness can act by calling them forth in recollection. Hamiltonian retention is merely a process that keeps a record, perhaps entirely subconsciously, of what has been experienced. We will return to this terminological issue in section 8.

We turn now to Hamilton's views on consciousness, which revolve around what he identifies as five "special conditions" of consciousness. Hamilton defines consciousness as "the recognition by the mind or ego of its own acts or affections" (*Lectures* 1, 193)—and the special conditions are requirements that any entity must satisfy in order to count as being conscious (so defined). The conditions are clearly meant to be individually necessary, though it is not clear whether they are intended to be jointly sufficient; we can ignore this issue. The first condition is that consciousness involves actual, and not merely potential, knowledge. The fourth condition is that it involves judgment. These conditions will not concern us. The second, third, and fifth will.

The second condition is that "consciousness is an immediate, not a mediate knowledge" (*Lectures* 1, 202). In part, Hamilton is here criticizing what he takes to be Reid's position to the effect that we can, through memory, be immediately aware of a past event. One of Hamilton's major themes, in the *Lectures* as well as other works,[14] is a critique of Reid's theory of direct perception in favor of a more traditional representational account. This theme manifests here in the case of memory. Hamilton quotes Reid as saying that, in memory, we have immediate knowledge of the past, and in consciousness we have immediate knowledge of the present (*Lectures* 1, 215). According to Hamilton, what we are immediately aware of in reproductive memory is, if anything, a *representation* of the past event. We know the past event itself only mediately. This applies not only to events in the distant past, but to the most recently-past ones as well.

The third condition on consciousness is that "it supposes a contrast,—a discrimination; for we can be conscious only inasmuch as we are conscious of something; and we are conscious of something only inasmuch as we are conscious of what that something is,—that is, distinguish it from what it is not. . . . We are conscious of one mental state only as we contradistinguish it from another . . . and were we to note no difference in our mental modifications, we might be said to be absolutely unconscious" (*Lectures* 1, 203). This is, of course, similar to Brown's discussion

[14]Hamilton edited the collected works of both Reid and Stewart, and in the case of Reid's collected works (Thomas Reid, *Philosophical Works*, with notes and supplementary dissertations by Sir William Hamilton, ed. Harry M. Bracken, 2 vols. [Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967]), wrote extensive, extremely detailed editorial notes and exegesis. Hamilton's writing in this collection is literally as long as Reid's. At the time of his death in 1856, Hamilton was engaged in writing a memoir of Dugald Stewart that was to be included as the never-published tenth volume of *The Collected works of Dugald Stewart.*

of self-consciousness, where he used the example of the mind taking note of two qualitatively distinct sensations (the fragrance of the rose, and the note played on a flute). Note that, while Brown took this to be a requirement on what he called 'self-consciousness', it is clear from Hamilton's definition of 'consciousness' that the two are addressing the same phenomenon.

The fifth and final special condition of consciousness is *memory*. Interestingly, Hamilton claims that this is a corollary to the third condition, that all consciousness implies a discrimination:

> For without memory our mental states could not be held fast, compared, distinguished from each other, and referred to self. Without memory, each indivisible, each infinitesimal, moment in the mental succession, would stand isolated from every other,—would constitute, in fact, a separate existence. The notion of the ego or self, arises from the recognized *permanence and identity* of the thinking subject in contrast to the recognized succession and variety of its modifications. But this recognition is only possible through memory. The notion of self is, therefore, the result of memory. But the notion of self is involved in consciousness, so consequently is memory. (*Lectures* 1, 205; emphasis added)

One might raise the same questions here that were raised with Brown. Why could not the two mental states that are being compared such as to satisfy the third condition be both current perceptual states, neither a *remembered* prior state? And why is qualitative diversity, as opposed to merely numerical diversity, required? Hamilton's discussion here seems to equivocate on the issue of qualitative diversity, needed for recognition of contrast, and numerical diversity, which requires the positing of a principle of unity.

The sense of 'memory' involved in the fifth condition is clearly that of reproduction. A re-presented prior experience is necessary, presumably, to provide the materials the mind needs to make a contrast. And of course, since reproduction requires retention, this will also be a condition of consciousness implied by the fifth condition. But the equivocation manifests itself here as well, since presumably an active faculty could produce representations not based on retention that would do the job required for contrast: an *imagined* feeling of coldness contrasts with a present feeling of heat just as much as does a *remembered* feeling of coldness.

These questions aside, Hamilton has taken Brown's position to the effect that the minimum of (self-)consciousness is a comparison that requires the operation of rapid retrospect, and has squeezed out of it an explicitly temporal requirement on consciousness. As Hamilton puts it in Appendix I to his *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature*:[15]

> In the internal perception of a series of mental operations, a certain time, a certain duration, is necessary for the smallest section of continuous energy to which consciousness is competent. Some minimum of time must be admitted as the minimum of consciousness. (*Discussions* 257)

While arguably much of this is present at least implicitly in Brown, Hamilton has explicitly taken the issue of the temporal interval grasped by consciousness and made it a requirement that that interval always be of non-zero magnitude. Time,

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[15]William Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature* [*Discussions*] (New York: Harper, 1856); page numbers from this edition.

he says elsewhere, "called likewise Duration, is a necessary condition of thought" (*Discussions* 571). Interestingly, later on the same page, Hamilton discusses some ontological aspects of time:

> In regard to Time Past, and Time Future there is comparatively no difficulty. . . . But Time Present, when we attempt to realize it, seems to escape us altogether—to vanish into nonentity. The present cannot be conceived as of any length, of any quantity, of any protension, in short, as any thing positive. It is only conceivable as a negation, as the point or line (and these are only negations) in which the past ends and the future begins—in which they limit each other. "Le moment où je parle, est déjà loin de moi." (*Discussions* 571)

While Hamilton never explicitly puts the pieces together, these passages jointly paint a picture that is essentially the SP doctrine as stated in the passage James quoted from *The Alternative*: an analysis of time as it really is, with three "nonentities" including the past, the future, and a punctate present, and a characterization of conscious experience as necessarily comprehending some temporal interval.

6. EARLY HODGSON

Though he did not have an academic appointment, Shadworth Hollway Hodgson was actively engaged in the philosophical scene of his day. He co-founded, with other notable figures including Dewey, the Aristotelian Society in London, of which he was president for fourteen years. Not only did Hodgson and James have a warm friendship,[16] but James thought very highly of Hodgson's work. We will return to the relationship between James and Hodgson in the final section. For now, the topic is Hodgson's work, in particular the texts that were an influence on James, namely *Time and Space*[17] and *Philosophy of Reflection*.[18] We shall discuss Hodgson's later work, his canonical publication, *Metaphysic of Experience*,[19] and its influence on Husserl, in section 8.

Like Brown and Hamilton, Hodgson is motivated by what he takes to be requirements on, or conditions of, consciousness, and he agrees with Brown and Hamilton (though not by name) that a minimal requirement for consciousness is the comparison of two conscious states. Indeed, Hodgson feels licensed to invoke this as the received view: "It is a current theory at the present day, that all perception includes comparison . . ." (*TS* 34). In *PR* this doctrine is spelled out in more detail:

> The minimum of consciousness contains two different feelings. One alone would not be felt. . . . But of this *apparent* simultaneity there are two cases: the first is that of

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[16]Hodgson and James exchanged letters over a twenty-year span on philosophical as well as personal topics, and James often visited Hodgson when in London (James, *Collected Correspondence of William James*, ed. Ignas K. Skrupskelis and Elizabeth M. Berkeley [Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992–1994], vol. 5, 345; vol. 8, 23). James reported to his wife in a letter that he "found that bashful & amiable philosopher charming in the extreme" (ibid., vol. 5, 108).

[17]Shadworth Hollway Hodgson, *Time and Space* [*TS*] (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1865).

[18]Shadworth Hollway Hodgson, *Philosophy of Reflection*, vols. 1 and 2 [*PR*] (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1878).

[19]Shadworth Hollway Hodgson, *Metaphysic of Experience*, vols. 1–4 [*ME*] (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts, and Green, 1898; reprint New York: Garland Publishing, 1980).

> a real simultaneity, the two sub-feelings are really parts in coexistence, not in succession; the second is that in which one of them is felt as growing fainter (called *going* when referred to its place in succession), the other as growing stronger (called *coming* when referred to the succession). The simultaneous perception of both sub-feelings, whether as parts of a coexistence or of a sequence, is the total feeling, the minimum of consciousness, and this minimum has duration. (*PR* 249–50; emphasis added)

The similarity to Hamilton is obvious, though quite crucially Hodgson allows exactly what Hamilton and Brown do not, namely, the possibility of simultaneous objects of comparison. The minimum of consciousness for Hodgson requires only that there be a difference; this can be from comparison of two simultaneous feelings, experienced in parallel. It could also be from comparison of two successive feelings, experienced as an apparent simultaneity because the succession falls within the minimum duration of consciousness—a temporal interval within which feelings have an apparent simultaneity, where one is "growing fainter" while the other is "growing stronger." Thus Hodgson separates two issues that Hamilton conflated. On the one hand, Hodgson agrees that a contrast is required, and so two qualitatively distinct feelings must be comparable by consciousness in order for them to be felt. On the other hand, this issue is kept distinct from temporality. A situation in which the two qualitatively distinct feelings are genuinely simultaneous is possible, though even in this case, the experience of them comprehends a temporal interval in that "[a] former and a latter are included in the minimum of consciousness" (*PR* 252), perhaps with one of the simultaneous feelings growing fainter and the other growing stronger. For Hodgson, the claim that consciousness comprehends a temporal interval is not derived from the comparison requirement as it is for Hamilton.

Hodgson directly discusses this capacity of the mind, this temporal window of experience, in a passage that is remarkably similar to the influential passage James quoted from *The Alternative*, as well as to the discussion of time from Hamilton's *Discussions* quoted in the previous section:

> Crudely and popularly we divide the course of time into Past, Present, and Future; but, strictly speaking, there is no Present; it is composed of Past and Future divided by an indivisible point or instant. That instant, or time-point, is the strict *present*. What we loosely call the Present is an empirical portion of the course of time, containing at least the minimum of consciousness, in which the instant of change is the present time-point. (*PR* 253)

Not only does the distinction between crude and strict divisions of time strongly echo Reid's (see section 2), there is little doubt that Hodgson's doctrine here was very much influenced by Hamilton. Though Hodgson does not quote Hamilton *here* as an inspiration on these doctrines, it is clear that, in general, he was familiar with Hamilton's work, and even discusses the relevant Appendix from Hamilton's *Discussions* on p. 178 of *PR*. Indeed, Hodgson quotes the same line of poetry that Hamilton quoted in his *Discussions* (see the passage quoted in the previous section).[20] While it could of course be coincidence, a much more likely explanation

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[20]As a poet, quoted by Mr. Hodgson, says,
"Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi,"
and it is only as entering into the living and moving organization of a much wider tract of time that the strict present is apprehended at all. (*Principles* 609)

is that Hodgson had read Appendix I to Hamilton's *Discussions*, and that this material figured in the production of a doctrine that Hodgson calls the *empirical present*, essentially the same as the SP doctrine but published four years before *The Alternative*. This invites the question of whether Kelly had read Hodgson. We will return to this question in section 9.

7. ROBERT KELLY, A.K.A. 'E.R. CLAY'

Although the coiner of the phrase 'specious present' is widely known as 'E.R. Clay', following James' reference in his *Principles*, the name is fictitious. The author of *The Alternative*,[21] published anonymously, was in fact E. Robert Kelly, father of the famous early twentieth-century American lawyer and socialist Edmond Kelly, who was himself a friend of William James. Kelly was neither a philosopher nor an academic. An Irish immigrant to the U.S. who built a successful cigar company, he retired relatively early and acquired an interest in philosophy apparently as something of a hobby. References to the book in the psychological and philosophical literature are invariably repetitions of the passage quoted by James, along with a repetition of James' own pseudonymous citation. The only published work we have found that correctly identifies Kelly is James Gilbert's (1972) *Designing the Industrial State*, a sociological work that discusses Edmond Kelly at length, and mentions in passing that his father, Robert, wrote and anonymously published *The Alternative*. Documentation of Kelly's authorship is not easy to come by. A small volume consisting of the last chapter of *The Alternative* is in the possession of one of Kelly's descendants. The volume originally belonged to Robert Kelly's daughter Kathleen. A note appended to the volume, written by Kathleen's cousin, Eliza Palache, explains that the volume is from the last chapter of *The Alternative*, written by Kathleen's father under the pseudonym 'E.R. Clay', and that Kathleen had permission from her confessor to use the volume as a "help and companion in her devotional life" (personal correspondence). We will return to the historical aspects of Kelly and his book in the concluding section.

Kelly's motivation for crediting temporal-interval contents to experience is neither the limited resolution of memory as the time-sense (as with Reid and Stewart), nor some minimal requirement on consciousness or self-consciousness (as with Brown and Hamilton). Rather, it is our capacity to perceive motion:

> Divide the time of any extremely brief visible motion into the five equal parts *A B C D E*. The motion cannot be seen during the time *A*, for the parts of it that measure *B C D E* have not yet obtained. It cannot be seen during the time *C*, for that which measures the time *A* has ceased and the parts which measure *D E* have not yet obtained. It follows the whole of the motion is not immediately visible at any instant

The quote is from Nicolas Boileau-Despreaux, "Épîtres III" (1701), in *Épîtres Art Poétique Lutrin,* ed. Charles H. Boudhors (Paris: Société les Belles Lettres, 1952), 18–21. The full line is *Le temps fuit, et nous traine avec soi: Le moment où je parle est déjà loin de moi*. . . . ("Time flies and draws us with it. The moment in which I am speaking is already far from me.") It appears in Hodgson's corpus at *TS* 105. However, this same line is quoted by Hamilton in Appendix I of his *Discussions*, 571, as we pointed out above in section 5. None of the three cites the source of the line. Although Hodgson was himself a poet (and even won an award as a schoolboy for his poetry), and produced translations of Latin poetry into English, the lack of any mention by Hodgson of its source suggests that he merely lifted the quoted line from Hamilton.

[21]Anonymous [E. Robert Kelly], *The Alternative: A Study in Psychology* [*The Alternative*] (London: Macmillan and Co., 1882).

> whatever, and that the immediate object of perception must be unreal, must be a mental modification serving as vicar or symbol of a remote object, viz. the motion, and that the beginning of the immediate object must be either coincident with or posterior to the end of the remote one. Several successive perceptions, each having for object a part of a motion, however rapidly one may follow another, are not a perception of motion. . . . (*The Alternative*, 152)

Like Reid, Kelly recognizes the truth of the following conditional: *if we can perceive motion, then the contents of perception must span a temporal interval.* But where Reid used this conditional with *modus tollens* to deny the claim that we perceive motion, Kelly uses it with *modus ponens* to affirm the claim that the content of our perceptual experience spans a temporal interval:

> When we watch the flight of a bird, a part of the flight seems to be occurring at the present instant, and a part to have occurred prior to the present instant. Experience of this pre-present part exemplifies the species of experience opposed to that which I am putting in relief. . . . The whole object, if the time of the experience do not exceed a few seconds, seems to be contained in a larger present of which the present instant seems to be the term. (*The Alternative*, 151)

A time series that lasts at most a few seconds is such that we experience the entire series as present, in one sense of 'present'. The sense in question is a "larger" present than another, strict sense of 'present' that comprehends only a durationless time-point. This leads us directly to the definition of the *specious present.* Quite simply, there are three parts to *objective* time, which are also the three possible *real* "objects" of experience: the past, a continuous line stretching one way in time; the future, a continuous line stretching the other direction in time; and the strict, objective, present, a point-like "conterminus of the past and future" (ibid., 168). But there are *four* parts to time when it is considered relative to human understanding: the *obvious past*, in which the direct object of experience both is located in the past on the time line, and is given as actually having occurred in the past; *the future*, in which the object is actually in the future and given as being in the future; the *real present*, which is a point-like instant; and fourth and finally the *specious present.*

Like Hodgson, Kelly was familiar with Hamilton's works. In particular, the definition of the specious present, like Hodgson's empirical present, seems to have clear roots in Appendix I of Hamilton's *Discussions.* Kelly was the first to make the apparent perception of motion its central motivation. Interestingly, motion perception would be the central motivation among proponents of the SP doctrine in the early twentieth century, most notably C. D. Broad.

8. LATE HODGSON AND HUSSERL

Up to this point we have discussed those works that directly or indirectly influenced James. We turn now to the influences on Husserl. As is well known, Husserl was very aware of James' work, and had read *Principles* carefully. Husserl was aware of Hamilton's work, both directly and via Mill's *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*. He seems also to have been aware of Brown's work and known of its relevance to these topics.[22] Thus, at a minimum, each of the authors discussed in

[22] Husserl noted the name 'Brown' in the margin of a note dated December 20, 1901 (No. 15 of *PZB*, 173–77), at a point where the issue concerns when the object of a memory is given *as past.*

sections 2 though 7 had an indirect influence on Husserl mediated through James; at least Hamilton, and possibly Brown, also had a direct influence.

The main topic of this section, however, is the almost completely unknown direct influence of Hodgson on Husserl. The discussion will focus on two later works: Hodgson's *Metaphysic of Experience*, and an exchange in 1900 in *Mind*[23] in which Hodgson defended the doctrines of the initial chapters of *ME* from a criticism by George Stout. The question of Hodgson's influence on Husserl is explicitly raised, so far as we have discovered, only in three articles published in the early 1970s. In 1971, Spicker considered a range of historical evidence, and concluded that, while Hodgson and Husserl developed some very similar doctrines, neither was significantly influenced by the other's work.[24] In 1972, Schuhmann conducted a more careful examination of the historical evidence, and argued that Husserl likely had read and was perhaps influenced by Hodgson, though he felt that there is no evidence that Husserl had read very much of Hodgson's work, and that the influence was not terribly profound.[25] Two years after his initial article, Spicker published a follow-up in which he claimed that the influence of Hodgson on Husserl was much stronger than he initially believed.[26] In this article, Spicker focused not on historical documentation, but on similarities of content between Husserl's and Hodgson's doctrines, in particular Hodgson's *process-contents* and Husserl's *Erlebnisstrom.*

After summarizing the historical documentation discussed by Spicker and Schuhmann, we will bring to light additional evidence concerning Husserl's reading of Hodgson's work. Then we shall turn to the topic of similarities of content. Both the historical documentation and the philosophical similarities, while not conclusive, support the claims that Husserl was aware of Hodgson's work regarding the experience of time, was struck that this work was particularly important, and incorporated features of it into his own examination of time consciousness.

Spicker reports on a communication from Iso Kern of the Husserl-Archives in Louvain to the effect that nobody at the Archive "can testify that Husserl studied the work of this English philosopher or referred anywhere to him," and that the archive "possesses the entire personal philosophical library of Husserl . . . [and] in it no single writing of Hodgson is found" ("Hodgson's Reduction," 58). This report from the Husserl-Archive notwithstanding, Spicker cites several mentions Husserl makes of Hodgson's work. The first is from a passage included by Rudolph Boehm, editor of *Husserliana*, Band 10, from Husserl's manuscripts of 1907, in which he wrote: *Mancherlei Verwandtes mit meinen Anschauungen findet sich . . . bei Stout und Hodgson. Jedenfalls geht das nicht so weit, daß ich einfach auf diese Forscher verweisen*

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[23]George Stout, "Perception of change and duration," *Mind* 9 (1900): 1–7; Hodgson, "Perception of Change and Duration—A Reply," *Mind* 9 (1900): 240–43; Stout, "Rebuttal to Hodgson (1900)," *Mind* 9 (1900): 243.

[24]Stuart Spicker, "Shadworth Hodgson's Reduction as an Anticipation of Husserl's Phenomenological Psychology" ["Hodgson's Reduction"], *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 2 (1971): 57–73.

[25]Karl Schuhmann, "Husserl and Hodgson: Some Historical Remarks," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 3 (1972): 63–65.

[26]Stuart Spicker, "The fundamental constituents of consciousness: Process-contents and the *Erlebnisstrom*" ["Fundamental Constituents"], *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 6 (1973): 26–43.

und somit auf dem vorgegebenen Grunde weiterbauen könnte[27] (*Husserliana* 10, xvi–xvii). Second, there is a remark that refers to "(Stout, *Mind* 1900)" (i.e., Stout's initial 1900 article) in the "Textkritischer Anmerkungen" (*Husserliana* 10, n4, 11ms). This suggests that Husserl had, or at least had access to, this volume of *Mind* that included the Stout-Hodgson polemic, despite the fact that it was not in Husserl's library in Louvain. Spicker's conclusion (in 1971) from this is:

> All we can say for certain is that there is no positive evidence that Husserl was more than familiar with this polemic between Stout and Hodgson. . . . It is uncertain . . . whether Husserl read Hodgson's first volume of the *Metaphysic of Experience*; he certainly knew of Hodgson, but perhaps only knew of him. . . . Hodgson's writings seem to have been of no major importance to Husserl's phenomenology. ("Hodgson's Reduction," 59)

Schuhmann brings to light additional interesting facts. First, nine issues of *Mind* were in Husserl's personal library of *scientific* periodicals, which are not part of the archives in Louvain. Schuhmann concludes from this that it is likely Husserl had read the Hodgson-Stout exchange. This particular exchange between Hodgson and Stout is particularly important because it focuses on the idea of *retention* in *ME*, which Stout mis-terms 'memory images' and criticizes, and which Hodgson then clarifies. More on this when we turn to similarities of content.

Furthermore, in chapter 15 of Husserl's copy of James' *Principles*, there are five diagonal strokes (which Schuhmann suggests intimate consent) along footnote 3, the extended quotation from Hodgson's *PR*, including most of pages 248–54 (part of which was quoted above in section 7). Additionally, a bibliographic note Husserl jotted down in a notebook (which Schuhmann dates between 1900 and 1908) is a reference to Hodgson's *ME*. Finally, Schuhmann brings attention to a draft of a letter from Husserl to Walter Pitkin dated around February 12, 1905 (in R I of the Husserl Archives), in which Husserl discusses Anglophone work he takes to be "narrowly related" to his own work: "I think of Hodgson's *Metaphysic of Experience* and Stout's *Analytic Psychology*, work of which, to my regret, I have caught sight only recently" (Schuhmann's translation). Schuhmann notes that the words "only recently" replace the crossed-out words "only some months ago," which would place the sight-catching at around the latter half of 1904. From all this, Schuhmann takes it that a somewhat bolder conclusion can be reached than that of "Hodgson's Reduction." Specifically, Schuhmann thinks it very possible that Husserl had read the Hodgson-Stout exchange, and that there is evidence that Husserl was at least superficially familiar with Hodgson's *ME*, and was aware of its relevance to phenomenological investigation. Even so, Schuhmann draws a cautious conclusion about the extent of the specific influence of Hodgson on Husserl.

While this is a reasonable amount of circumstantial evidence, the cautious conclusions were largely forced by the fact that neither Spicker nor Schuhmann found a smoking gun, something to more clearly indicate that Husserl had actually read and considered the relevant parts of *ME*. However, there is a letter from

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[27]"Many things related to my own point of view are found . . . in Stout and Hodgson. However, the similarities are not so extensive that I could simply refer to these researchers and build further upon previously established grounds."

Husserl to his former student Winthrop Bell, dated January 22, 1922,[28] which was unknown to both Schuhmann and Spicker, and which provides exactly this evidence.[29] In the letter, Husserl acknowledges receipt of a package containing English philosophy books sent by Bell and then asks, *Wirkt nicht noch Hodgson, von dem ich vor 20 Jahren einige frappante Cap<itel> las?* (roughly, "Is Hodgson still active, from whom I read some striking chapters 20 years ago?"). As smoking guns go, this is about as smoking as it gets. The time period, about 20 years before 1922, places the reading of the chapters squarely in the time frame in which Husserl had written the bibliographic note for *ME*, and is consistent with the date of late 1904, when Husserl claims he first caught sight of Hodgson's *ME*. It thus appears that Husserl had not merely become aware of *ME*, but actually read at the least some chapters of it.

It deserves to be pointed out that the wording of the letter to Pitkin (in which Husserl claims that it was "unfortunate" that he only recently caught sight of *ME*), together with the circumstances of the timing, strongly imply that Husserl had read at least some of it very carefully. First, he had to know it at least well enough to lament the fact that he had not caught sight of it earlier. Furthermore, Husserl was actively engaged with the issue of time consciousness in preparation for his lectures on that topic that were to be delivered in the early part of 1905. Given the content of the first three chapters of volume 1 of *ME*, it would be surprising in the extreme, bordering on intellectually irresponsible, if Husserl did not study them carefully as soon as he gained a minimal understanding of their content. (Anyone familiar with Husserl's *PZB* and who reads the first volume of *ME* will see exactly what we mean. We will discuss some of the content of these chapters below, hopefully enough to provide a palpable sense of the overlaps of content.)

To summarize the historical documentation, it is certain that Husserl had read and taken note of those passages from Hodgson's early works that were quoted by James. This was no later than 1894. No later than 1904, but for all anyone knows, as early as 1900, Husserl seems to have read the Hodgson-Stout polemic on retention. Finally, it is certain that Husserl read at least *einige* chapters of *ME* (he said so himself), and most likely in late 1904.

We turn now to overlap of content between Hodgson's doctrines and Husserl's. There are three striking overlaps we will discuss (there are others we shall not discuss): the phenomenological reduction as a methodological technique for focusing on the contents of consciousness; the idea, and terminology, of *retention*; and the idea of the double intentionality of the temporal flow.

We will begin with one of the best-known aspects of Husserl's program, the so-called "phenomenological reduction," in which one "brackets" everything other than what is given immediately to consciousness, such that bracketed considerations are not taken to be explanatorily prior to considerations arising from the

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[28]Edmund Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 3, ed. Karl Schuhmann (The Hague: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994), 33–34.

[29]The letter was not published until two decades after Spicker's and Schuhmann's articles. As an interesting coincidence, Schuhmann was the editor of the 10 volumes of Husserl, *Briefwechsel*, volume 3 of which contains this letter to Bell.

investigation of consciousness *per se*.[30] The first explicit and detailed statement of the phenomenological reduction occurs in section 2 of *PZB*:

> We are concerned with reality only insofar as it is reality meant, objectivated, intuited, or conceptually thought. With respect to the problem of time, this means that we are interested in *experiences* of time. That these experiences are themselves fixed in objective time, *that they belong in the world of physical things and psychic subjects,* and that they have their place, their *efficacy,* their empirical being, and their origin in this world does not concern us and we know nothing about it. (*PZB* 9–10)

Now, as Husserl scholars well know, there are precursors to the full blown phenomenological reduction to be found in Husserl's work as early as the mid-1890s. There is also some flirting with an immature version of the technique in *The Philosophy of Arithmetic* and the *Logical Investigations*, as well as notes from 1900–01 that would be incorporated into *PZB*. Brough describes these early phases of the development as follows:

> Psychological questions are overtly suppressed in these texts, with the emphasis placed on describing the acts and act-components through which the intentional objects are intended. There is no extended discussion of the method Husserl will employ in his analysis.[31]

The first extended and specific discussion, Brough notes, "occurs in 1904 . . . and 1905, particularly in notes written for the lectures of 1905. The reduction announces itself in these texts in a form that is direct and forceful. . . ."[32]

Consider now the following passages from Hodgson's *ME*, in which he describes his method:

> [T]he primary distinction of method, adopted by the metaphysical treatment of experience . . . is the distinction between consciousness apprehended simply as a process-content, on the one hand, and any other realities. . . . (*ME* 31)

'Process-content' is the term of art he uses to indicate the sort of experience he begins with in his investigation. Hodgson explicates his method of analysis using the specific example of being in his sitting room with the "ordinary surroundings of sight and sound":

> How then does my analysis proceed? . . . It consists in dismissing from present consideration . . . all those parts . . . contained in the actually present experience, in which

[30]We note that Charles Sanders Peirce also developed a theory that he called, among other names, 'phenomenology', which was worked out over the course of several decades, from the 1880s through 1905. This theory is not addressed here for several reasons: Peirce seems to have had no familiarity with Husserl, nor Husserl with him; the same holds for Hodgson. Even with his close relationship with James, Peirce's influence on these other authors seems to be minimal or nonexistent, mediated only through what James wrote of him during the time periods in question. Furthermore, the versions of phenomenology developed by Peirce and Husserl were quite distinct. For more details on this, see Herbert Spiegelberg, "Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies: Coincidence or Interaction," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 17 (1956): 164–85.

[31]John Brough, "Husserl's Phenomenology of Time Consciousness," in *Husserl's Phenomenology: A Textbook*, ed. J. N. Mohanty and William R. McKenna (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), xxi.

[32]For more on the evolution of Husserl's phenomenological reduction before and after late 1904, see Husserl, *Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein (1917/18), Husserliana* 33, ed. R. Bernet and D. Lohmar (Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), esp. xviii–xxxiii.

> ideas of genesis, history, and real conditioning, or more briefly of causality, are plainly so involved, that *what* those parts . . . are, is not perceivable without them. Everything else I retain for the present analysis; that is, I retain the whole *minus* (1) the idea that what I am experiencing is a part of the world of persons, things, actions, and events, and *minus* (2) the idea that *I* as a real person am experiencing it or them. . . .
>
> I dismiss, then . . . all ideas of the real origin of the colours, sounds, odours, tactual and other bodily sensations, pleasures and pains, immediately perceived; all ideas of the real objects suggested by memory or imagination, or which are objects of emotional feelings, desires, thoughts, or volitions; and also of myself as a real person. At the same time I retain the colours, sounds, odours, tactual, or other bodily sensations, memories . . . but I retain them only in the character of contents of experience. (*ME* 38–40)

Anyone familiar with Husserl's phenomenological reduction should find this passage, to use Husserl's expression, *striking*. Indeed, there is much more in Hodgson's version of the reduction and its relation to Husserl's that is striking. For the purposes of this section, we shall merely summarize that not only are there *significant* overlaps between Hodgson's and Husserl's versions of the reduction, but there is a temporal coincidence to the effect that Husserl's first sustained development of the reduction as a methodological technique arose within the same interval of a few months, late 1904, during which we have argued that he read the relevant chapters of Hodgson's *ME*. In "Fundamental Constituents," Spicker discusses much of this commonality as part of his argument concerning what Husserl's phenomenological method owed to Hodgson. Spicker's analyses are detailed and rich, and go into more adequate detail than do our remarks, and so we shall merely point the interested reader in the direction of Spicker's article and move on to the concept of *retention*.

As with the phenomenological reduction, Husserl grappled with and developed over many years the idea that he would eventually call 'retention'. We will not here remark on the development of Husserl's thinking about retention. Any discussion of this with an eye to comparison with other source texts, including Hodgson, would be a huge undertaking, and one saturated with uncertainty given the state of uncertainty about what exactly Husserl had read and when. Furthermore, we will not discuss the timing of when Husserl himself began using the expression 'retention'. Rather, we will limit our discussion to two points.

First, as we remarked in section 5, the word 'retention' itself was first introduced by Hamilton, but with a very different meaning, namely, the bare storage of information, like an image filed away. For Hamilton this was a precondition for recollection, the active reconstruction or re-presentation of a past experience. These exact expressions, with very similar senses, are reiterated by James at length in chapter 16 of the *Principles*, the chapter devoted to memory (and while James mentions Hamilton in this chapter, he does not credit him with defining 'retention'). Moreover, chapter 16 of the *Principles* uses the expression 'primary memory' to mean something very close to what Husserl would eventually call 'primary memory'—we say 'very close' because it is not nearly as well developed as the notions eventually worked out by Hodgson and Husserl. The first author to use the expression 'retention' in the way Husserl would eventually use it was Hodgson, in precisely those texts that Husserl read between 1900 and late 1904

(both the Hodgson-Stout polemic and *ME*). Had he not been following Hodgson, Husserl's eventual adoption of the expression 'retention' would be remarkable, for two reasons. First, scientific and philosophical texts with which Husserl was very familiar, notably Hamilton and James, already had established a contrary meaning for the expression 'retention'. Indeed, this is probably the main reason that the Hodgson-Stout polemic took the form it did, since Stout, in his criticisms of Hodgson's use of 'retention', interpreted Hodgson to be using the expression in this other sense, and hence Stout's criticisms hinged on a misreading of Hodgson.[33] Hodgson's use of 'retention' for this phenomenon was atypical. Second, Husserl already had two expressions that seemed to fit his meaning, namely, *primary memory* and *fresh memory*. Except for Hodgson's use of 'retention' for the phenomenon, there would not be any good reason for Husserl to adopt that expression, but instead fairly good reason not to.

Next, we remark on the manner in which Hodgson, in *ME*, and Husserl, in *PZB* and the precursor notes, introduce the notion of retention. In *ME*, Hodgson begins his analysis of time consciousness proper, after various preliminaries, in book 1, chapter 2, section 2; Husserl's analysis proper begins in section 8 of *PZB*. In both cases, the preliminaries chiefly involve bringing to bear the phenomenological reduction in order to delineate the object of study. Having dispensed with preliminaries, Hodgson and Husserl both begin their analyses with the example of consciousness of a single enduring tone.[34] Hodgson's section 2, where the analysis begins, is titled "Analysis of the Content of a Single Sound," and consists of bringing in as an example the sound of "the note *C* [struck] on a pianoforte behind me" (*ME* 46). Most of this section is dedicated to pointing out what is not to be taken as the object—associations, causal knowledge about the source of the sound, and so forth (Hodgson's "phenomenological reduction"). Section 3, titled "Analysis of the Process of Hearing it.—How Memory is Involved," then continues with the following passage:

> Another thing . . . involved in the experience as an empirical process is Retention, or Memory in its lowest terms, the word *memory* having thus a somewhat different signification from its ordinary one, in which it designates recall or re-appearance of something which has been forgotten. . . . Now retention, or memory in its lowest terms . . . is actually involved in the perceived element of duration. . . . (*ME* 59)

[33]In one of the few historical treatments of Husserl's thought to even *mention* either Stout or Hodgson, *Phenomenology of Time*, Kortooms (who discusses Stout but not Hodgson) mentions Stout's "Perception of change and duration," but his discussion describes it as a critique of *Meinong's* view! Stout criticizes Hodgson by assimilating his view, quite incorrectly, to Meinong's, and then attacking the latter. Presumably it is because he was convinced by Stout that Hodgson's position was essentially Meinong's that Kortooms did not even mention Hodgson. In this regard, Kortooms is not alone. Hodgson's name is conspicuously absent from even the most detailed investigations of Husserl's influences, with the exception of the Spicker-Schuhmann exchange.

[34]The example of the sound of a single tone brings to mind Brown's example of a consciousness contemplating the sound of a flute. The example of a single enduring tone is probably from Herbart, whose work was familiar to both Hodgson and Husserl. Although the example of a melody was ubiquitous in discussions of time consciousness, the example of a single enduring tone is rare. Brown came close to it with the sound of a flute, but it was not provided as an example of *time* consciousness. Stumpf used it several times in his *Tonpsychologie*, a work with which Husserl was quite familiar, but primarily as an example of how various factors, such as the depth or height of a tone, could affect its perceived duration. To our knowledge, the first explicit sustained instances of a single unchanging enduring tone being used as an example of time consciousness *per se* are from Hodgson and (later) Husserl.

> [T]he least possible empirical present moment is one in which perception and memory (in the sense of simple retention) are indistinguishable from each other. . . . (*ME* 60)

> [R]etention of a past in a present moment, has now been shown to take its place among the ultimate facts of experience, being involved in the simplest cases of perception, for which, in fact, it is but another name. (*ME* 71)

Anyone familiar with Husserl's analysis of time consciousness (recall the brief gloss in section 1 of this paper) should find this remarkable, because singling out exactly this restricted sense of memory, calling it *retention*, and even specifically classifying retention as *perceptual*, are among the best known and most distinctive aspects of Husserl's analysis (though it was not until a few years later that Husserl began consistently using the expression 'retention').

We turn now to how Husserl introduces the phenomenon. Husserl ends section 7 of *PZB* with the example of a single tone:

> When it begins to sound, I hear it as now; but while it continues to sound, it has an ever new now, and the now that immediately precedes it changes into a past. Therefore at any given time I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, in smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation. (*PZB* 24)

Husserl goes on immediately in section 8 to describe the experienced temporality of the tone, once it has ceased, as receding in "retention." In summary, in the notes written in 1904–05, Husserl employed exactly the same notion as Hodgson's *retention*, and even introduced it with the same example, the experience of a single tone enduring through a temporal interval. And within a few years he would drop his previous expressions entirely and begin consistently using the expression 'retention' for this phenomenon. Of course, Husserl was playing with doctrines very much like what would eventually become the fully worked out notion of retention before 1904 as early as the mid-1890s. Indeed, the SP doctrine that he read in James pretty directly implicates something akin to retention, as that aspect of the specious present that is given as part of present experience but is really an aspect of the past. This means at best Husserl's reading of *ME* and the Hodgson-Stout exchange would have helped him to develop ideas he was already playing with. But note that, as we have argued, the path through James' SP doctrine is also one that leads back to Hodgson.

One more example should suffice to establish the improbability of the conceptual overlaps between Hodgson and Husserl being mere coincidence. This example revolves around a doctrine more subtle than the phenomenological reduction or the notion of retention. Section 39 of *PZB*, titled "The Double Intentionality of Retention and the Constitution of the Flow of Consciousness," contains the following description of "double-intentionality" in retention:

> If a self-contained flow (one that belongs to an enduring process or object) has elapsed, I can nevertheless look back on it; it forms, so it seems, a unity in memory. Hence the flow of consciousness obviously becomes constituted in consciousness as a unity too. The unity of a tone-duration, for example, becomes constituted in the flow, but the flow itself becomes constituted in turn as the unity of the consciousness of the tone-duration. . . . Our regard can be directed, in the one case, *through* the

> phases that "coincide" in the continuous progression of the flow and that function as intentionalities of the tone. But our regard can also be aimed at the flow, at a section of the flow, at the passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to its end. (*PZB* 84–85)

This is one of several places where Husserl brings attention to the obscure yet fascinating phenomenon of double intentionality, in which a structure that is itself primarily an intentional structure—in this case a temporal-flow structure—itself becomes an intentional object—for example, by aiming one's regard at this flow. This idea appears to have developed from a more basic process of coincidence between a current flow and a reconstructed prior flow, the double intentionality of recollection, or secondary memory:

> Now the question is whether this evidence pertaining to time-consciousness can be preserved in reproduction. This is possible only through a coinciding of the reproductive flow with a retentional flow. If I have a succession of two tones *c*, *d*, then, while fresh memory lasts, I can repeat this succession, even repeat it adequately in certain respects. I repeat *c*, *d*, internally, with the consciousness that *c* occurred first and then *d*. And while this repeated succession is "still living," I can proceed in the same way again, and so on. Surely, in this way I can go beyond the original field of evidence. We also see here the way in which recollections are fulfilled. If I repeat *c*, *d*, this reproductive representation of the succession finds its fulfillment in the still living earlier succession. (*PZB* 52, §22)

Husserl's first explicit formulation of the double intentionality doctrine is from a note that Bernet dates to around early 1905, where the topic is the double intentionality of recollection (or secondary memory). It is later that Husserl works out a doctrine of the double intentionality of retention.

One finds a compellingly similar notion in Hodgson's *ME*. In a passage from book 1, chapter 2, section 5, Hodgson discusses a scenario in which a temporal sequence more sophisticated than a single note—indeed, exactly the note sequence *C* followed by *D*—is used to illustrate a deeper sense in which prior process-contents themselves become the objects of apprehension:

> The retrospective . . . moment of experience has thus for its content the perception of a process-content differing from itself in . . . place in time-sequence. . . . There is, in fact, a repetition of the process-content in the objective perception of it. . . . The process-content of one moment of consciousness is in this way the object or objective aspect of the next moment. . . . All consciousness, all experience, has in itself this double-aspect. . . . (*ME* 74–75)

Hodgson does not take this phenomenon in exactly the same directions that Husserl eventually would;[35] on the other hand, he takes it in some interesting

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[35]An anonymous referee points out that, arguably, one of the uses to which Husserl puts the phenomenon of double intentionality is to show how the stream of consciousness can be given to itself in a non-objectifying way, that is, without taking itself as an intentional object. This is indeed one of Husserl's eventual aims, but the phenomenon itself seems unquestionably to be one in which, at least in the first instance, two layers of intentionality are involved. The name 'double intentionality' itself suggests this, and the passages we quoted above cannot be interpreted any other way without doing major violence to the plain meaning of the text. That Husserl put the idea to use for different aims than did Hodgson is consistent with our claim that the two authors were pointing out essentially the same phenomenon.

directions Husserl does not (see especially *ME*, vol.1, ch. 3, §3). Nevertheless, the commonalities are striking.[36]

Our goal in this section has been to substantially strengthen the case that Husserl's analyses, especially with respect to time consciousness, were significantly influenced by his reading of Hodgson, especially, but not exclusively, his reading of at least the first two or three chapters of volume 1 of *ME* in late 1904. The evidence is persuasive, but of course not conclusive. Without any explicit remarks by Husserl as to the role played by Hodgson in the development of his ideas, then for anything short of *verbatim* repetition of large passages (which would be unlikely given the fact that they wrote in different languages), almost any degree of similarity of content could potentially be coincidence. In that case, the reason Husserl found the chapters noteworthy would be the extent to which he found in them ideas very similar to ones he had already independently worked out himself, perhaps mere weeks or days earlier.

Though no conclusive case can be made, in our opinion it seems likely that Husserl had begun reading *ME* in late 1904, perhaps because he had recently dug out his issues of *Mind* to find the Hodgson-Stout polemic as part of his preparations for the lectures he was preparing on time consciousness. The polemic in *Mind* then led to his reading of *ME*, which in turn played a very substantial role in the development of Husserl's ideas. If this is the case, one might wonder, why then does Husserl not acknowledge Hodgson? Keep in mind that *PZB* was not written initially as a text for publication, but as lecture notes and notes for Husserl's own use. In this context one is simply not concerned with the issue of proper citation as much as in published work. Indeed, the notes on which *PZB* is based contain large passages that are lifted verbatim from other works without any explicit indication that the words are not Husserl's own. For example, section 7 mentions Stern, and soon thereafter appear large passages that look as though they are Husserl's own words but are in fact lifted *verbatim* from Stern's article. Edith Stein, in her editorial work on *PZB*, would have had no way of knowing that such passages were

[36]One final point regarding this example. Section 22 of *PZB,* introducing the concept of double intentionality, was based upon a note written *vermutlich vor 1901* (see note by Boehm, *PZB* 49), which is before we are claiming he had read *ME*. This would seem to present a challenge to our interpretation. However, a closer look corroborates our interpretation. The note that was written pre-1901, upon which section 22 of *PZB* was based (note 2, *PZB* 151–54), is *nearly* identical to that section; however, it lacks the final paragraph. This last paragraph appears to have been added only later. The pre-1901 note begins with the example of a sequence *A* preceded by *B—Einen* zeitlichen *Verlauf wahrnehmen, das heißt ein gegenwärtiges Dasein* A *zusammen mit einem eben vergangenen und gegenstandlich damit zusammenhangenden* B . . . ("To perceive a *temporal* flow is to perceive a presently existing *A* together with a just-past *B* . . . "), and ends with the example of the *note* sequence *C* then *D*. In the Stout-Hodgson polemic, from the 1900 *Mind* issue that Husserl possessed and read, Stout's criticism of Hodgson begins with the example of *A* then *B* ("that in order to be aware of *B* as succeeding *A*, we must have . . . "), and Hodgson's reply uses the example from *ME* of the *note* sequence *C* then *D*. The polemic, however, never got into finer points regarding retention, including the "double aspect" issue we quoted above. This means that when Husserl initially wrote the note, having read the issue of *Mind* in 1900 or 1901, he could have picked up the specific examples used in the Stout-Hodgson polemic, as well as the phenomenon of retention, which was the explicit topic of the polemic, but not the double-aspect discussion. At some later point (there is no indication of when this later time is, but presumably after late 1904, that is, after Husserl had read *ME*) when this note was worked up into section 22, the paragraph we quoted above concerning double intentionality was added. This is at least a possible sequence of events.

Husserl's paraphrased or directly quoted notes on another text and not Husserl's own thoughts. Decades after he wrote the notes, Husserl's own memory concerning what was paraphrase of something he had been reading and what was original would surely have deteriorated. In any case, this is one possibility. But this is pure speculation, and the historical record is too sparse to do much else.

9. CONCLUDING REMARKS

We will close with a few historical remarks on the reception of Kelly's and Hodgson's work. First to Kelly. There are two reasons Kelly's work is not better known today. First, just finding the title and locating a copy of *The Alternative* was difficult, and discovering the book's true author was nearly impossible. Investigations aimed at discovering more about the historical figure "E.R. Clay" of course go nowhere, and without any inkling of the fact that it is a pseudonym, for an anonymously published book, research grinds to a halt. As such, it is not surprising that the only option available to scholars has been a repetition of the quote from James' *Principles*, along with a repetition of James' pseudonymous reference. It is not known why Kelly chose to publish his book anonymously. Perhaps as an intellectual outsider he felt that his book would receive more attention if authorship were unknown. Anonymous publication would have averted attention from himself in a way entirely consistent with the self-abnegation he advocated in the final chapters of his book.

This factor may not have been the only one at work. The history of philosophy boasts many well-known books that were initially published anonymously or under pseudonyms. A further factor may have been the cold reception of *The Alternative*. Kelly must have been at least mildly disappointed at Sidgwick's lukewarm endorsement to the publisher, part of which we quote shortly. Further, Burns-Gibson's review, published in *Mind* in 1883, which was largely, but not entirely, critical, could not have buoyed his morale. With this unfriendly reception, not only was Kelly given no motive to self-promote the book under his own name or produce any more work, but the philosophical and psychological readership was given no motivation to study *The Alternative* or inquire into the identity of its author.

But there is an irony connected with the initial criticisms of Kelly's book. Sidgwick complains that he "cannot but wish that the Author had somewhat restrained his impulse to innovate in technical terminology" (*The Alternative*, preface). Burns-Gibson comments on the lack of newness to what Kelly (referred to in the review as the "anonymous author of this book") takes to be new innovations in philosophy, and damns him with this: "His manner, however, is only the natural foible of an enthusiastic student, who, so far as one can judge by this book, has not read very widely in philosophy and psychology . . . [he] loves to think things out for himself, and *to coin words to fit his own thinking*."[37] The irony is that it is arguable that the only reason that *The Alternative* currently is known at all is due to Kelly's catchy neologism 'specious present'. As we pointed out, Hodgson had already independently developed an essentially identical doctrine. The main dif-

[37] J. Burns-Gibson, "Review: *The Alternative: a Study in Psychology*," *Mind* 8 (1883): 109–16; emphasis added.

ference between the relevant passages from Hodgson's and Kelly's books was that Kelly had, and Hodgson lacked, a snappy name for the doctrine. It is very likely that the reason James used the quote from Kelly to introduce the doctrine in the main text, while sticking the quote from Hodgson in a footnote, was that he wanted to use the neologism 'specious present'. Of course, our pointing out that the neologism is probably in fact the only reason Kelly's book has not completely vanished from contemporary awareness should not be taken as a claim that this is all the book has going for it. Quite the contrary, we hope to have provided some reason to think that renewed study of Kelly's book will be useful for the historian of nineteenth-century Anglophone philosophy, or the historian of theories of time consciousness.

As a final remark on Kelly's work we turn to the question of whether he had read Hodgson, and wittingly or otherwise lifted the idea from him. We doubt this is the case. Kelly appears to be extremely willing to credit ideas and cite their sources throughout *The Alternative*. There are no indications that he had read either *TS* or *PR*. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that one who saw to it that his book was published anonymously, and took pains to hide his identity as author, was in any way motivated to purposefully take credit for someone else's ideas. In our judgment, Kelly and Hodgson developed the main idea independently, though both were heavily influenced by similar source material, particularly Hamilton.

Now to Hodgson. At the beginning of this paper, we pointed out that the decades bracketing the turn of the nineteenth century saw two colossal developments in the psychology and philosophy of time consciousness, developments associated largely with James and Husserl. In our opinion, Hodgson really is the unsung hero of both of these colossal developments. In his early work he developed the SP doctrine independently of, and before, Kelly; and in his later work he anticipated a good number of substantive doctrines that are now credited exclusively to Husserl. Even *if* Husserl developed these methods and ideas independently (which we have argued is unlikely), the fact remains that Hodgson developed many of them first. That one philosopher produced such a wealth of deep and original work is impressive. That he is currently all but completely forgotten is scandalous.[38]

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